Ukraine: from network US intervention to Euromaidan. Part IV
During the 90th US were looking into one of the young post-Soviet republics and formed here the influence of a group of politicians, bureaucrats and opinion leaders. US while dealing with Yeltsin's Russia, which was ready in most matters to follow in the footsteps of American politics, paid Russia a formal recognition of Moscow's domination in the post-Soviet space as a zone of Russian vital interests and tried at least formally not to focus its intervention in the internal affairs of post-Soviet countries.
At the beginning of 2000s, Russian foreign policy became more independent. Of course, many pro-Washington politicians remained in power, but the influence of the pro-American lobby in Russian politics was no longer decisive, and the dynamics of change and motion vector did not cause doubts: the new Russian government has committed itself to the restoration of foreign policy and domestic political independence. Putin has agreed to remain a friend and ally of the United States, but as an equal, not a vassal.
It is in this time they chose to make use of the anti-Russian agents in post-Soviet states. It is important that almost all the failed "color revolutions" in the CIS accounted for the period 2003-2008 (from the "Rose Revolution" in Georgia, to "War 08.08.08"). The aim of these coups was not simply cutting off Russia from the former Soviet Union, but in the creation of buffer hostile states for the entire length of its western and southern borders (up to the border with China and Mongolia). As a result, the possibility of an active foreign and economic policy of the Russian Federation were to be blocked, resources tied with a belt of hostility consisting of the former Soviet republics. The credibility of the Russian authorities within the country and abroad would were to be undermined with constant provocations (modeled by those undertaken by Saakashvili). At the same time Moscow would be limited to the ability to give an answer, because any wrong move would provoke an open war with the block of former Soviet republics (Yushchenko tried to draw Ukraine into the Russian-Georgian conflict and such situations as Georgia-Ukraine was to be multiplied to 10-11). Thus, Russia would be opposed to the block of the front from the Baltic to the Baikal, and the United States could, interpreted this war as a confrontation between the former republics against Russian neo-colonialism, bringing Russia under the UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples of 14 December 1960 (by the way adopted by the General Assembly on the initiative of the Soviet Union) and all subsequent resolutions of the UN General Assembly on this topic.
Russia missed a coup in 2003 Georgia and 2004 in Ukraine. Further spread of "color contagion" Moscow was able to fully block (further than Bishkek they have not moved, but even in the Kyrgyz "revolution" ended with the same "color" counter-revolution). In 2008, during the five-day August war, Russia has moved into a geopolitical offensive.
From that moment all the forces of the United States are no longer cast on the marginalizing of Moscow in order not to give it to become a geopolitical rival Washington, but on the destruction of their geopolitical rival. There was a pacification (relative and unstable) by Russian forces in Central Asia, as well as the blocking of American interests in the Caucasus, which to a certain, even to a great extent contributed to two things: taking on Ramzan Kadyrov's key role in the stabilization of the North Caucasus and discrediting of the pro-American regime of Saakashvili Georgia due to its defeat in the war (policy, which replaced Saakashvili, is not Russian-friendly, but more adequate, which made it possible to stabilize relations). After all of this, by 2010, Ukraine has been made a key for US among the post-Soviet countries.
Thus, the external interest superimposed in a favorable watered-economic balance of power in post-Soviet Ukraine. In Kiev remained the national-oligarchic consensus suggesting that from Russia Ukraine will receive the maximum possible economic preferences, but its policy will be oriented to the West. This was the so-called code multidirectional, proclaimed as the basis of foreign policy under President Yanukovych. Full cultural, educational, humanitarian and general orientation to the United States and Europe with an attempt to use economic resource of "brotherly people". The United States in connection with this did not oppose to the election of Yanukovich as President in 2010. The support Ukrainian multidirectional was also by pushed the general weakening of the US geopolitical position, and the growing problems of the American economy. Money for the maintenance of the US allies was absent. Now powerless vassals had to pay US policy from their own pocket.
Meanwhile, Yanukovych has not only been under the control of American agents (group of Lyovochkin - Firtash), and sincerely going to "integrate into the EU" by signing the Association Agreement. Apparently, Victor Fedorovich decided to prove to all those who overthrew him after winning the 2004 election, that only he can "unite Ukraine", reconciling East and West. In fact, this meant the rejection of election slogans and promises and the beginning of the pro-Western policy. All of this "tricky" policy of Yanukovich resulted in Euromaidan during the all-consuming corruption and pressure of oligarchic groups of different regions in Ukraine. To consideration of the prerequisites, course and outcome of Euromaidan we will devote our next article.