On the issue of the denunciation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Treaty. Part V


Part I

Part II

Part III

Part IV

Possible negative consequences for Russia following denunciation of the INF Treaty / Solution: Global INF Treaty

As it was shown above, for Russia there are motives for the decision on a withdrawal from a treaty about INF Treaty caused by need of acceptance of additional measures for ensuring of own safety in changed after signing of this agreement conditions.

Meanwhile such steps can lead to a number of serious negative consequences. Therefore all pluses and minuses of such decision should be carefully counted.

Among negative consequences of denunciation by Russia INF Treaty discussed in the expert environment, it should be noted the following:

- expansion in Europe of new American missiles of intermediate-range;

- expansion in Europe of additional means of the US’s AMD (planned on “A stage-by-stage adaptive approach”);

- further strengthening of military capacity of the US and NATO, increase in their military expenses;

- revision of nuclear policy of Great Britain and France on partial reduction of the nuclear potential;

- possibility for the US freely to develop high-precision PA of intermediate-range;

- further consolidation of the countries of NATO on the anti-Russian platform, strengthening of positions of the US in NATO;

- negative political and military reaction of others (non-European neighbors of Russia) - China, Iran, Turkey, etc., an aggravation of contradictions of Russia with them;

- negative influence on international legal system in the field of control over arms and non-proliferation;

- image losses of Russia in the world community as advocate of ideas of disarmament.

A number of these consequences have military and technical character, a row - the political and diplomatic character, some lie in the psychological plane.

The main danger of denunciation of the INF Treaty to Russia consists that it can be a reason for expansion in Europe of the American missiles of intermediate-range. This danger is real and essential. As a result we can return to a situation from which at the price of big concessions left by the conclusion of the INF Treaty.

The US actually already has missiles of intermediate-range in the form of targets for test of AMD systems, and to turn them into means of war will not demand big work and time.

As it is represented, new members of NATO without special problems will agree to provide the territory for the American missiles. It is possible to judge it how it occurs to expansion of the American AMD in Europe.

Thus if in the year 1980 the American missiles of intermediate-range of "Pershing-2" (developed in Belgium, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands and Germany) hardly reached the centre of the European part of the USSR, now in case of placement of similar systems in the territory of new members of NATO (Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, the Baltic States) will be blocked all European territory of Russia.

It really would threaten objects of the state and military management of the Russian Federation and the Russian potential of strategic nuclear control.

Taking into account technological development it is possible to expect expansion in Europe not only of ballistic and cruise missiles of intermediate-range, but also of shock pilotless aircraft (which, from the point of view of terms of the INF Treaty also treat cruise missiles). According to V. Dvorkin, “at full transparency of battlefield at the expense of space and other investigation and when using shock pilotless aircraft it is possible to provide rather high vulnerability of a wide range of strategic objects”.

Other possible negative consequences of a possible exit of Russia mentioned above from the INF Treaty, as it is represented, influence more emotions.

So, for example, NATO and as never after the completion of cold war “rallied on the anti-Russian front” in connection with events in Ukraine. To it testify the atmosphere and solutions of the last summit of NATO which has passed in the beginning of September, 2014 in Newport.

It is hardly necessary to expect a revision of the nuclear policy of Great Britain and France. These countries partially reduced the nuclear potential, but these actions were caused considerably by economic motives which and are actual now. The same reasons will influence policy of military expenses of the US and NATO.

Reaction of other neighbors of Russia to cancellation of the INF Treaty in many respects will depend not so much on the fact of denunciation of this agreement, and how many from real possibilities, plans and the subsequent actions for creation and expansion of land based  missile systems of intermediate and short range (quantity, areas of placement, nuclear or non-nuclear fighting equipment, etc.).

Russia will keep a mode of the INF Treaty or will not keep, but those countries which will consider it for itself necessary, all the same will develop the missiles, without meaning a factor of threats of the Russian Federation as meaning. Hardly they will apprehend such step of Russia as threat of own safety and will direct a part of the nuclear missile funds for the Russian Federation.

According to S. Brezkun, “fears are decided that emergence of RAR in us will provoke allegedly China. In total just the opposite - if we had near the Urals and Baikal RAR … that respect of China, Japan and others to Russia only would increase. Where-where, and in the East executed to behavioral politeness really appreciate only force”.

As to development of pilotless aircraft as it is represented, Russia itself it is interested in development of the relevant systems and overcoming of a ban on them in the INF Treaty.

Now, as to impact of denunciation of the INF Treaty on the international legal monitoring system over arms and non-proliferation.

According to supporters of saving of the INF Treaty denunciation of this agreement by Russia “will transfer arrows as on the main opponent of idea of nuclear disarmament popular in the world”, “will even more loosen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty” to Moscow, “will be unequivocally understood as return to confrontation and race of arms between great powers”. In their opinion, the international public perceives the INF Treaty as the sign phenomenon - a symbol of the final stage of cold war and transition to real nuclear disarmament.

It is necessary to recognize however that the international legal monitoring system over arms and so to be in a certain crisis. Stopped existence the Agreement AMD after an exit from it in 2002 of the United States. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty did not come into force, as was not ratified by a number of the countries (including the same United States). The long time is in the deadlock a situation at Conference on disarmament in Geneva therefore negotiations on the Agreement on prohibition of production of being split materials for the nuclear weapon and to the Agreement on prevention of placement of the weapon in space are blocked. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty so did not receive universal character, out of this mode remain a number of the nuclear countries - India, Pakistan, Israel, Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Certainly problems of the international legal monitoring system over arms and non-proliferation - not an occasion to "finish" it. Such system is certainly necessary for safer and stable world. However such system not is something stiffened, it constantly is in change. After all agreements should serve safety strengthening and if it does not occur, they should change.

It is necessary to notice also that the reason of many problems of control over arms is the policy of a number of the countries and military blocks, and first of all the US and NATO, on use of force for settlement of the international problems, including plans on use in these purposes of the nuclear weapon or the SOA in non-nuclear equipment. The policy similar to those which was shown by NATO countries in Yugoslavia and in the Middle East, remains a serious obstacle on a way of ideas of disarmament.

It is necessary to remind also that the United States in 2002 unilaterally left the Agreement on the AMD of 1972 which admitted "cornerstone" of system of agreements on nuclear disarmament.

In the become widely known Valdai speech on October 24, 2014 the President of Russia, speaking about destruction of operating system of agreements on restrictions and control over arms emphasized that “the beginning to this dangerous process was put by the US when in 2002 unilaterally left the agreement on the AMD. I pay your attention - not we began it!”

It is necessary to remind also that Russia urged to discuss the possibility of giving the INF Treaty a global character. Let's consider this possibility of preservation of a verification regime over INF in more detail.

Solution: Global INF Treaty

 In 2007 Russia put forward an initiative about giving to the INF Treaty of global character. This idea was supported by Washington that allowed to prepare and extend at the 62nd session of General Assembly of the United Nations in 2007 the Joint Russian-American statement under the Agreement on elimination of missiles of intermediate-range and short range.

In this statement the appeal “sounded to discuss possibility of giving of global character to this important mode by refusal of ballistic and land based cruise missiles with ranges of 500-5500 kilometers, conducting to destruction of any such missiles and the termination of the related programs”.

In 2008 Russia prepared “Basic elements of the international legal arrangement on elimination of missiles of intermediate-range and short range (land based), open for wide international accession”.

Main provisions of this document are as follows:

- any participating state of the arrangement does not make any missiles of intermediate-range and short range, does not carry out flight tests of such missiles and does not make any steps of such missiles and any launchers of such missiles;

- each participating state of the arrangement liquidates all the missiles of intermediate-range and short range, launchers of such missiles, and also connected with such missiles and launchers all auxiliary constructions and all auxiliaries which are in its property or possession or which are placed in any place under its jurisdiction or control.

It is curious that a bit later with an initiative of the global INF Treaty the president of France of that time Nicolas Sarkozy acted.

Certainly, creation and the subsequent realization of a mode of the global INF Treaty would bring mass of positive results.

The world would get rid of missiles in a range of ranges from 500 km to 5500 km, in summary - further improvement of a situation on a global scale and safer world.

It would become a powerful positive contribution to strengthening of a mode of nuclear non-proliferation. Well-known that the most effective remedy for delivery of nuclear ammunition are missiles. Their absence essentially would reduce motivation to creation of the nuclear weapon. It would be an all-important contribution of other states to process of nuclear disarmament.

The arrangement on a complete elimination of INF Treaty practically would remove from the agenda a question of the need of the AMD to fight against such missiles, after all they are available for the countries, “causing concern”.

The result of the realization of this idea would be not only to strengthen international and national security, but also to rid the participants in the future agreement of the economic burden connected with the creation, production and expansion of the considered classes of weapons.

However it is necessary to recognize that the realization of the INF global mode is hardly possible as a foreseeable prospect. And the countries possessing ballistic INF also do not wish to be connected to the INF Treaty.

On the one hand, for many countries, such a missile system is viewed as important (and sometimes, the main thing and the only thing) and the most effective remedy of ensuring their own safety and control of regional conflicts (an example - Indian-Pakistan relations). So, the realization is on the rise, politically, at the regional and global levels.

On the other hand, the promotion of an initiative of the global  INF Treaty does not make a guarantee of safety to the states which do not possess – or have refused –  missile means. The agreement does not contain in it any instructions on the encouragement of such countries. It is clear, that the states having missile weapons spent huge material and financial means for their creation, and the question of possible compensation in default from missiles is not designated.

At last, the question is essentially important, whether the initiative means involvement of all states without exception, or whether it allows the possibility of a future invitation to the agreement of only some states.

The idea of the elimination of two classes of weapons bears in itself a positive beginning. For its advance it is necessary to discuss conditions and principles on the basis of which the arrangement on the elimination of missiles of intermediate and short range should be developed. Here it is important to consider, at least, the following:

- recognition of inadmissibility of power methods of the permission of political affairs, and the threat of force is necessary;

- it is necessary to be defined, whether the arrangement is to be general, or some states cannot be participants, or subsequently they can join;

- the arrangement should assume a term-less character;

- the arrangement should provide a realization of phased implementation in rather long terms (all at once);

- the achievement of the arrangement on the preliminary announcement of the missile stocks of all states in INF Treaty available for them could become an important point on a way of transfer of an initiative to the practical plane;

- in the arrangement guarantees of ensuring national security for all the participants (otherwise to count on success it is not necessary) should be surely fixed;

- along with guarantees of safety it is important to fulfil and fix measures of encouragement of the states which have refused possession by missile means. For example, there could be a speech about preferential terms for them in implementation of a conclusion of payloads to space by means of carrier missiles of other states or assistance in the creation of carrier missiles by them.