International Relations and Geopolitics. Lecture 1 - Theories, Paradigms, Concepts, Schools, Debates

24.12.2018
China Institute, Fudan University, Shanghai, China

This lecture will include all knowledge of International Relations. It is dedicated to the discipline, the science, that is called International Relations. The general course will have four lectures. The first lecture is dedicated to International Relations as a discipline. The second, to geopolitics. The third, to the theory of the multipolar world. The fourth will be dedicated to China in all these fields of theoretical and academic thought. 

But we cannot follow the logic of this course without knowing the basis of International Relations, geopolitics, and multipolarity. We need to understand that International Relations is a Western discipline. What does “Western discipline” or “Western science” mean? Now, in the present situation, we should be very careful, because knowing what post-modern is, modern critiques, and modern anthropology, we should carefully distinguish what is “Western.” The Western science and Western approach often tries to impose itself as the universal one. This is the imperialist aspect of the Western mind. It is racism that is implicitly present in any kind of Western thought. Western thought is ethnocentric and, more than ethnocentric, it does not recognize itself as ethnocentric. This kind of implicit racism is worse than explicit racism. Western liberals say “we are defining universal values”, but when you ask them what they mean by “universal values”, they begin to explain Western values as universal - individualism, libertarianism, progress, materialism. There is no place for metaphysics, the spirit, no belief in the soul or afterlife. This is a product of Western civilization, an historical product, that pretends to be universal. 

When we forget that International Relations, and many other, indeed, almost all sciences which we study at university, are Western, then we are losing a very important aspect. We fall into the trap of regarding this discipline, theory, and science as something universal. We need to always remember that we are dealing with the Western vision - in International Relations more than elsewhere. Because that is the Western vision of how things are. 

Above all, in China or in Russia today, if we consider ourselves to be subjects of history, not simple objects of history made by others, then we need to always remember this distinction. This does not mean that we should refuse Western science, resist against Western science, or ignore Western science. It means that we must always remember that it is a Western ethnocentric vision. We need a kind of theoretical Chinese wall in the epistemological field.

 

When you stop some internet connections at the border of your country, you are trying to make a distinction between what is wrong and what is possible for Chinese culture. We need to establish the same wall in the epistemological field. 

 

International Relations deals with the State as such. This is very important. In the very name of this science, this discipline, there is the concept of “nation.” In the Western understanding, the nation is a political value. The West thinks of politics in terms of the “national State” that is normative since the Westphalian peace, and is the normative attitude. The Nation is the national State (Etat-Nation), it is not the people or an ethnic group. International Relations are relations between these States. What kind of State? Modern, Western States. This is the first, very important principle. When we are dealing with the concept of the State, we are dealing with historically Western concepts about how political reality should be organized and studied. 

 

This is a modern paradigm. “Modern paradigm” means Western, but not in all the history of the “West”, but only in modernity. Modernity has transformed the Western mentality and has taken only part of the traditional Western mentality of the middle ages or antiquity and transformed it into a new kind, a new version. International Relations was born as a discipline in the beginning of the 20th century. It is Western and modern. Western modernity is different from Western pre-modernity. This is very important from an historical point of view. 

 

The next point is that there is always an implicit hierarchy in International Relations. We can say that this is a “hidden” hierarchy. The Western concept of International Relations is based on the idea that there are examples of a “normal” State and “normal” relations, and that is precisely the Western world. All the rest are thought to be un- or underdeveloped and under-Western, but striving and tending to become Western. This is a kind of hierarchy. 

 

These are the four principles which we should always remember in studying International Relations, and, I would suggest, other sciences as well. International Relations is a Western and modern discipline. The science is not universal, but is historically, geographically, and ethnically defined. It reflects Western ethnocentrism or “Eurocentrism.”

 

International Relations is not universal, but reflects the standpoint of the Western part of humanity. This remark opens up the possibility or question of how non-Western International Relations theory should look. Are they possible? Are they desirable? 

 

International Relations is essentially a modern discipline which deals with the modern State and international system created under the Westphalian treaty, when there was a very important shift from pre-modernity in the international political system to modernity, when national, sovereign States were accepted as normative actors in global politics. This was not the case before, when religion and dynasties played an essential part. There was no concept of purely rational calculation of national interests or the sovereign body as the State. Instead, the State had a mission, a religious mission, a religious dimension - such as with Catholic politics in Europe. With the end of the Thirty Years War, a new political system was established that was accepted as universal, normative, progressive, and necessary for everybody else. 

IR was born in the beginning of the 20th century in England and Switzerland as “tentation” to conceptualize international political science, and now it is established as an acknowledged academic science and discipline in the West, and in imitation of the West elsewhere. When I was teaching International Relations in Russia, it was exactly as it was represented in the rest of the world. 

So, International Relations studies the relations and interactions of States. The fundamental subject is State-to-State relations, not people-to-people or culture-to-culture. The State is considered as the modern Western State - sovereign and secular. Secular means that there is no religious aspect or mission recognized in the State, so it is purely rational. Sovereign means that there is no higher government above the State. The State is the highest point. There is no god above the State, and the State is the prophet of itself. This is a kind of absolutization of the liberty of the State to do anything and everything. There is no other authority. That is the basic concept of sovereignty. Sovereign is he who has no other ruler or legitimate instance above himself. That is Jean Bodin’s definition of sovereignty. It was applied first in the Protestant concept of politics, and directed against the authority of the Catholic Church, which pretended to be a supranational authority above the State, and after that it was recognized as normative. Sovereignty is modern in its essence, and it is anti-empire.

 

For example, in Chinese history, according to Professor Zhao Tingyang [1] (赵汀), badao (霸道) and wangdao (王道). Badao (霸道) is power based on the force of hegemony, which does not recognize any other authority. Wangdao (王道)is a kind of moral and spiritual or mystical power of the emperor. This is not only the biggest, but is completely different, a qualitative change. This is not sovereignty. It is a mission. Wangdao (王道) is a mission. Sovereignty is modern and is badao (霸道). 

 

The State is conceived as separate from religion, ethnic traditions, culture, and civilization. The State is national. But what does national mean in the modern political sense? The State is based on individual citizenship. The concept of the normative State considers the individual to be the subject of the State, and all individuals, united in the nation-State, are citizens. He who is not a citizen is outside of the State. All citizens are politically equal. The concept of nation-State is bourgeois and modern. It is not traditional. It does not recognize classes or other forms of professions or different layers of society - they have no political meaning in the modern national State. Nationality is based on individual citizenship. 

 

The modern State, as the subject of International Relations, without a mission, is rational, egoist, and has clearly calculable national interests. It is a rational body. The nation is a rational creation [which exists] in order to organize individuals and to propose to them some kind of order and structure. If individuals are not happy with that, they can change it. Hence the concept of “social-public treaty” (contract). Because the State has nothing transcendental, nothing above it, no mission, it can be reshaped, recreated, destroyed, and created anew, if individuals or citizens decide to do so. It is based on a public treaty or agreement, that is the contractual nature of the modern State. It is almost like a contract agreement between, for example, economic groups. They can decide to put together their capital, and they can decide to stop and to create a new firm. So the State is conceived or is thought to be a kind of commercial firm. This is bourgeois in its roots. 

 

This modern State is believed to be sovereign, so there is no higher authority above it. And the modern State is opposite to empire. It is opposite to the religious State, to the archaic community. It is based on the concept of progress. It is regarded as something that comes historically “after” empire, religious States, and archaic communities, all of which are considered to be pre-modern,  while the modern State is “new” and the “more progressive” form of political organization. So the modern State, as a bourgeois concept, obtains or acquires a sense of meaning only in the context of “progress.” If we challenge the concept of progress, everything will fall apart. No modern State has any sense outside of progress. Progress, modernity, and the modern State always go together. The concept of progress is embedded implicitly in the concept of the modern State. 

 

The implicit hierarchy in International Relations conceives all States as being “Western” or “similar to the West”, “modern”, and “equal”, and deals with them as such. Reality is different, because States, as they are, not as they are thought to be, are not equal. There are big States, huge States, and small States - all of them are “sovereign”, and all of them have a place in the United Nations organization, but Monaco and small Luxembourg - sovereign States - and China, for example, are incomparable, like the huge sun and a small grain of sand. They are not equal. 

But, interestingly enough, the hierarchy of International Relations contradicts the basic concept that every sovereign State is equal to one another [2]. Nevertheless, it exists, and there are debates in International Relations on how to explain and represent this hierarchy. The old Western racism comes into play here[3]. Racism was formed during colonial times and, little by little, step by step, acquired three layers. Normative racism consists of the first class of humanity - “white” humanity, a second, “yellow” class of humanity, and the third class, the lowest of all, is “black” humanity. This was reflected in the so-called “anthropology” of the 19th century, in Morgan, for example, with some explanations for these terms. “White” means “civilization”; “yellow” means “barbarity” or “quasi-civilization”, something like “civilization”, but not “civilized”, and “black” means “savagery”, or “savages” with no image of civilization, living in wild forests as gatherers, small farmers, and hunters. 

 

Now we can see the exact same in International Relations - although formally without racism, because it was discredited by Nazi Germany - where we have an implicit, unofficial hierarchy that divides all countries into three groups: the First World, or the center in Wallerstein’s system[4], which is the Rich North. This is precisely the Western, white, European, American civilization. This is an old racist concept, in which the “whites” are the First World because they are “more progressive”, richer, more “developed”, have more “human rights”, are more liberal, freer, and happier. This is the old, normative ethnocentric history of the imperialist, hegemonic, colonial system. Although now it is not linked to “racism”, the First World is a purely racist concept. It is a transposition of the old racism onto the new, liberal political plane. The Second World in Wallerstein’s system is called the “semi-periphery”, represented by China, Russia, Latin America, India, and some eastern States, presented as “barbarity.” The West says that they are “corrupt”, “authoritarian”, “totalitarian”, and do not have proper “human rights.” They have dictatorships and corrupt Caesarist regimes, but they are like “us” - that is the First World - “in delay”, and we will “help them” to develop human rights, liberal values, transparency so that they will, one day, maybe, catch up with us and will be “white.”

 

Then there is the Third World. This is the “periphery” and, as Thomas Berger and Huntington said, this is the “rest” of the “West and the rest.” It is undeveloped and under the influence of the hegemonies of the second and first. 

 

This is a more or less implicit hierarchy. We cannot understand anything in International Relations if we ignore this implicit hierarchy. The most sincere authors, such as Krasner[5], Hobson[6], and others, recognize this. But this is a little bit of an awkward moment, because to recognize the implicit hierarchy of International Relations is the same as to recognize the “racist” nature of the liberal way of thinking. This is a problem for “political correctness”, so they try to avoid this aspect. But it is implicitly, always, in any case present.

 

Now we will see the content of the science of International Relations.

International Relations as a discipline has different schools. They are different in many senses. The first, fully established, “classical” school is the positivist school. What does “positivist” mean? Positivism means that this school recognizes that there is an “external” or “material” reality that is the subject of International Relations. There are States, interactions between States, nations, and economies, and these exist somehow independently of how we describe them. There is the “positivist” fact that can be regarded, studied, and explored without our subjective relation to it. This is a pre-quantum-mechanical vision. It is “good old materialism” that regards that everything goes by itself, and the human presence is here to describe or deal with the positive reality that is always there outside of and independent of our interpretation. Our interpretation depends on reality, which is not dependent on our interpretation, but is as such. 

There is also the post-positivist school, which has been gaining more and more ground in the science of International Relations. It is based on post-modernism, such as Michel Foucault’s epistemology, which challenged the existence of the positive fact and described the positive fact as an epistemological struggle. The will to knowledge is the will to power, according to Michel Foucault. This is the basis of post-modernist, hyper-critical ontology, that does not believe in the existence of anything outside of our explanation. This is a quantum-mechanical attitude. In quantum mechanics, the position of the observer is linked to the process itself. Processes with and without observers are different. This is a concept introduced into post-modern philosophy based on the deconstruction of discourse. According to post-positivists, there are no International Relations. There is only discourse on International Relations. There are no States without explanations, documents, and texts. Everything is written, everything is in speech and discourses, and by changing discourse, we change reality. This is very important. I suggest Chinese students to study post-modernism very carefully. It is a growing field of research, and without understanding the basic principles of post-modernism, we cannot understand anything in the present West. Because the present West affects us, we would not be able to understand ourselves without understanding post-modernity. The semi-periphery does not pay sufficient attention to post-modernity. We need to study it because, otherwise, we will be easily tricked in many aspects. 

The post-positivist school does not believe in the existence of independent material reality. They think that material reality is created in the process of speaking, thinking, and discussing this “material reality.” This is the late concept of Wittgenstein that there is no positive fact, because the positive fact is always embedded in the interpretation. This is the so-called “language game” that creates meaning. Without meaning, there is no thing. The thing is born in the process of the language game. This is the basic principle of post-modernity. 

 

The post-positivist school challenged the status quo in modern science generally, and in International Relations. Post-positivists attack the positivist school as “idiots” affirming things that belong to the past. Post-modernists are progressivists as well, but critical progressivists. The majority of them are from the left, such as from Cultural Marxism, from Trotskyism, from nihilism, and different forms of the leftist, socialist, and pro-communist schools. That is why post-positivist challenges exist in the world order. This is a little revolutionary, because it tries to transform the epistemology of International Relations and, thus by this means, transforms the reality, which is the same as the discourse about reality. This is the test in Derrida’s version. There is nothing but the text. If we change the text, we change reality. This is the revolutionary aspect of post-modernism and the post-positivist school.

 

The positivist school is fully established with a hundred years of debates, schools, different conferences, and hundreds and thousands of books and manuals written in favor of one or another theory. And there is controversy. 

 

But post-positivism in International Relations is new, is gaining more and more ground, and needs to be taken into consideration. At any conference dedicated to International Relations, there will normally be a representative of this school. They create scandals and may look marginal, but now they are part of an established attitude. In modern manuals dedicated to International Relations, a part is always reserved for expositing post-positivist doctrines. It is not an innovation anymore. Now it is already a part of the discipline, developing and growing,  remaining controversial and scandalous, but as a part of the discipline. 

 

There is a third kind of school of International Relations that does not exist in the form of a academic accepted theory in the proper sense yet. But it is has been born and is beginning to expand. Only the first steps are being made. I call it the multipolar school that is in the process of creation. It does not exist as an established school, but this approach is making its first steps. It is precisely to this concept that I will dedicate the third lecture, explaining it in more detail, but in order to have a general vision of International Relations, we must introduce it. 

The multipolar school challenges Eurocentrism, modernity, universalism, and the global hegemony of the West. It forms a kind of parallel to some post-positivist structures. It is based on the presumption that there is a multitude of civilizations, which is not the case for post-modernists. Post-modernists are universalists, progressivists, and believe in liberation, democracy, and enlightenment, but they try to “enlighten enlightenment”, to “develop development”, and to “make modernity more modern.” They think that modernity is not modern enough. They try to liberate and bring to its end the process of liberation. Post-modernity is a kind of futuristic modernism. 

 

The multipolar school does not accept linear progress nor the normative status of the West. The multipolar system deals with different civilizations, with no hierarchy at all. It is based on the complete incomparability of different civilizations, which we need to study without regard for any normative status for the West. That is the new aspect of multipolarity. It is based on anthropological pluralism and a positive evaluation of diversity. Here the concept of the Other is decided completely differently than in the traditional Western approach. We can say that the multipolar approach is not Western, and is an anti-Western school of International Relations. That explains why it is not so much developed and why it is not present in manuals, and why it is not mentioned during discussions and debates. It stands outside of globally “understood” Western-centrism. It is not Eurocentrism. So it is not by chance that this theory has been developed in the semi-periphery. Based on the new anthropology of Eduardo Viveiros de Castro and of Eduardo Kohn, which affirms that archaic traditions have their own ontology and gnoseology and that we need to accept them as human and not as sub-human, as in progressivist, racist, Western-centrist epistemology.

But as for the main, positivist school of International Relations, there are two main schools: Realism, represented and founded by Morgenthau and Carr, and Liberalism, represented by Angel, US President Woodrow Wilson, and Zimmerman. At any normal university, you can pass exams if you understand realism and liberalism, because these are the main approaches which they teach about International Relations in conventional, normative, Western (and non-Western) institutions. 

 

What is realism in International Relations? Realism is the idea that there should not and cannot be supranational organizations. Realists believe in sovereignty in the sense as I have explained it. Because realists believe in sovereignty, they think that there is chaos in International Relations. Chaos in International Relations is something other than “chaos” in normal language. It is not disorder, but is the absence of a higher level of authority which could legally oblige the State to do anything. States are absolutely free, and if you cannot oblige them to do one thing or prevent them from doing another or punish them legally, then you can only punish and oblige illegally. So International Relations as a field is always based on this chaos, because sovereignty is sovereign, and by recognizing sovereignty as an absolute principle, there can be only relations of power. If you are more powerful, you can oblige another, but not by law, legally, but by force. That this is possible and normal - that is realism. You measure forces. For example, how can survive countries and States survive? Either there is something that is “bigger” or “biggest” that is against the other “bigger.” For example, there is small Ukraine and big Russia. Russia attacks Ukraine, and Ukraine calls Washington and says “please, come here, we are attacked by Russians”, and the Russians don’t come. There is always an open situation. But when Ukrainians repress Russians living in Ukraine, they call Russia: “Moscow, please, come here, we want to go back to the motherland.” Everything here is not “legal” or “equal” - these are relations of power. If you can do it, just do it. Take Crimea, take Taiwan, take Hong Kong, if you can do it. You cannot wait when you will be strong enough. That is the realist attitude. You can accept that you will be disappointed with some position, and you can be a loser, or you could gain; you could deplore or you could start a war, and you can conclude a peace. War is not destiny in that situation, but it is possible, and it is real during all of history. 

That is realism - the idea that everything will be like this forever, as in history, as now, and as forever. The greater part of American experts are realists. When we speak about the West, and above all the United States or Great Britain, at least half, maybe more of them, are openly realists. That is not nationalism, not fascism, but is called realism in International Relations, which represents a school of thought which is implicitly Eurocentric, and was created in Europe based on the normative concept of the State and sovereignty.

 

The other “half” are liberals. What is liberalism in International Relations? It is different from liberalism in arts, politics, and the economy. Liberalism has a very special and precise meaning in International Relations. It is not a liberal, funny hipster guy who is open and friendly, while realists are hawkish, evil, and aggressive. In International Relations, the term liberalism has a concrete and precise meaning. What does it mean? It means that there is progress in International Relations, which proceeds from State systems, or from a realist system, towards a new world system with a world government. The idea of liberalism in International Relations recognizes the necessity of creating a supranational level of decision-making that should be legally applied to every State. This is the creation of another type of State - a State above a State. In this sense, when the global government is established, everyone should follow the order of the global government just as citizens should follow the orders of nation-State governments. It is the same system, but established on a global, planetary level. This is explained with the concept of progress. Both realists and liberals accept progress, but realists accept it in some relative sense, while globalists believe in progress more than anything else. There is pacifism as well in liberalism, because they might consider war to be the worst and try to avoid war by means of manipulation and destruction of those who think otherwise than they themselves. War for them is to kill those who don’t accept global government. 

This idea, as well as human rights theory, is based on liberalism in International Relations. It tries to make citizens and humans equal, which is possible only on a supranational level if we recognize the same rights of a citizen, as part of the nation-State, and man as a human being with no concrete connection to political status, in a cosmopolitan version. If you recognize both as legally equal, then you need a global government in order to empower and force this. You need a kind of level of authority that should oblige different nation-States to treat human beings as the global government of liberals thinks they should - legally. Liberalism tries to weaken nation-States, to reduce their sovereignty, and to install an international order instead of chaos. That is precisely the other half of Western scholarship of International Relations. 

 

Liberalism in International Relations is globalization, cosmopolitanism, individualism, human rights ideology, progress, and the idea of destroying nation-States and destroying any form of citizenship in order to create “citizens of the world.” In order to do so, you should dissolve nation-States, because they pretend to be sovereign. 

 

The debate between these two schools represents the history of the twentieth century. The creation of the League of Nations after the First World War, the creation of the United Nations, the Hague Tribunal, the European Union, and the European Court of Human Rights - all of these moments were forms of implementing the theory of liberalism in International Relations. This is not by chance, by agreement between States, but is an idea of liberalism in International Relations. It is a theory based on progress and the affirmation that the Nation-State is not the best thing, as realists affirm, but a stage in human social, political, and cultural development.

Globalism and globalization are first of all a theory, a thought, not a fact. They are a discourse represented by liberals. Liberalism in International Relations openly advocates the creation of a world government and the deconstruction of Nation-States. This is not a conspiracy theory. It is part of manuals, which you can see if you carefully read any existing manual on International Relations in any country. Perhaps with astonishment, you will discover that the concept of global governance is not a conspiracy theory or the idea of some small elite trying to impose it, but is an openly recognized theory - one of the two main theories of International Relations. 

There are two other schools, which are also positivist. One is the English school, which is a kind of “middle way.” Representatives of the English school say that there should be the sovereignty of States, and no world government, but more progressive States should create a “club” that will not punish, but exclude or put pressure on others - such as when the G8 was transformed into the G7. Russia was punished by the “club” in the English school. It was illegal. There is no such institution - it is a club. They can accept some and exclude others. This is a constant of the English school - there can be order, but based on agreements and the rules of the club - not law, not global government, but a global club. Hedley Bull, John Burton, and Barry Buzan, who is one of the brilliant scholars of the English school - I like him very much - and who explains the transformation of the international system through history, in an historical sociology of International Relations.

 

There is the Marxist school in International Relations. But it is not so familiar to you or to us because it is not Stalinist, Maoist, or Soviet. It is rather Trotskyist. Our Chinese and Russia politics and traditions in China and Russia were based on realism, with some special “details” about progress, socialism, and social systems, but they were more or less openly Russia-centric or China-centric. But the Marxist school in International Relations is something different. It affirms that there has been a global world from the beginning: capitalism. Capitalism is global, and the divisions between nation-States are a kind of formality that does not represent reality. Capitalism was born in the West, and it should expand to all the earth. And only when everybody will be capitalist and will be liberal, there will be no more nations, peoples, or races, but only classes - two of them: capitalists on top, international in nature, and proletarians below, also international. Marxists in International Relations are against the Russian and Chinese examples because they are a kind of “national version” of communism. They insist that International Relations - everything - should be absolutely international - no nationality, no tradition, no languages, only class relations between the international bourgeois and the international proletarian. And when they say international, they mean that capitalism should win. And after that will come revolution. But first of all, it should be global. So they are very close to the liberals: they say “let them win, and after that we will come.” This is Negri and Hardt’s concept of the multitudes and Empire [7]

These are more or less the two main schools, representing the majority of discourse in International Relations. In the United States, for example, everybody is either liberal or realist. That is the normal position, even if they debate. Trump is a realist, and Hillary Clinton is a liberal. So there can be good realists, bad realists, crazy liberals - this does not mean anything. We are speaking of ideas.

But the post-positivist schools are much more interesting in my opinion. There is the normativist theory that affirms that if we create a norm, then it does not reflect reality, but creates the reality, and everybody will follow the norm. If you try to punish people who violate some rule on the street, little by little this norm, which does not reflect anything, creates people who very carefully behave “correctly” because of these norms. By changing norms, we change reality - that is the modest version of post-positivism.

Critical theory, such as that of Cox[8], Gill[9], and Linklater[10], tries to criticize the ideas of the liberals and realists which are inconsistent from the post-modern point of view, showing that they defend the status quo and are biased - politically, intellectually, structurally. Critical theory shows how discourse in International Relations is biased. That is their main purpose. Post-modern theory, such as that of Ashley[11]and Der Derian[12], says that International Relations consists of texts and only texts. This is an application of Derrida to International Relations. If you deconstruct texts, you will see that there is nothing behind them. Everything is based on corrupted information currents. If you change the information currents and rearrange the “facts”, you immediately receive a completely different image and reality. This is the “tail wearing the dog.” Soft power is an applied part of this idea. Post-modern theory is based on the deconstruction of the discourses of International Relations. 

 

Next is the feminist theory of Enloe [13, Tickner[14], and Donna Haraway[15]. Feminists in International Relations affirm that all International Relations have been made, conceived, described, proposed, and promoted by males in what is a kind of hierarchy…If we put a female instead of male, she presumably will create peace, prosperity, friendship, and good relations between countries. There will be no State, no patriarchy, no hierarchy, no verticality in International Relations. There will be a completely different description of reality. If a woman will not pretend to be a man in dealing with International Relations, and if the woman tries to wrest “the woman” and describe reality from a woman’s point of view, then there will be a completely different construction of International Relations. This is a relativization of male dominance in International Relations. This is a growing theory, and I suggest that feminism should be taken seriously. It is not a joke; it is part of modern civilization.

 

In the historical sociology of International Relations, Hobden and Hobson[16]try to put the discourse of International Relations in historical contexts. They criticize the Western-centric, Eurocentric point of view. 

 

And there is the constructivist theory of Onuff[17], Katzenstein [18], and Wendt[19]. They affirm more or less the same as the others. They say that we need to construct, and not only deconstruct, International Relations. Onuff’s main thesis is the “world of our making.” We live in a world which we make. There is no world. The only world that exists is the world we are making. This is the main idea. We are dealing with a fixed, frozen hallucination or imagination. There is no positive reality, so let us construct the world we dream of, the world we want. This is possible because we are living in an imaginational order. 

The multipolar school, which I will only evoke some aspects of, includes Eurasianism and the Theory of the Multipolar World and Fourth Political Theory, which is precisely what I am working on. There are many texts which are more or less accepted as the position of the Russian strategy in International Relations and the Russian tradition of realism. This is gaining popularity in Russia. You can see how Putin has introduced the Eurasian Union. Multipolarity is very important and has been approached by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lavrov. That is something I am working on. 

 

There is the Chinese school, including Zhao Tingyang[20](赵汀阳), Qin Yaqing[21](秦亚青), Yan Xuetong[22](阎学通), and Zhang Weiwei[23](张维为). The concept or approach of these authors is not only realism, but Yan Xuetong is mostly a realist. Nevertheless, all of them try to establish the particularity of Chinese civilization, and I like above all the concept of Tianxia Tixi (天下体系), which regards the historical relations of China and other people not as a pure hegemony, not as an order of force or imposition. For example, Vietnam is a very interesting case. It accepted all of Chinese culture up to the details, but never recognized the direct right of physical, brutal rule, fighting against Chinese attempts to submit, at the same time being part of the Chinese universe, as opposed to the case of the Japanese who subjugated Korea. The empire of Tianxia (天下) is not only China as such as a State, but China as a pole of civilization with multiple layers. The idea of defending it in the present situation is a revolutionary idea, because it challenges all other discourses, just as Eurasianism challenged Western-centrism. There are many similarities between them. 

 

There is also the European New Right of Alain de Benoist, the French GRECE and French New Right. They are not liberal, but are right anti-liberal, not nationalists, but Europeanists, not Catholic or Christian, but pagans, with the very interesting idea to recreate European civilization by returning to pre-modernity. Because they are living inside of globalization and modern Western civilization their remarks and theories are very important for the countries and cultures outside of the West. 

 

La Teoría de la Insubordinación Fundante is a very interesting theory of Marcelo Gullo Omodeo from Argentina which represents the idea that, basically, Latin America should not submit to North America and global world order. This is an idea that is very famous and developed in Latin America. It is growing in importance. Marcelo Gullo Omodeo is part of this multipolar discourse which is completely new in International Relations. 

 

And there is the Brazilian author, Andre Martin, with his O Meridinalismo, which is the important idea that the South should be a united alternative to the North, not following or trying to catch up with the North, but creating different links between Latin America and, for example, Africa, and South Asian countries. This is a very interesting concept based on multipolarity. 

 

What is important in all of these is that they challenge Eurocentrism. They consider International Relations to be provincial in its present State, a provincial Western concept with hegemonic, universalist, colonialist, imperialist pretenses. They try to reduce Western theory of International Relations in a much broader context, defending the rights of peoples and civilizations instead of modern States or global government. They are liberals and realists and post-modernists. 

 

We can also consider the debates in International Relation, such as that of Realism against Liberalism in International Relations. That is a major part of the science. The discipline of International Relations is dedicated to this question: how liberals think that universal peace is possible if we reduce the sovereignty of the State, and how realists respond that such is not the case, because everyone will try to use this international institutions in their favor. The realists say that the United Nations fails, while the liberals say that it is better than the absence of international institutions. There are thousands of books on this. Precisely what is going on in International Relations on the practical level in the West is only about that. The Americans speak honestly about this and call things by their names. They have no shyness and speak about hegemony, realism, chaos, internationalism, confronting arguments, and attacking each other. But they are honest in that, and only they are. When they come to Europe, there is pure political correctness. There is no realism in Europe. In Europe it is impossible. In Europe realists in International Relations are “fascists”, with whom there can be no good relations. There is an overwhelming liberalism in International Relations in Europe. In manuals, certainly, you will read the debates of realism and Morgenthau, Carr, and chaos in International Relations, but in official debates in European diplomacy, there prevails exclusively liberalism in International Relations. And the realization of it is the European Union, which is a supranational structure that shows how to turn liberalism in International Relations in reality. They are not joking. They are liberals. Before there were different points, such Gaullism of Charles de Gaulle, for example. There was realism in the history of Europe, and all of its modern history were struggles, wars, and fights between Nations, but now liberalism is absolutely and overwhelmingly prevailing. Realists don’t recognize that. That is hypocrisy. They are promoting human rights always and everywhere, including when they simply destroy some countries in order to rob them, as with Libya, for example, but that was all about “human rights.” You can kill in favor of human rights, invade, destroy, and support radical Islam if it corresponds to “human rights.” Americans can say “it’s our business, business like business, nothing personal” and close our eyes to Saudi Arabia in some situations because they are our allies, and open our eyes when something is happening in Russia, and when nothing is going in Russia, we will just imagine and create a story.

 

In that sense, I suggest America as an example of a normal and honest field of debate between realists, who are recognized as an absolutely normal part of this society - half of American politicians are realists - and the other half are liberals, who try to demonize the realists now, and this is the European case, as in Trump’s election. He is a realist, he is honest, they are allies, America First, and the liberals go “no no, that is nationalism.” And they, the liberals, have lost. That is a sign that realism is half of the population of the political spectrum of the political elite of the United States, and they recognize that - “nothing personal.” There is a pure and honest International Relations school in the United States of America. In Europe, there is now no such clear possibility. Liberals try to demonize the realists, call them “fascists”, “extremists”, “Putin’s agents”, “Russian hackers”, and so on. But now, for example, in Italy, Hungary, and so on there are realist governments. There are left and right realists. Realism exists in Europe in spite of the European rules of political correctness and globalism. 

 

The other debate - more interesting and charged with irony and humor - is that between positivism versus post-positivism, which is philosophical, but which in International Relations acquires a special dimension. I suggest philosophers, and Chinese philosophers, to pay attention to post-modernism in International Relations as broader than post-modernity. It is not only abstract philosophy and playing with concepts as in Deleuze’s plateau or Lacan, but in the everyday life of International Relations you will see how post-modernity works.

 

The next terms of debate are universalism and Eurocentrism versus the plurality of civilizations. This is precisely the multipolar theory that is only in its first stage of development. The main principles of realism are: 

 

  • absolute sovereignty
  • chaos in International Relations, 
  • national interests which discount everything based on rational calculation, 
  • mercantilism in foreign trade, which means that the State should control foreign trade by taxes, 
  • no supranational legitimacy,
  • anthropological pessimism

 

It is interesting how realists explain that the State should be because men are “evil”, and in order to put them order, we should have a State - otherwise they will behave in an unpredictable way and destroy everything. So they are pessimists and try to put humans in their place based on mutual agreement. They do not believe that human nature can be changed in progress. Humans are more or less the same. 

 

The main principles of liberalism are:

 

  • relative sovereignty
  • from chaos to order in International Relations creating a supranational legal system, international interests should prevail - which is something incomprehensible to realists, for whom there are no international interests as there can be no international interests 
  • liberalism in foreign trade, direct seller-buyer links with no State monopoly on foreign trade, no taxes, and no regulation in foreign economic policy
  • and universal peace is an imperative. War is worst of all, if it is not a ‘holy war’ against the enemies of the open society 
  • world government, political globalization, and internationalism (and sometimes “pacifism”)
  • anthropological optimism, or the idea of progress, that humans can be better, more peaceful, more friendly, more hipster, more equal 
  • education and progress should be political means destroy Nation-States using epistemology in order to promote their vision
  • human rights and the individual are the universal norm. There is no concept of the citizen as in realism, but the individual is a global concept. 

 

If we put these together, we can see quite a symmetric opposition - term against term, affirmations against negations. What realists affirm and accept, liberals in International Relations challenge and deny. We see a symmetry in this debate and, to say the truth, we can find some intellectual bases in both. It is not a case of “stupid” against “wise.” This is one form of mentality against another form of mentality. You can choose your position. 

 

For the English school or “middle way”:

 

  • States are sovereign
  • there is no legitimate supranational organization, but chaos in International Relations should be organized somehow nevertheless. This can be done through the concept of the club of the most powerful. The club of the less powerful has no influence. 
  • States form the International system, and this system can be reflected, corrected, and indirectly controlled by the club. 
  • Potestas indirecta (in Latin), a concept developed by Carl Schmitt

 

For Marxism in International Relations: 

 

  • the capitalist system is global
  • Nation-States are fictions, 
  • the differences between realists and liberals are useless and misleading, and the division between the capitalist States are lesser than vertical antagonism between the bourgeois and proletarian. 
  • Capitalism, globalization, cosmopolitanism, and the reduction of society to the individual status are necessary. This creates real internationalism. 
  • Contradictions in the capitalist system will grow - this is the difference with liberals, for whom contradictions will decline. 
  • The growth of the middle class is a lie according to Marxists, and pauperization will become total. 
  • All peoples and cultures of the world are obliged to repeat the economic development of the West. In that sense, they are racists. 
  • In the globalist future, the proletarians will also become global, will rise from the global revolution and will overcome the bourgeoisie. This is the difference in the far future. 

 

The main principles of post-positivism are: 

 

  • the theoretical fields of International Relations are an artificial construction. 
  • There is no independent reality, and the subjects of International Relations are not States, peoples, and civilizations, but are created in the process of discourse. By speaking of International Relations, we are creating the subject of International Relations. 
  • All discourses are necessarily biased - you cannot have neutral or scientific, objective discourse, because you serve one or another power. International Relations reflect not the State but the will of their creators. 
  • International Relations is the fight for domination and hegemony, and nothing else. This is pure political propaganda. All International Relations, according to the post-positivists, is nothing but direct political propaganda in order to submit all of humanity and install their operational system instead of others. 
  • There is a need to create a new critical theory against discourses of power in International Relations. There is hard criticism of of all positivist theories as varieties of dominant, authoritative discourse - this is a post-modern concept.
  • There are a variety of proposals that should be based on post-positivist version of IR. It is very diverse, not united.

 

Fudan University, Shanghai, China

Footnotes

[1] Zhao Tingyang (2005). Tianxia Tixi: Shijie Zhidu Zhexue Daolun [Tianxia System: An Introduction to the Philosophy of World Institutions]. Nanjing: Jiangsu Jiaoyu Chubanshe.

[2] Krasner S. Sovereignty: Organized HypocrisyPrinceton: Princeton University Press, 1999.

[3] Hobson J.M. The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics: Western International Theory, 1760–2010. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2011.

[4] Wallerstein I. Geopolitics and Geoculture: Essays on the Changing World-System. Cambridge:Press Syndicate, 1991.

[5] Krasner S. Sovereignty: Organized HypocrisyPrinceton: Princeton University Press, 1999.

[6] Hobson J.M. The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics: Western International Theory, 1760–2010. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2011.

[7] Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire, Harvard University Press, 2000; Idem. Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire, New York: Penguin Press, 2004.

[8] Cox R.W. Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History. New York: Columbia University Press, 1987.

[9] Gill S. American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991

[10] Linklater A. Critical Theory and World Politics: Citizenship, Sovereignty and Humanity. L, NY: Routledge, 2007.

[11] Ashley R. The Eye of Power: The Politics of World Modeling // International Organization. Vol. 37. No. 3 Summer 1983.

[12] Derian Der J. Antidiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed, and War. NY; London: Blackwill, 1992.

[13] Enloe Cynthia. Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics.London: Pandora Press 1990.

[14] Tickner A.B., Wæver O. International Relations Scholarship around the World. N.Y.: Taylor & Francis, 2009.

[15] Haraway Donna. “A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century” // Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature. New York; Routledge, 1991. C. 149–181.

[16] Hobden Stephen, Hobson John M. Historical Sociology of International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

[17] Onuf Nicholas. World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations. Columbia: University of South California Press, 1989.

[18] Katzenstein Peter J. Civilizations in World Politics: Plural and Pluralist Perspectives. London, UK: Routledge, 2010.

[19] Wendt Alexander. Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge University Press, 1999.

[20] Zhao Tingyang (2005). Tianxia Tixi: Shijie Zhidu Zhexue Daolun [Tianxia System: An Introduction to the Philosophy of World Institutions]. Nanjing: Jiangsu Jiaoyu Chubanshe.

[21] Qin Yaqing. (2007). “Why Is There No Chinese International Relations Theory”// International Relations of the Asia Pacific. vol. 7, No.3.

[22] Yan Xuetong. (2015). Shijie quanli de zhuanyi: zhengzhi lingdao yu zhanlue jingzheng [The Transition of World Power: Political Leadership and Strategic Competition]. Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe.

[23] Zhang Weiwei. China Wave, The: Rise Of A Civilizational StateNew Jersey: World Century Publishing Corporation, 2012.

 

[24] Marcelo Gullo Omodeo. La Teoría de la Insubordinación Fundante. Buenos Aires: Biblos, 2008.

Bibliography

 

Acharya Amitav, Buzan, Barry (eds.). Non-Western international relations theory: perspectives on and beyond Asia. London: Routledge, 2010

Adler E. Communitarian International Relations: The Epistemic Foundations of International Relations. London and New York: Routledge, 2005.

Aldrich John H., Sullivan John L., Borgida E. Foreign Affairs and Issue Voting: Do Presidential Candidates ‘Waltz Before a Blind Audience’?// American Political Science Review. 83 (1) (March 1989). P. 123–141.

Allison G. Essence of Decision. Boston: Little Brown, 1971.

Almond G. The american people and foreign policy. NY: Praeger, 1950.

Amin S. Mondialisation, comprehendre pour agir. Paris, 2002.

Angell N. The Great Illusion — a Study of the Relation of Military Power to National Advantage. London: Heinemann, 1910.

Angell N. The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power in Nations to their Economic and Social Advantage. New York: G.P. Putnam's & Sons, 1910.

Aron R. La Société industrielle et la Guerre, suivi d'un Tableau de la diplomatie mondiale en 1958. Paris: Plon, 1959.

Aron R. Paix et guerre entre les nations, Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1962.

Ashley R. Imposing International Purpose: Notes on a Problematic of Governance// Czempiel Ernst-Otto, Rosenau James N. (eds.). Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989.

Ashley R. Living on Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism and War // Derian Der, Shapiro M.J. (eds.). International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989.

Ashley R. The Achievements of Poststructuralism // Steve Smith, Ken Booth, Marysia Zalewski (eds.). International Theory: Positivism & Beyond, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996. С. 240–253.

Ashley R. The Eye of Power: The Politics of World Modeling // International Organization. Vol. 37. No. 3 Summer 1983.

Ashley R. The Powers of Anarchy: Theory, Sovereignty, and the Domestication of Global Life // Derian D. (ed.) International Theory: Critical Investigations. London: MacMillan, 1995.

Ashley R., Walker R. B. J. (eds.). Speaking the Language of Exile: Dissidence in International Studies // International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 34. No. 3. September 1990.

Ashley Richard. The Achievements of Poststructuralism // Steve Smith, Ken Booth, Marysia Zalewski (eds.). International Theory: Positivism & Beyond, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996. С. 240–253.

Babst Dean V. Elective Governments—A Force For Peace // The Wisconsin Sociologist. 3.1. 1964.

Bakker I., Gill S. Power, Production and Social Reproduction. NY: Macmillan-Palgrave, 2003.

Baran P.A. The Political Economy of Growth. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1957.

Baran P. The Political Economy of NeoColonialism. London: Heinemann, 1975.

Barkin J.S. Realist Constructivism: Rethinking International Relations Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Batistella D. Theories des relations internationales. P: Presse de Sciences Po, 2003.

Beck U. Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. New Delhi: Sage, 1992.

Bhagwati Jagdish N. Free Trade Today. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002

Bhagwati Jagdish N. In Defense of Globalization. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Boas F. The Mind of Primitive Man. New York: Macmillan, 1938.

Boli J., Thomas G. World Culture in the World Polity// American Sociological Review. 1997. № 62 (2). С. 171–190.

418 Международные отношения (парадигмы, теории, социология) Braudel F. Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme (XVe-XVIIIe siècles). 3 volumes. Paris, Armand Colin, 1979.

Brewer A. Marxist theories of Imperialism: a critical survey. London: Routledge, 1990.

Brown Ch. International Relations Theory: New Normative Approach. NY: Harvester Press, 1992. 

Brown Ch. Understanding International Relations. Basingstoke: Palgrave Publishing, 2005.

Bull H. The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977.

Bull H., Watson A. (eds.), The Expansion of International Society. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984.

Buzan B., Little R. International Systems in World History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Buzan B., Woever O. Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Buzan Barry, Acharya Amitav Conclusion: on the possibility of a non-Western IR theory in Asia // International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 7 (3). 2007.

Buzan Barry, Acharya Amitav. Why is there no non-Western international relations theory?: an introduction // International Relations of the Asia-Pacific. 7 (3). 2007.

Buzan Barry, Little Richard. International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Buzan Barry, Little Richard. The historical expansion of international society // Denemark, Robert Allen (ed.). The international studies encyclopedia. Wiley-Blackwell in association with the International Studies Association, Chichester, UK., 2010.

Campbell D. National Deconstruction:Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia. Minneapolis, 1998.

Carr E.H. The Twenty Years' Crisis. London, 1939.

Caspary W.R. The Mood Theory: A Study of Public Opinion and Foreign Policy // American Political Science Review. 64. 536–547. 1970.

Clinton W.D. The realist tradition and contemporary international relations. Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 2007.

Clough P.T. Feminist Thought. Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1994.

Cobden R. Political writings. 2 vol. London: Fisher Unwin, 1903.

Code Lorraine. Encyclopedia of Feminist Theories. London; New York: Routledge, 2002.

Cohen R., Kennedy P. Global sociology. N.Y.: New York University Press, 2007.

Cohn C. Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals // Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society. Vol. 12. No. 4. Summer 1987.

Cox R.W. Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History. New York: Columbia University Press, 1987.

Cox R., Jacobson Harold K. The Anatomy of Influence: decision making in international organization. London, 1973.

Cox R., Schechter M. The Political Economy of a Plural World: Critical Reflections on Power, Morals and Civilization. Routledge: London and New York, 2002

Cox R.W. Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method // Gill S. (ed.). Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

Cox R.W. Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History. Columbia: Columbia University Press, 1987

Cox Robert W. Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory

// Millennium 10. 1981.

Crocker David A. Ethics of Global Development: Agency, Capability, and Deliberative Democracy.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008

Crocker David A. Development Ethics, Globalization, and Democratization/ Chatterjee D., Krausz M. (eds.) Globalization, Democracy, and Development: Philosophical Perspectives. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007.

D'Anieri P. International Politics: Power and Purpose in Global Affairs. Boston: Cengage Learning, 2009.

Derian Der J. (ed.). International Theory: Critical Investigations. London: MacMillan, 1995.

Derian Der J. Introducing Philosophical Traditions in International Relations// Millennium. Vol. 17. No. 2. 1988.

Delgado R., Stefancic J. Critical Race Theory: An Introduction. NY: NYU Press, 2011–12.

Derian Der J. On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement. NY: John Wiley & Sons, 1987.

Derian Der J. Antidiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed, and War. NY; London: Blackwill, 1992.

Derian Der J., Shapiro M. (eds). International / Intertextual Relations; Postmodern Readings of World Politics. New York: Lexington Books, 1989.

Devetak R. Post-structuralism // Burchill S., Linklater A., Devetak R., Donnely J., Nardin T., Paterson M. Reus-Smit Ch., True J. Theories of International Relations. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.

Devetak R. Postmodernism // Burchill S., Linklater A. Theories of International Relations. London: Macmillan Press, 1996.

Devetak R., Burke A., George J. An Introduction to International Relations: Australian Perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Donneli J. Realism and IR. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Doyle M. Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs//Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 12. No. 3 (Summer, 1983). Р. 205–235.

Doyle M. Liberalism and World Politics//American Political Science Review. 1986. 80 (4). 1151–1169.

Dumont L. Essais sur l'individualisme. Une perspective anthropologique sur l'idéologie moderne. Paris: Le Seuil, 1983.

Dumont L. Homo Æqualis I: genèse et épanouissement de l'idéologie économique. Paris: Gallimard/ BSH, 1977.

Dunne T. Inventing International Society. A History of the English School. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998.

Dunne T., Kurki M., Smith S. International relations theories: discipline and diversity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Durand G. Les Structures anthropologiques de l'imaginaire. Paris: Borda, 1969.

Durkheim E. Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse. Paris: Libraire générale française, 1991.

Edkins J.,Vaughan-Williams N. Critical theorists and international relations. N.Y.: Taylor & Francis, 2009.

Eisenstadt S.N. The Civilizational Dimension of Modernity: Modernity as a Distinct Civilization// International Sociology, 16 (3). 2001. С. 320–340.

Elshtain J. Women and War: Gender Identity and Activism in Times of Conflict. Sterling, VA: Kumarian Press, 2010.

Enloe C. Margins, Silences, and Bottom-Rungs: How to overcome the Understanding of Power in the Study of International Relations // Smith S., Boot R., Zalewski M. (eds). International Theory: Positivism and Beyond. Cambridge, 1997.

Enloe Cynthia. Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics. London: Pandora Press 1990.

Everett D. Don’t Sleep, There are Snakes. New York: Pantheon Books, 2008.

Featherstone M. (ed.). Global Culture. London: Sage, 1992

Finnemore Martha. National Interests in International Society. Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1996

Fox J. Paradigm Lost: Huntington's Unfulfilled Clash of Civilizations Prediction into the 21st Century // International Politics. 42. 2005. Р. 428–457.

Fox J. Paradigm Lost: Huntington's Unfulfilled Clash of Civilizations Prediction into the 21st Century // International Politics. 42. 2005. Р. 428–457.

Friedman George, LeBard Meredith. The Coming War With Japan. New York: St. Martin's. Press, 1991.

Friedman Thomas L. The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization.New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1999.

Friedman Thomas L. The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005; Idem. The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1999.

Frobenius Leo. Paideuma: Umrisse einer Kultur — und Seelenlehre. München: Beck, 1921–1928.

Frost M. Ethics in International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Frost M. Towards a Normative Theory of International Relations & Ethics and International Relations Consensus. Cambridge: CUP, 1986.

Fukuyama Francis. After Neoconservatism // The New York Times Magazine. 2006–02–19.

Furtado C. A nova dependência, dívida externa e monetarismo. RJ: Paz e Terra, 1982.

Geertz Clifford. The Interpretation of Cultures. NY: Basic Books, 2000.

Geertz Clifford. Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture/George J. Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical Introduction to International Relations. NY: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994.

Giddens A. Risk and Responsibility // Modern Law Review. 1999. № 62 (1). С. 1–10.

Gill S. American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991

Gill S. Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Gill S. Power and Resistance in the New World Order. London; New York: Macmillan-Palgrave, 2003.

Gill S. The Global Political Economy: Perspectives, Problems and Policies with David Law. Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf; Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988.

Gilpin R. Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order. NY, 2001.

Gilpin R. Political Economy of International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987.

Gilpin R. The Theory of Hegemonic War // Journal of Interdisciplinary History. 18 (4). 1988.

Gilpin R. War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

Gowa J. Farber H. Polities and Peace // International Security. Vol. 20. Issue 2 (autumn 1995). P. 123–146.

Gray C.S. War, peace and international relations: an introduction to strategic history. N.Y.: Taylor & Francis, 2007.

Griffiths M. International relations theory for the twenty-first century: an introduction. N.Y.: Routledge, 2007.

Griffiths M., O'Callaghan Т., Roach S.C. International relations: the key concepts. New York: Taylor & Francis, 2008.

Guddzini Stefano. A reconstruction of Cоnstructivism in IR // European Journal of International Relations Copyright. Vol. 6 (2). 2000.

Guzzini S. Realism in international relations and international political economy: the continuing story of a death foretold, New York: Routledge,1998.

Guzzini S., Leander A. Constructivism and international relations: Alexander Wendt and his critics. N.Y.: Routledge, 2006.

Haass Richard N. The Age of Nonpolarity. What Will Follow U.S. Dominance//Foreign Affairs. May / June 2008.

Halliday Fred. Rethinking International Relations. London: Macmillan, 1994.

Haraway Donna. A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century // Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature. New York; Routledge, 1991. C. 149–181.

Harris Lee. Civilization and Its Enemies: The Next Stage of History, New York, The Free Press, 2004.

Harrison Lawrence E., Samuel P. Huntington (eds.). Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress. New York: Basic Books, 2001.

Haslam J. No virtue like necessity: realist thought in International Relations since Machiavelli. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002.

Heidegger M. Sein und Zeit (1927). Tubingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2006.

Held David, McGrew Anthony, Goldblatt David, Perraton Jonathan. Global Transformations. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999.

Henderson E.A., Tucker R. Clear and Present Strangers: The Clash of Civilizations and International Conflict // International Studies Quarterly. 45. 2001.

Hiro Dilip. After Empire. The birth of a multipolar world. NY: Nation books, 2009.

Hobden Stephen, Hobson John M. Historical sociology of international relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Hobden Stephen. International Relations and Historical Sociology: Breaking Down Boundaries & L. NY: Routledge, 1998.

Hobson J.M. The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics: Western International Theory, 1760–2010. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2011.

Holsti Ole R. Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann Consensus//International Studies Quarterly. 36 (4) (December 1992). P. 439–466.

Huntington Samuel P. (ed.) The Clash of Civilizations?: The Debate // Foreign Affairs, New York, 1996.

Huntington Samuel. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. London: Simon, 1996.

Hurd I. Legitimacy and authority in international politics / International Organization. 53. 1999.

Ikenberry G. John, Slaughter Anne-Marie. Princeton Project on National Security, Forging a World Under Liberty and Law: U.S. National Security in the 21st Century. September 2006.

Ikenberry J. After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.

Jackson R., Sorensen G. Introduction to International Relations. Oxford Univeristy Press, 2010.

Reus-Smit Ch., Snidal D. The Oxford Handbook of International Relations. Oxford University Press, 2008.

Kaiser K. Interdependence and autonomy // Morgan R., Kaiser K. (ed.). Britain and Germany. London. Oxford University Press, 1971.

Kaplan M. System and Process in International Politics. NY: Wiley, 1964.

Kaplan R.D. Imperial Grunts: On the Ground with the American Military, from Mongolia to the Philippines to Iraq and Beyond. NY: Vintage, 2006.

Katzenstein P. (ed). Civilizations in World Politics: Plural and Pluralist Perspectives NY: Routledge, 2009.

Katzenstein P. Beyond Paradigms: Analytic Eclecticism in World Politics NY: Palgrave, 2010.

Katzenstein Peter J. Civilizations in World Politics: Plural and Pluralist Perspectives. London, UK: Routledge, 2010.

Katzenstein Peter J. (ed.). The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.

Kegley C.W., Blanton L.B. World politics: trend and transformation. Boston: Cengage Learning, 2009.

Kelsen H. Reine Rechtslehre. Vienna, 1934

Kennedy Paul. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Unwin Hyman, 1988.

Keohane R. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy.

Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.

Keohane R. Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World. New York: Routledge, 2002.

Keohane Robert O., Nye Joseph S. Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977.

Khatami Mohammad. Dialogue among civilizations: a paradigm for peace. NY: Theo Bekker, Joelien Pretorius, 2001.

Kindleberger Ch.P. World Economic Primacy: 1500–1990. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Kissinger H. A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812–22. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957.

Klotz A., Lynch S. Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations. N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2007.

Köchler, Hans (ed.). Civilizations: Conflict or Dialogue? Vienna: International Progress Organization, 1999.

Krasner S. Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999.

Krasner S. Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985.

Krasner S.D. Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investment and American Foreign Policy Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978.

Krauthammer Ch. The Unipolar Moment// Foreign Affairs. 1990/1991 Winter. Vol. 70. No 1. С. 23–33.

Krauthammer Charles. The Unipolar Moment Revisited // National Interest. Volume 70. Рages 5–17. Winter 2002.

Lash S. Another Modernity, A Different Rationality. Oxford: Blackwell, 1999.

Lash S., Featherstone M. (eds.) Spaces of Culture: City, Nation, World. London: Sage, 1999.

Lash S., Featherstone M., Szerszynski B., Wynne B. Spaces of Culture: City, Nation, World. London: Sage 1999

Lash S., Lury C. Global Culture Industry: The Mediation of Things. Cambridge: Polity, 2005.

Lash S., Szerszynski B., Wynne B. (eds.) Risk, Environment and Modernity. London: Sage (TCS), 1996.

Layne Ch. Kant or Cant. The myth of the Democratic Peace // International security. 19 (2). 1994. P. 5–49.

Lebow R.N. A cultural theory of international relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Lebow R.N., Lichbach M.I. Theory and evidence in comparative politics and international relations. Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

Lederach John Paul. Preparing for Peace. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1996.

Richmond Oliver P. Peace in International Relations. London: Routledge, 2008.

Lederach John Paul. Preparing for Peace. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1996.

Linklater A. Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations& London: MacMillan Press, 1990.

Linklater A. Critical Theory and World Politics: Citizenship, sovereignty and humanity. L, NY: Routledge, 2007.

Linklater A. Marx and Marxism / Theories of International Ralations. NY: Pilgrave Macmillan, 2009. P. 117

Linklater A., Suganami H. The English School of International Relations: A Contemporary Reassessment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Lippman W. Essays in Public Philosophy. NY: New American Library, 1956.

Little R. The balance of power in international relations: metaphors, myths and models. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Wittgenstein Ludwig: Philosophische Untersuchungen. Kritisch-genetische Edition. Herausgegeben von Joachim Schulte. Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. Frankfurt, 2001.

MacLean J. Marxism and international relations: a strange case of mutual neglect// Millennium. Vol. 17. No. 2.

Mahan A.T. The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783. New York: Dover Publications, 1987.

Mann M. The autonomous power of the state: its origins, mechanisms and results //Archives Europeennes de sociologie. № 25. 1984.

Mansfield E., Snyder J. Democratization and the Danger of War // International Security, Vol. 20. No. 1. Summer, 1995.

McCain John. America must be a good role model // Financial Times. March 18. 2008.

Mearsheimer John J., Walt Stephen M. The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007.

Mearsheimer John J. E. H. Carr vs. Idealism: The Battle Rages On // International Relations. Vol. 19. No. 2.

Mearsheimer John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: Norton, 2001.

Merton Robert K. Social Theory and Social Structure. New York: Free Press,1968

Mesquita Bueno de, Lalman David. War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992.

Meyer J., Boli J., Thomas G., Ramirez F. World Society and the Nation-State // American Journal of Sociology. 1997. № 103 (1). С. 144–181

Meyer John W. The World Polity and the Authority of the Nation-State // Bergesen A. (ed.). Studies of the Modern World-System. New York: Academic Press, 1980. С. 109–137.

Michael M.S., Petito F. (eds.). Civilizational Dialogue and World Order: The Other Politics of Cultures, Religions, and Civilizations in International Relations. Palgrave-Macmillan, 2009.

Miliband R. Divided Societies: Class Struggle in Contemporary Capitalism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989.

Moravcsik A. Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics //International Organization. 51 (4): 513–53. 1997.

Morgenthau H. In defence of the national interest: a critical examination of American foreign policy. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951.

Morgenthau H. Truth and Power: Essays of a Decade, 1960–70. NY: Praeger, 1970.

Morgenthau Hans J. Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace. Second Edition, Alfred A. Knopf: New York, 1955.

Morin, E., Le Moigne, J.-L. L'intelligence de la complexité. Paris: L' Harmattan, 1999.

Mühlmann Wilhelm Emil. Methodik der Völkerkunde. Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke, 1938.

Muir Ramsay. The faith of a liberal. London,1933.

Niebuhr R. Christian Realism and Political Problems. York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953.

Nitzan J., Shimshon B. Capital as Power: A study of order and creorder. London: Routledge, 2009.

Nye J. Power in the Global Information Age: From Realism to Globalization L.,NY: Routledge, 2004.

Nye Joseph S. Jr. Soft Power: The Means To Success In World Politics. PublicAffairs, 2004.

Nye Joseph S. The Future of Power. NY: Public Affairs, 2011.

Nye Jr., Joseph S. Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power. New York: Basic Books, 1990.

Onuf Nicholas. World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations. Columbia: University of South California Press, 1989.

Patomäki H., Teivainen T. A Possible World: Democratic Transformation of Global Institutions. NY: Zed Books, 2005.

Petitio F. Dialogue of Civilizations as Global Political Discourse: Some Theoretical Reflections // The Bulletin of the World Public Forum 'Dialogue of Civilizations'. Vol. 1 No. 2/ 21–29. 2004.

Petito F., Odysseos L. (2006) Introducing the International Theory of Carl Schmitt: International Law, International Relations, and the Present Global Predicament (s // Leiden Journal of International Law. Vol. 19. No. 1. 2006.

Petito F., Odysseos L. The International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt: Terror, liberal war and the crisis of global order. London and New York: Routledge, 2007

Petito Fabio. Dialogue of Civilizations as Global Political Discourse: Some Theoretical Reflections // The Bulletin of the World Public Forum 'Dialogue of Civilizations'. Vol. 1. No. 2, 21–29. 2004.

Pijl K. van der. The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class. London, 1984.

Pijl K. van der. Transnational Classes and International Relations. London, 1998.

Pijl K. van der. Global Rivalries — From the Cold War to Iraq. London, 2006.

Pijl van der K. Modes of foreign relations and political economy. Vol. 1: Nomads, Empires, States. London, 2007

Pijl van der K. Modes of foreign relations and political economy. Vol. 2: The foreign Encounter in Myth and Religion, London: 2010.

Prebisch Raul. The Economic Development of Latin America. New York: United Nations, 1950.

Qin Yaqing. Why Is There No Chinese International Relations Theory. International Relations of the Asia Pacific. vol. 7, No.3. 2007

Reus-Smit C., Snidal D. The Oxford handbook of international relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Reus-Smit Ch., Snidal D. International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Reuss-Smit Ch. Constructivism // Burchill S., Linklater A., Devetak R., Donnely J., Nardin T., Paterson M. Reus-Smit Ch., True J. Theories of International Relations. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 

Reuss-Smit Ch. Constructivism / Burchill S., Linklater A., Devetak R., Donnely J., Nardin T., Paterson M. Reus-Smit Ch., True J. Theories of International Relations. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.

Richmond Oliver P. Peace in International Relations. London: Routledge, 2008.

Robertson R. Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture. London: Sage, 1992.

Robinson W.I. Capitalist globalization and the transnationalization of the state // Rupert M., Smith H. Historical materialism and globalization. London: Routledge, 2002.

Rosenau J. Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity. Princeton, 1990.

Rosenau J., Fagen W. A New Dynamism in World Politics: Increasingly Skillful Individuals? //JSTOR. Studies Quarterly. 41. 1997.

Ruggie John. What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge // International Organization. 52. 4. Autumn 1998.

Rummel R. Understanding Conflict and War. NY: John Wiley & Sons, 1976.

Rupert M. Producing Hegemony: The Politics of Mass Production and American Global Power. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1995

Rupert M., Smith H. Historical materialism and globalization. London: Routledge, 2002.

Russet B. Grasping the Democratic Peace. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.

Russett B.M., Oneal J.R., Cox M. Clash of Civilizations, or Realism and Liberalism Déjà Vu? Some Evidence // Journal of Peace Research. 37. 2000.

Russett B., Starr H., Kinsella D. World Politics: The Menu for Choice. Boston: Cengage Learning, 2009.

Safire William. The End of Yalta // New York Times. July 09, 1997.

Said Edward. The Clash of Ignorance // The Nation. October 2001.

Salmon T.C. Issues in international relations. New York: Taylor & Francis, 2008.

Sanbonmatsu J. The Postmodern Prince: Critical Theory, Left Strategy, And The Making Of A New Political Subject. Quebec: Monthly Review Press, 2004.

Savarkar Vinayak Damodar. Hindutva. Delhi: Bharati Sahitya Sadan, 1989.

Schmitt C. Der Leviathan in der Staatslehre des Thomas Hobbes. Berlin, 1938.

Schmitt Carl. Völkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung mit Interventionsverbot für Raumfremde Mächte — Ein Bitrag zum Reichsbegriff im Völkerrecht. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1991.

Schmitt Carl. Völkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung mit Interventionsverbot für Raumfremde Mächte — Ein Bitrag zum Reichsbegriff im Völkerrecht. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1991.

Sen Amartya. Democracy as a Universal Value // Journal of Democracy. 10.3. 1999.

Shapiro M.J. Textualizing Global Politics/ Darian Der J., Shapiro M. J. (eds.). International // Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989.

Shapiro M.J., Hayward R. Alker (eds.). Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1996.

Sharp P. Diplomatic theory of international relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Sheeran P. Literature and international relations: stories in the art of diplomacy. Bogmin: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2007.

Shilliam R. International Relations and Non-Western Thought: Imperialism, Colonialism and Investigations of Global Modernity. N.Y.: Taylor & Francis, 2010.

Shimko K.L. International Relations: Perspectives and Controversies. Boston: Cengage Learning, 2009.

Singer D. Correlates of War Project: Interim Report and Rationale // World Politics. Vol. 24. No. 2. Jan., 1972.

Singer Hans W., Ansari Javed A. Rich and Poor Countries: Consequences of International Disorder. London: Routledge, 1988.

Small Melvin, Singer J.D. The War Proneness of Democratic Regimes, 1816–1965 // Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 1: 50–69.

Smith S. Epistemology, Postmodernism and International Relations Theory: A Reply to Osterud // Journal of Peace Research, 1997. Vol. 34 (3). P. 330–336.

Smith S.M., Booth R., Zalewski M. (eds.). International Theory: Positivism and Beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Smith S. New approaches to International Theory / Baylis J, Smith S. (eds). The globalization in world politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. P. 181.

Snyder R., Bruck H., Sapin B. Foreign policy decision making. NY:The Free Press, 1962.

Spykman N. America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1942.

Spykman N. The Geography of the Peace. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1944.

Strange S. Casino Capitalism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986.

Strange S. States and markets. London: Pinter, 1988.

Sumner W. Folkways. Boston: Ginn, 1907.

Teivainen T. Enter Economism, Exit Politics: Experts, Economic Policy and the Damage to Democracy. London; New York: Zed Books, 2002.

Telò M. International relations: a European perspective. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2009.

Thomas W.I., Znaniecki F.W. The Polish Peasant in Europe and America: A Classic Work in Immigration History. Urbana.: University of Illinois Press, 1996.

Thurnwald R. Die menschliche Gesellschaft in ihren ethno-soziologischen Grundlagen, 5 B. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1931–1934.

Tickner A. Yans Morgentau’s Political Principles of Political Realism: A Feminist Reformulation // Millenium. 17 (3). 1988.

Tickner A.B., Wæver O. International relations scholarship around the world. N.Y.: Taylor & Francis, 2009.

Tickner J. Ann. Gendering World Politics. Columbia University Press. 2001.

Tickner J. Ann. Hans Morgentau's Principles of Pjlitical Realism. A Feminist Reformulation // Derian D. (ed.) International Theory: Critical Investigations. London: MacMillan, 1995.

Tilly Ch. Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1990. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990.

Tretschke von H. Politics. London: Constable, 1916.

Tshiyembe Mwayila. Would a United States of Africa work? Le Monde diplomatique (English edition). September 2000.

Vincent R.J. Human Rights and International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.

Walker, R.B.J. Inside / Outside: International Relations as Political Theory. Cambridge: University Press, Cambridge, 1993.

Wallerstein I. After Liberalism. New York: New Press, 1995.

Wallerstein I. Decline of American Power: The U.S. in a Chaotic World. New York: New Press, 2003.

Wallerstein I. Geopolitics and geoculture: essays on the changing world-system. Cambridge: Press Syndicate, 1991.

426 Международные отношения (парадигмы, теории, социология)

Wallerstein I. Geopolitics and geoculture: essays on the changing world-system. Cambridge: Press Syndicate, 1991.

Wallerstein I. Historical Capitalism, with Capitalist Civilization. London: Verso, 1995.

Wallerstein I. The End of the World As We Know It: Social Science for the Twenty-first Century. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999.

Wallerstein I. The Twentieth Century: Darkness at Noon? Keynote address. Boston: PEWS conference, 2000. С. 6.

Wallerstein I. Utopistics: Or, Historical Choices of the Twenty-first Century. New York: New Press, 1998.

Wallerstein I. World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2004:

Wallerstein I. World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2004.

Walt S. American Hegemony: Its Prospects and Pitfalls // Naval War College Review. Spring 2002.

Walt S. Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy. W.W. Norton, 2005.

Walt S. Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy. W.W. Norton, 2005.

Walton Dale C. Geopolitic and the great Powers in the Twenty-first Century. Multipolarity and the revolution in the strategic perspective. L; NY: Routledge, 2007.

Waltz K. Man, the State, and War. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959.

Waltz K. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed. W. W. Norton & Company. New York, 1995.

Waltz K. Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw Hill, 1979.

Waltz. M. Man, State and War. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959.

Walzer Michel. Thinking Politically. Yale: Yale University Press, 2007.

Yan Xuetong. Shijie quanli de zhuanyi: zhengzhi lingdao yu zhanlue jingzheng [The Transition of World]. 2015.

Zhang Weiwei. China Wave, The: Rise Of A Civilizational State. New Jersey: World Century Publishing Corporation, 2012.

Zhao Tingyang. Tianxia Tixi: Shijie Zhidu Zhexue Daolun [Tianxia System: An Introduction to the Philosophy of World Institutions]. Nanjing: Jiangsu Jiaoyu Chubanshe. 2005.