How Britain Provoked Two World Wars and Tries to Make It for The Third Time


C'est l'Anglais qui nous a fait ça!

- or How Britain Provoked Two World Wars and Tries to Make It for The Third Time

An indisputable fact is that what has led to both World Wars – that was British politics, or, if you prefer, whatever acted through it. However, there is an interesting difference between the activities of London in 1914 and 1917, and in 1939 – and also there exists a lot of similarities with present London (and Washington) proceedings.

Just before and during the Great War, the United Kingdom's priority was to counteract the possibility of repeating the Treaty in Björkö[i] (and giving it real shape to this fundamental geopolitical construction), but twenty years later, towards the upcomingWorld War II - the British war party seemed to be sure that is possible and absolutely necessary to finally solvethe problem of both continental rivals of Britain - ie. Germany and the Soviet Union. If we want to clearly understand present global situation, and even recent events connected with British-Russian crisis – we should analyse all aspects of these processes 

Different strategies - one goal

While the Britain did everything to prevent the German-Russian agreement during the First World War and even went so far as to overthrow the Tsarist regime in the name of continuing the conflict lost by Russia - in July and August 1939 the British diplomacy sabotaged the chances of concluding a trilateral British -French -Soviet treaty. Thus, the action was seemingly opposite - but the aim, however, was one, in both cases indeed achievable by a similar method, i.e. the ruthless pursuit of War, which was to break out in the place and time chosen by London.

Only Hitler's speed and the cunning of Stalin we owe that the plan (of which a fervent advocate was, among others, Winston Churchill) has fallen and there was no armed clash between the Ocean and the Continent on that moment in blocks as geopolitically natural as well as simultaneously forced by British policy. However, as it happened in history - the War which anyway has broken out about the imperial interests of the Ocean - brought victims primarily to the nations that were drawn into it, not only European ones.

In particular, World War I had the characteristics of the British Imperial War about the interests of Great Britain as a global power (and not only was a battle for a civilizational change in the World in the interests of forces for which all empires have only a utilitarian meaning) - because its purpose was to annihilate or at least significantly weaken the forces that prevented London to gain almost total global hegemony, i.e. Germany and Russia. Interestingly, this calculation ultimately excluded the victorious United States not only because of their complementarity with Britain (which Bismarck already pointed out – what is written farther), but also because of the specific features of the Ocean Empire, where the ruling group never cares about a parasite carrier, interesting only in the continuity of interests.

The choice of tactics was decided by a simple calculation of strength - if before 1914 the Brits were aware of the impossibility of simultaneously defeating Germany and Russia, and the threat of their cooperation (or even pacification of mutual relations) were considered deadly danger, on the eve of the Second World War – London clearly underestimated the potential of the Stalinist Soviets.

The Power of Provocation

We have to repeat to the boredom: The Great War broke out only because the German side was convinced that Britain would not act in connection with Vienna's ultimatum towards Serbia and further escalation of the conflict - and the Asquith-Gray-Churchill government, despite President Raymond Poincaré'ssupplications for a clear declaration to save peace - did everything to ensure Berlin in this attitude. In the case of the Second World War, it was necessary to use a different tactic - namely, convincing Berlin of London's irreversible pursuit of encircling Germany and imposing a War on them in a disadvantageous geopolitical system. For this purpose, providing guarantees - Poland was put on the target by forcing Hitler to accelerate plans and make aggression to eliminate the weakest link in the forming alliance.

Russia's current historical policy puts the Second Republic of Poland in charge of consistently sabotaging attempts to stop Hitler by cooperating with the superpowers and states concerned. This accusation is, unfortunately, justified. It should be emphasized that especially in July and August 1939, practically unsovereign at that time (because depended on British "guarantees") - Poland only carried out its task designated by London, reporting its expected Veto to the Soviet proposal for a tripartite guarantee pact for Central and Eastern Europe.

The Brits, using Poles as well as obedient to them completelyFrench, did everything to fail the mission of Admiral Reginald Drax [ii] and to sabotage his talks with Marshal Kliment Voroshilov,so as to prevent saving peace nor creation of an effective anti-Hitler coalition in the summer of 1939. And what is important - if the Guarantee Pact was concluded, it would be almost certain that the Third Reich would withdraw from plans of aggression against Poland and attempt of dominating Romania, and the only contentious issue between the powers would remain colonial claims and German revindications against France and Great Britain, not covered by guarantees. War, if even broke out - it would only be fought in the West, as a clash of imperialisms, stripped of decoration!

Such a scenario was obviously unacceptable to the true leaders of British policy, consistently striving to resume the global conflict in order to achieve the goals that after 1918 proved to be short-lived, i.e. achieving simultaneous defeat of Germany and the Russian geopolitical space. Thus, we had to deal with the continuation of the British policy, which was already conducted at least from the Izvolski-NicholsonPact[iii], i.e. from 1907, which led straight to the Guns of August seven years later.

(Non) Glorious Revolution

Breaking the chronology, let us remind you the obvious - the German-Russian War in 1914 was deadly for the three Central European Empires, what relatively early was realized in all interested capitals. However, in each of them there have been forces that prevented the pacification of relations, despite the propositions, especially from the Central Powers at an early stage proposing restoring the status quo.

The stubbornness of London in sabotaging attempts to make peace (not only peace in the East, what seems to be understandable, but also the end of the War without achieving strategic goals, i.e. the fall of Germany and Russia and the breakup of Austria-Hungary and Turkey) is especially visible in the Russian question. It is not a coincidence that the War Party in Petrograd consisted ofFreemasons (Scottish Rite), frequent guests of the British Embassy, supporters of the English-based parliamentary Monarchy - and simply intelligent agents, led by Samuel Hoare [iv] (also active in the work of bringing the World to Warin era of the Munich Conference).

While the German participation in the outbreak of the Bolshevik Revolution is already recognized and described to boredom - the British activity in the fall of Tsarism and the continuation of War (against the elementary Russian state instinct, only to achieve the objectives set in London and to get some time before the United States joined the War) is often neglected and ignored. The murder of Rasputin and the February Revolution were the events that sealed the fate of Russia (and, hence, the whole World) for the next Century, and what is interesting - at the same time laid the foundations for the future German-Bolshevik, German-Russian and German-Soviet cooperation.

Unsupportive Logic of Geopolitics

The Brits relatively quickly gained experience in fighting the Germans and Russians at the same time, what was evidenced by the events of October 1919 when the Royal Navy attacked on the German-Russian West Volunteer Army General Pavel Bermondt-Avalov operating in Latvia, although this action prevented providing enough help to the anti-Bolshevik General Nicolai Yudenich offensive to Petrograd. In fact, the Entente intervention in the Russian Civil War used only to maintain a weaknessof Russia and exploitation of its reserves, of course not to restore the pre-Revolutionary status quo,which was and always could be a potential deadly threat to the British Empire. Especially if post-War or post-Revolutionary Russia were to find itself again as a continental power, interested in expansion in Asia.

Contrary to the expectations of Western leaders - geopolitics is irresistible logical, that is why after the period of chaos and ideological experiments - also the Soviets decline the line of the "World Revolution" more and more leaned towards the state-imperial policy. First the West watched it passively, only occasionally using some threats of War and intervention just to establish (in the case of the UK even twice) and to strengthen diplomatic and, above all, economic relations. Thus, it can be assumed that very seriously preparing for the attack on the USSR in 1939, the allies wanted to make up for their withdrawals from 1923 and 1927, when Moscow was threatened with new war and intervention. What is interesting for author as Polish - Brits for this purpose, among others, used also a unconsciousPolish tool – and they  reached for it again in late 1939/1940 -  realizing that Operation PIKE[v], as well as the landing of Polish Podhale Rifles in Finland were actually quite possible - the Stalin’s administration decided nervously about the liquidation of the threat factor -Polish officers in Soviet hands, declaring the impossibility of cooperation with Moscow with whom, in addition, it was not known what to do.

Katyn as a Result of British Policy and Stalin’s Mistake

Let’s stop for a moment in our considerations – because of the importance of Katyn [vi] question in Polish-Russian relationship – and in relation with Polish significant position in any anti-Russian action.

There will never be any conscious foreign policy - if we do not learn that the action triggers a reaction. We must finally remember that there is no history of events - there is only a history of historical processes in the macro scale and sequences of related events in a directly perceptible scale. In Polish-Russian relationship it is extremely difficult to obtain such a balance – almost at any moment[vii]. But against all appearances the Katyn Massacre, recognized almost always as main historical problem, dividing our fraternal nations – could even help to find understanding, that (apart of our own faults) someone else always tried to quarrel us and to create between Poles and Russians shed blood barrier. The murder of Polish officers was completed by the NKVD, but because of the West's failed political and military calculations, in which we all were less than a tool.

Especially in Polish literature and science there is no simple answer for the most basic question: "Why were these officers murdered?".Of course, now it is quite easy to suggest the answer the same, like in present provocations:  "because that were Russian/Commies, and they always act like this". This is straight line of anti-Russian propaganda for decades or even Centuries, of course with total lack of respect for facts – and hidden motives. In case of Katyn the murder was directly provoked by the ideas of the participation of Polish forces in the Allied intervention in Finland, 1940. In this way, Katyn is placed in the context of diplomatic activities of the Polish side (and as it was mentioned - Poles do not usually think that what we do has consequences, sometimes tragic). Regardless, whether the view of the relationship between the use of Podhale Rifles and Stalin's decision is correct - it indicates that Poles dreamed of a war with a state known for bloody repression and having Polish hostages, meanwhile the circumstances of jeopardizing their fate seem to be not considered in the Polish calculations at the time at all[viii].

Even in February of 1940 General Petr Soprunienko, the head of the NKVD board for prisoners of war reported Lavrentiy Berianecessity of  “unloading Polish prisoners camps” in a completely different way than it later happened. Soprunienko suggested that some of the prisoners (sick and elderly, but also all reserve officers coming from the Borderlands, against whom there are no individual “comprmaterials”) should be released to their homes. As potentially politically dangerous there were recognized only officers of the Border Protection Corps, the General Staff, military judiciary, intelligence and some nobles – and NKVD were to investigate them longer, but they did not risk much more, thansentences of about two to six years in the labour camps. It meant life.

However, these decisions have been changed at the last minute – it is sad to say, but as a result of the terrible irresponsibility of the Polish government in exile, adoring the disastrous idea that Poland will eventually be rewarded for war overzealousness. Meanwhile, contrary to Western and mainstream Polish propaganda - Katyn is unprecedented in the history of the USSR with maybe only one exception - planned massacres in Soviet prisons, when in 1941 Germans were marching East. Tragic decision about murdering Polish prisoners could structurally similar. It was taken in anticipation of the threat of war against the Anglo-French coalition, in afraid of what these prisoners would do, when the USSR would have to defend. When the invasion did not finally take place (because the Brits are not only cynical, but also flexible and dodgy) – probably about this coincidence of events Stalin said: "we made a mistake" ...

Why we describe so long these – let’s be honest – details of history? Because it is necessary to become aware of the existence of forces and interests which, both geopolitically and in their own economic and financial point of view, will do everything to prevent natural and stabilizing (at least) two continents European-Russian cooperation. 20,000 Polish officers, the same as millions of others killed during both World Wars does not really matter in this Greatest Game. Regardless of whether the British Empire was the centre of action of these forces, whether it is the United States - we are dealing with a tragic paradox of using smaller nations (even if their location, history and culture should predispose them to the role of pacifier or connector between Europe and Eurasia) or even individuals for breaking any attempt to stabilize the international system. Although about 75 year ago the centre of forces interested in maintaining antagonisms in the Eurasian area has shifted across the Atlantic, the methods - and threats - remained the same. 

Why Germany Could Not Win the Wars...

Of course, this is not an attempt of belittlement of Russian and other war efforts and sacrifices. But this question was answered a few decades before the outbreak of the World conflict by Chancellor Bismarck, pointing out thatthe decisive factor for the coming twentieth century is the fact that on two sides of the Atlantic live English-speaking nations. The combined economic and demographic potentials as well as the geographical location of the British Empire and the United States have settled the result divided into two parts World War even before it began. The only unexpected and unwanted aspect was, that global conflict did not lead in the same time to destruction of much greater threat to the Western domination – the Russian one.

Russian resistance, use of reserves and revealed passionarity surprisedinitiators of the War, forcing them to achieve a limited goal: elimination of the western part of Eurasia from the game.

The rest are details and contributions, although it is necessary to repeat the obvious: that wars (when they last) are not the domain of humanists and ideologues, but engineers, mechanics, logisticians, production managers, builders (roads, tracks, factories, airports, yards ...). That the key are industrial capabilities, production efficiency, technical thought, access to transport routes. Lot of people and whole irresponsible nations hardly understand that – but how was it possible, that the most interested in, rational German had not catch it?

As usual, we can only mention that Berlin has tried almost all the variants of the military resolution of the Great War and World War II - again misinterpreting the recommendations of the Iron Chancellor who avoids the fight against two fronts at all costs. In the WW1 finally, Germans excluded Russia from this conflict, in the WW2 they almost immediately beat France (with the East neutralized) – and get nothing from these successes. All authors of alternative histories trying to find any miracle method of German winning in the land, in the air or on the sea cannot overcome the basic barrier - that having one ton of steel man could make a ton of aircraft, ton of ship, or ton of tank, but not a ton of any of these kinds. And the same you cannot move on one road or discharge in one port an infinite number of soldiers. In a word, war – these are not the arrows on the maps viewed by humanists. The global conflict could not be won by the Prussian Junker, nor the Aryan Übermensch, no Wunderwaffe was able to settle it(of course, apart from the atomic one - for which Germany did not have chance), nor were conceptual prototypes (each symbolizing in essence the fundamental weakness of Germans’ weapon policy and their decision-making process in general). Nazis struggling from the fence to the fence, without determining whether should win this War for the Fuehrer: super-battleships, wolfpacks, unbeaten tanks, jet planes, atomic fission or UFOs. So, the War was won by the American and Soviet industry: the ability to mass-produce, easy-to-use and servicing weapons and equipment, the ability to quickly move factories and build airports and bases from attitudes, with ready-made elements while shortening transport lines. The German officer was beaten by the Soviet worker and the American production organizer. And this is the symbol: hammer and capital defeated the sword.

Of course, history is not fully determined, so it is not only the mathematical comparison of potentials that determines it. After all, if we were always sure what the effects of our actions will be - we would almost do nothing. But the main problem of Germany in both parts of the World War, however, consisted in the fact that their leaders completely did not understand what was going on and this dissonance had certain consequences. Let us recall: the cause of the Great War was the British fear of resurrection of the Treaty of Björkö, and thus the continental cooperation of Russia and Germany. London as a war goal was to quarrel, weaken and dominate these two countries (and Turkey, which the British drew into the war even more primitive than the Reich). Meanwhile, the Germans, being blind to the obvious, were genuinely surprisedby the British participation, and naively hoped to finish conflicts quickly (even though Hitler himself had known who his main enemy was, as evidenced by Hossbach's Report!)

The actual goal of the WW1 was to decompose the transnational traditional monarchies, for the 20-year resulted the interlude period replaced by inefficient national states, these ones, as a result of the WW2 were gradually subjected to the power of regional and then global geopolitical blocks. One of them lost the next one, Cold War – and now we witnesses of the third part of this Greatest Game, when states and regional powers should be destroyed, replaced by the pure corporate-financial interests of new World ruling class. 

Meanwhile, looking back to avoid the same mistakes - the Germans in both WWs seemed to take part in some traditional wars (though in a modern, total form ...) for a military advantage of one country over another. Barely, leading the total war - Berlin could not understand that it is not suitable for breaking with the shout "Stop! Break, please!". And its goals, set by actual inspirers - simply MUST be achieved, regardless of the costs. The Germans ran both Wars as Poles did their 19th Century uprisings: "When we beat the other long enough - they will finally accept what we want". And because of this truly Polish lack of reason and correct view of the situation - Germans had… Polish effects. Just as Vienna did not understand why the West does not want to accept its offer of honorary peace in the Great War, so Berlin made very favourable proposals for the end of the WW1 to Russians (what Brits blocked murdering Rasputin, and then overthrowing the Tsar), and in the WW2 trying to negotiate with the UK, and later with the USA - but such solutions were not taken seriously at all. Therefore, it is true that economic potentials did not decide. However, we should not miss, that deciding ones are global geopolitical, financial, ideological interests. On the practical level, the decisive factor was that when the World's decision-makers played multi-level poker - Germans thought it was an old, good 18thCentury tiddlywinks… And I am afraid, that lot of leaders (including Russian ones) make the same mistake, as the Kaiser and Hitler – they look at the past not to learn, but to prepare to conflict which already passed and evolved to higher level.

Five Pounds with Churchill (Did Britain Really Win World Wars?)

So, we know that Britain provoked both World Wars, how the Brits did it, how they used small nations (like Poles) and confused Germans so much, that even now they have problem with understanding their own role in this history. We can recognize stagesachieved as a result, and that why we can prognose the most probable next steps of Anglo-Saxon policy. But sensing more than simply understanding we are still to think – did Britain really win? And what this means for the threat of American victory in the nearest future?

This is kind of reflection I had seeing new 5 pounds note with portrait of Churchill... What a paradox and symbol at the same time! Here is a man who, acting solely in the interest of international finance, led to the demise of the United Kingdom from the position of the first World power – and he is immortalized on the British banknote…The politician who sealed only the superiority of money over the state - was brought to the graphical element of the currency ... Of course, not the heir of Prince Marlborough alone is responsible for what has happened with Britain, Europe and the world for the last 104 years, but he is iconic for that processes. 

Like no one other - Churchill joins both rounds of the World War, invariably prompting to them, sustaining their fire - and then losing all interest in consequences. Well, unless he (or his descendants) could do something for the third time.

Invisible Competitor

The most interesting thing about World War I is that almost none of its larger participants took part in it in his own interest - and basically everyone clearly against it! Of course, because of the London perpetrationin provoking the Great War - the most interesting issue is how rational was British policy. The remaining states were drawn into conflict, felt obliged to participate due the treaties or even the honourable reasons, their leaders mistakenly assessed the military situation, or believed that they are able to create their own, independent policy among powers (but in fact e.g. Italy, Romania and others remained only elements in puzzle). In this sense, everyone was a victim of this War - but in other everybody were perpetrators or even causes: equally Germans, Frenchmen, Belgians, Austrians or Russians. 

Till some time – only Brits seemed to understand what this all is going about. The conflict itself matched the interests of UK, reducing the potential of continental states, according to the principle that the combined powers of two strongest European countries must be smaller than the strength of Britain, and if they grow too much - you must drop blood from their veins and drain the pressure from political pots. In the realities of the early 20thCentury, the most dangerous for London was the potential threat associated with the summation of the possibilities of Germany and Russia. Even nipping their cooperation in the bud was not enough guarantee, especially because it was not only military or maritime danger (though just in caseLondon inaugurated and escalated the naval arms race), but also economic, demographic and social one. All these sounds relatively familiar and described issues, does not? 

However, the question remaining is: what did distract Brits from seeing the same, or even bigger and certainly more realistic American competition? Especially since it was a reality that grew during the considerable part of the 19th century, from the War of 1812, through rivalry in both Americas to the apogee during the Civil War, in which the Southern States fought as a British cover and also in the interest of UK. Finally, when invariably protecting its own internal market - Washington ultimately boldly sketched its own imperial policy on the entire American-Pacific hemisphere, when Alfred Mahan gave this vision a theoretical foundation, and The Spanish–American War, 1898 proved, that new Ocean centre is ready to announce its aspiration - London gave up. Why?

Apparent Rationalism

It would only be surprising and incomprehensible,if we were actually talking about British politics. The very same thing that led to the outbreak of World War I (let us repeat, no longer raising any doubts even considering diplomatic correspondence showing, not indecisively, as once described, but cunning and perfidy of British politics or in connection with the state of knowledge about war preparations of London, kept secret even before some of their own political elites) - but it had only the appearance of rational action. Yes, it is true, that for some time the continental Eurasian competitors of Britain have been eliminated, but at the same time the rival, much more seriously in the same Oceanic and economic field, has been strengthened, especially financially! Neither the Germans were ever able to attack the Islands, nor would any Tsar conquer India. Meanwhile, the first round of the World War found everyone in Wall Street pockets - which turned out to be a state much more lasting than Kaiser's military aspirations or the dynamics of the economic development of the Tsarist Russia!

It was even more serious after the Second round, after which the United Kingdom permanently felt out of the geopolitical league, lost its colonial Empire and the leading economic role nevertheless the World War II was provoked and started as a result of British inspiration either.

While in 1914 London played a card of feigned uncertainty and non-alignment, giving Berlin and Vienna a semblance of hope to maintain the limited, local character of the conflict - 25 years later, the aggression was triggered by stimulating the feeling of a new Dolchstoß – vision of Poland stabbing the German back. Kaiser had introduced Germany into the War, believing in a quick peace because of its narrow range and apparent lack of threats to the existing balance of power, and Hitler did the same believing that he is making an overtaking strike, improving his strategic position, what allow Germans to divide influences with Brits. As we can see now (and for some observers was obvious even then) both German leaders had a completely disturbed vision of their situation and the actual War objectives, as they were seen by more conscious participants. Therefore, Wilhelm II and Hitler are guilty of suicidal stupidity, the hardest sin of politicians. And any president, even most popular, beloved and powerful in his country - should never repeat their mistakes!

Everybody Lost

But what can we say about Churchill? The First World War-Hawk did everything to start conflict, uphold it and extend to Turkey, third interesting Britain War goal. In charge during WW2 he remained in national memory for sure better than Germans remember Kaiser and Fuehrer and he still wins the majority of plebiscites for the "Briton of All Times." Even the other Europeans, who have no reasons to like Churchill, usually admit, "maybe he was a pig, but Brits had the luck, that they had it ...".Well, yes - but the United Kingdom has actually lost the Great Two-Piece World War! And funny thing is, that similarly, like almost all the other participants - the United States, have lost it either!

After all, as a result of global struggles, the US has ceased to be a "normal" state, interested in satisfying the needs of its own citizens and carrying out its interests, and has become the carrier of fundamentally different, corporate, ideological, financial and conscious interests - but certainly not American (what can be seen even by some American authors). On the other hand, the interest/the will that directs British policy in the direction unfavorable for Britain - has already irrevocably left the Isles, associated with what we define as present American policy, for lack of a better name. And what is to happen now? Who is the next carrier and has transfer of the parasite to be so so destructive to the World?

To answer this fundamental for our presence and future question maybe we should more precisely investigate the past? Knowing that all the great players have lost the double World War - who the hell won it?! Maybe Winston Churchill knows the answer. In the end, probably there are some reasons to put his face on five-pound banknote... British imperial politics, although it seemed so rational and victorious - turned out to be a defeat and the unfortunate carcass of Britain fell out, when the dybbuk had left it, unnecessary yet and used. So, where is the current assurance that something similar will not happen to the mighty United States? Besides, maybe even for their own good...

Maybe our World to persist, but also to change – needs some kind of the Geopolitical Apocatastasis Even Satan could have been saved, if he regretted his sins – as Saint Martin of Tours ashamed the Evil - so even the USA and England becoming normal states would deserve and be worthy of Geopolitical Salvation. Or destruction if they do not convert.

[i]Treaty of Björkö - secret mutual defence agreement signed on 24 July 1905 between Wilhelm II of the German Empire and Tsar Nicholas II of Russia. Not ratified by Russian Government.

[ii]British-French mission send to Moscow on August 1939, officially to negotiate a possible alliance with the USSR against the Nazi Reich. Representing British Government Admiral Drax had not any power to make decisions and only pretended negotiation about holding back Hitler.

[iii]Convention between the United Kingdom and Russia relating to Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet, signed on August 31, 1907, delineated spheres of influence in Asia, initiated The Triple Entente, ended the Great Game. One of greatest defeats of Russian diplomacy and Russian history in general.

[iv]Samuel John Gurney Hoare, 1st Viscount Templewood, (24 February 1880 – 7 May 1959) – one of the most dangerous and most efficient intelligence and diplomats in the Ocean service. 

[v]Operation Pike was the code-name for a strategic bombing plan against the Soviet Union by the Anglo-French alliance in late 1939/early 1940.

[vi]The Katyn Massacre was a series of mass executions of Polish officers carried out by the NKVD probably in April and May 1940. Nazi Germany announced the discovery of mass graves in the Katyn Forest in April 1943.

[vii]Poles want to remember only e.g. the Praga Massacre during Kościuszkouprising 1794, when Russian troops of Marshal Suvorovkilled about 7,000 civilians – but this memory has no sense without understanding that this tragedy was caused by the slaughter of the unarmed 2,300 Russians (including women and children) by Polish Kiliński'sinsurgents six months earlier. Poles for the last 150 years has experienced bloody defeats of our 19thCentury uprisings, bypassing however without any trauma murdering young sleeping Russian recruits when the January Uprising broke up in the night 22nd/23rdJanuary 1863. Action and reaction… A blood count, as it is between brothers.

[viii]Again, we come back to the key problem - the blending of the concepts of "guilt" and "responsibility" in Polish minds. To use the classical comparison - Polish historiography (and politics following it) believes that when the hunter goes to the jungle between tigers without a weapon and ammunition and is devoured by the beasts - the only they are "guilty" because they ate him. The problem of responsibility, or rather its lack of a hunter - is not considered significant in this context.