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EDITORIAL

The Journal of Eurasian Affairs is a new international journal founded by the Russian NGO International Social Movement “Eurasian Movement”. It is dedicated to different issues such as Eurasianism in its different aspects (from philosophy to integration process on post-Soviet space), geopolitics, international relations, war and peace studies, globalization, multipolarity and new emerging theories in fields of politics and humanitarian sciences.

Because of its title covered themes are about processes in Eurasia, but not limited by continental boundaries. Eurasia as an idea and Eurasianism as an outlook are international by its essence.

In some sense the Journal of Eurasian Affairs is a interdisciplinary one where ideas cross from different schools, trends and sets that makes it a broad platform for discussion and forum for meetings of academic researchers, political activists, philosophers, independent scholars, experts and decision makers.

The red line of the Journal of Eurasian Affairs is a critical approach to (neo)liberalism and its derivatives manifested in realpolitik as well as in large scale of activities dealing with the human being itself. The need to develop an alternative is the second task, put before the founders of the Journal and core thinkers of the “Eurasian Movement”.

We believe that writers from all over the globe will join us for the development (and revival) of these kind of ideas that will promote and establish a new model of global affairs and of political systems paying respect to all nations, peoples, groups, beliefs, cultures and traditions.

The Journal of Eurasian Affairs invites contributors to send articles, essays and reviews.

Leonid Savin, Editor.
EURASIA IN THE WAR OF NETWORKS

Alexander Dugin

The reason for writing this text was Vladimir Putin’s address to Russia’s Federal Assembly and the synchronized passage of the anti-Russian resolution 758 by the U.S. Congress. Commenting on the latter, Congressman Eliot Engel stated: “It’s time to recognize the fact that Russia under the leadership of Vladimir Putin is a threat to European security and to U.S. interests in the region.” Back in 2011, Hillary Clinton similarly proclaimed: “We are in an information war.” In his address, Putin stated: “Crimea, the ancient Korsun or Chersonesus, and Sevastopol have invaluable civilizational and even sacral importance for Russia, like the Temple Mount in Jerusalem for the followers of Islam and Judaism. And this is how we will always consider it.” In other words, he declared a tough course for the revival of Russia’s sovereignty and continental power, as well as its sacred Orthodox identity. In response, the United States openly mentioned its information war against Russia:

— [The House of Representatives] calls on the President and the United States Department of State to develop a strategy for multilateral coordination to produce or otherwise procure and distribute news and information in the Russian language to countries with significant Russian-speaking populations which maximizes the use of existing platforms for content delivery such as the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Incorporated, leverages indigenous public-private partnerships for content production, and seeks in-kind contributions from regional state governments;

— calls on the United States Department of State to identify positions at key diplomatic posts in Europe to evaluate the political, economic, and cultural influence of Russia and Russian state-sponsored media and to coordinate with host governments on appropriate responses;

In reality, they have been carrying out this war against us for quite some time. But now it has reached a new level.

Parallel to these developments, I have noticed an increase in direct attacks against Eurasianists and me, personally, as well as the broad network of those interacting with me in Russia and around the world in the recent months. The last straw was the hacked e-mail box of a member of the Eurasian Movement, which was followed by a flurry of publications in the Western mainstream media about the alleged Russian-agent network around the world. These supposed agents were referred to as the “Black International” for the purpose of discreditation. I believe that the time has come to make some clarifications and, at the same time, identify the next trajectory for our Eurasian strategy.

1 http://engel.house.gov/latest-news1/engel-remarks-condemning-russian-agg...
2 http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704495004576264880231253582
3 http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/23341
Eurasianism as an Anti-Western Ideology

Let me remind you of the pre-history.

From the moment of its inception in the 1920s, Eurasianism has always opposed the global domination of the West, European universalism, and supported the uniqueness of the Russian civilization. Therefore, Eurasianism is, indeed, an anti-Western ideology in the sense that it rejects the Western society's right to impose its criteria of good and evil as the universal norm. Russia is an independent Orthodox-Eurasian civilization, rather than the periphery of Europe, insisted Eurasians, following their ideological predecessors, the Slavophiles, along with other Russian conservatives.

Gradually, Eurasianism was enriched with the methods of classic geopolitics that were based upon the dualism of the Land and Sea civilizations. Englishman Halford Mackinder introduced this concept in the first half of the twentieth century; it was further developed by American strategists such as Nicholas Spykman and Zbigniew Brzezinski. Here, Russia serves as the core of the Land civilization, Eurasia's Heartland, and is thus doomed to carry out a centuries-old battle against the Anglo-Saxon world. In the past, its core was the British Empire, and, from the second half of the twentieth century onward, this was the United States. Therefore, Eurasianists oppose Western hegemony, American expansionism, and Liberal values and support the distinct Russian civilization, religion, and tradition. Furthermore, Eurasianists not only oppose the West, but also Russia's own Westernizers and moderates: Liberals, first and foremost.

If the Atlanticist West is the enemy of the Eurasianists, then the Eurasians are the enemies of the West and its agents of influence. This is logical. Eurasianists know who their enemy is, and whom they oppose, and the enemy knows who the Eurasianists are. In this case, it would be strange if the Atlanticists, U.S. imperialists, and Liberals loved the Eurasianists and their supporters around the world. And vice versa. Hence the obvious thesis: we are either on the side of the Land civilization or that of the Sea. Land stands for Tradition, Faith (for Russians, this is Orthodox Christianity), Empire, narod (peoples), the Sacred, History, Family, Ethics. The Sea is modernization, trade, technology, Liberal democracy, capitalism, parliamentarism, individualism, materialism, and gender politics. These two are mutually exclusive sets of values.

Neo-Eurasianism in the Post-Soviet Period

A group of neo-Eurasianists, led by me, has been restoring and developing all these ideas as a comprehensive worldview starting from the late 1980s. We have reestablished a significant portion of the ideological heritage left by the original Eurasianists, added geopolitics and Traditionalism, and applied them to the political realities of the rapidly disintegrating USSR. Like the first Eurasianists of the 1920s—writing in emigration—we supported the transformation of the USSR into the Eurasian Empire. These transformations were supposed to involve preserving the entire space under unified strategic leadership, but changing the ideology to Orthodoxy and Eurasianism. And just like the original Eurasianists, we were convinced that the Liberals and Westernizers are the worst enemy of the Russian idea (worse than Communists), and that they would tear Greater Russia (USSR) apart if they were to be in power. After all, they were part of the Atlanticist network. This was fully confirmed in due time: they did get into power and did destroy it. And then they tried to break up the Russian Federation. Therefore, Eurasianists stood in radical opposition to Yeltsin and the entire Liberal-democratic pro-Western puppet regime of the 1990s, which was dominated by the comprador bourgeoisie and Russophobic agents of the U.S. This period marks the first demonization of neo-Eurasianists—the patriotic opposition in Russia—as “Russian chauvinists” in the United States and the West. Western ideologues even dragged a number of patriotic leaders into this anti-Eurasianist hysteria by using their ignorance and vanity and, occasionally, by simply bribing them.

All that changed by the year 2000 when Putin came to power. He began to transform the Yeltsin system in the patriotic vein, embodying a significant portion of ideas directly within the principles and values of the Eurasianist ideology. This and only this is the reason why the Eurasianists have supported Putin and support him still. There is nothing personal here: we opposed Yeltsin, an Atlanticist-Westerner, and began to support patriotic Putin. This is a purely ideological, crystal clear choice. This is also the reason why the degree of hatred toward Eurasianists among Russia's Liberal Westernizers along with the U.S.-dominated West had increased dramatically.

Today, Putin's policies are increasingly moving along the lines of Eurasianist ideas. This is why the West along with Russia's Liberal media and Liberals within the gov-
ernment that pragmatically support Putin have begun to carry out a direct attack against Eurasianists. They view the danger of Eurasianist support for Putin not in their number or influence, but in the sheer power of Eurasianist ideas, based on geopolitics and the civilizational method, accurate historic analysis and a radically anti-Western, anti-Liberal orientation, leaving no room for manipulation, fraud, and deception for the Westernizers. For this reason, thorough effort has been put into ensuring that Putin would not offer the slightest support for the Eurasianists. According to the architects of Atlanticism, this would lead, sooner or later, to marginalized Eurasianism, pushing its ideology out into the periphery. This required colossal effort for the West and Russian Liberals. We cannot say that we successfully overcame all their efforts, but the opposite is also obvious: Putin confidently marches toward the establishment of Eurasia in the War of Networks.

Eurasian Networks Abroad

Already in the 1990s and especially in the 2000s, Eurasianists began to create a vast and extensive network relying on those forces that also rejected Atlanticism and American hegemony, opposed Liberalism and gender politics—those who stood for Tradition, the sacred, Christianity and other traditional faiths. Most often, the Eurasianist network has tended to include conservatives that are normally referred to as “right-wing.” Quite often, however, there opponents of American hegemony were found on the “Left as well. Some of them were Russophiles, whereas others gravitated toward Eurasianism for pragmatic reasons: Russia’s traditional society was stronger than that of the West, and Russia’s strategic potential could become the counterweight to American domination. Many in Europe and beyond its borders studied geopolitics and easily identified the proponents of the Land civilization—to which they subscribed themselves (representing Tradition versus Liberalism)—in Eurasianism. However, the Eurasianist network was incomparably weaker and narrower than the enormous Atlanticist counterpart, supported by global capital (for instance, George Soros), pro-American Liberal elite (which almost always is the ruling class), military and intelligence power of the U.S. and NATO, an ever-expanding segment of youth attached to the Western network, forming a cosmopolitan view of things, individualism, overcoming morality, and a complete break with religion, traditions, narod (peoples), family, and even biological sex (gender). Nevertheless, the Eurasian network has been developing on the basis of those forces that disagreed with the new form of global domination—the “third totalitarianism” that rejects the rights of all other ideologies, if they do not recognize the basic principles of Liberalism. Any anti-Liberal alternative “on the Left was classified as a “Stalinism” and “GULAG,” whereas those “on the Right were called “Nazi” and “Auschwitz.” Eurasianism was neither Communist nor Fascist, that is, neither “Right” nor “Left.” This is why Liberals have dubbed it the “Red-Brown International.” Depending on the circumstances, they could declare Eurasianism to be “a network of KGB agents” (“Stalinism”) or the “Black International” (“Eurasianist Fascism”). No one cared about the fact that it was neither one nor the other: for Liberals, there is no truth outside Liberalism. This explains the systematic and deliberate campaign by the Western mainstream media that had begun in the 1990s in order to systematically discredit Eurasianism and Eurasianists.

Gradually, the influence of Eurasianism and Eurasianist networks grew outside of Russia (in Europe, Turkey, and the former Soviet Union—especially Crimea and the eastern territories of the former Ukraine), and within Russia itself. Putin’s response to the coup in Kiev—reunification with Crimea and the start of liberating Novorossia—served as a telling moment demonstrating the steadily growing significance of Eurasianism, often gone unnoticed by the surface-based observer. I described these scenarios as inevitable as early as the 1990s (See A. Dugin, Osnovy Geopolitiki [Foundations of Geopolitics] Moscow, 1997). Back then, I explained them through historical inevitability and geopolitical necessity: according to the logic of Eurasianist geopolitics, Ukraine will either join the Atlanticists (then the east and south will secede) or Russia (then the western regions will revolt). This is precisely what happened, and Putin acted as a true Russian patriot and Eurasianist under difficult circumstances rather than a Liberal and Atlanticist. As a result, the official West along with Russian Liberals and their veiled accomplices initiated a new wave of persecutions against Eurasianists, who were accused of endless and, at times, completely absurd claims, and blamed for all the deadly sins. The stronger these ideas became and the clearer was their embodiment in real political acts, the more hatred they aroused among the representatives of the Sea civilization and its network.
**Network against Network**

At the very beginning of the Ukrainian drama, I nominally divided Russia's Atlanticists into the "fifth" and "sixth" columns. The “fifth” column represents overt Atlanticists, Liberals, and supporters of U.S. politics, who oppose Putin and Russian patriotism. The so-called “sixth” column disguises itself as pragmatists and state bureaucrats, supporting Putin on the outside. Like the “fifth” column, however, they categorically reject Eurasianist ideas and attempt to either restrain or sabotage any of Putin's patriotic endeavors, dealing a blow to the Eurasianist network both in Russia and abroad. In Ukraine, the Maidan was an Atlanticist initiative. Crimea became the first Eurasianist answer to the Maidan. Novorossia would have been the second Eurasianist answer, but here, our offensive has (thus far) been contained by the Atlanticists in Russia and beyond. Much has changed during the course of the dramatic events in Ukraine in 2014. But Eurasianist geopolitics remains unchanged: Russia's strategy involves sovereignty, multipolarity, and complete independence from American domination. Putin speaks and acts upon this notion. Therefore, despite everything, Eurasians fully support Putin and his course. Again, this is nothing personal. At any given moment, certain aspects of his policy can generate small or great degrees of enthusiasm, while others—no enthusiasm at all. In general, however, a large segment of time measured in decades will reveal the fact that it is Eurasianist politics to which Putin subscribes. And it is obvious that he will adhere to this course later on. His latest address to the Federal Assembly leaves no doubt about this. It was impossible not to understand this from his speech. Openly declaring the Eurasianist platform, Putin stated:

If for some European countries national pride is a long-forgotten concept and sovereignty is too much of a luxury, true sovereignty for Russia is absolutely necessary for survival. Primarily, we should realize this as a nation. I would like to emphasize this: either we remain a sovereign nation, or we dissolve without a trace and lose our identity. Of course, other countries need to understand this, too.¹

In terms of the Ukrainian situation, Eurasianist networks in Europe demonstrated their full potential. Almost all the pro-Russian protests, election observers, and even the French volunteers in Novorossia were somehow connected to the Eurasianist networks or to closely related or parallel movements. This is quite natural. In Europe and other places, Eurasians are well aware of geopolitics, grasping the fact that this is not a conflict between two Slavic nations, Russia and Ukraine, but the Land versus Sea, American hegemony and unipolarity against the multipolar world represented by Russia. Therefore, the Eurasianist network does not act in the interests of Russia, but rather, the interests of Europe and the idea of multipolarity. Again, this is nothing personal: there are those who agree with Liberalism and American agenda and those who disagree. Europe's conservatives do not agree with being dominated by the U.S. Consequently, they turn their gaze toward a place that offers a possible alternative. And what do they see? Putin's Russia and the Eurasianist ideology. And they understand one through the other, regardless of the starting point.

This logic is obvious to friends, but it is also evident to enemies. Putin is enemy number one for today's Liberal West and the Sea civilization, because he consistently defends the interests of the Land counterpart. Any successful leader making Russia great and independent would be a “villain” in the eyes of the West, no matter who he really is. Therefore, Putin simply cannot become a hero for the U.S. and global Atlanticism. To do so, he would have to destroy Russia, as Gorbachev did with the USSR, for which he was applauded.

The same applies to Eurasianism: no matter the ideology, if it defies America's hegemony, while relying on a powerful nuclear state, it cannot be indifferent or viewed in an abstractly neutral manner. Enemies understand everything very well and will use every effort to demonize Eurasianism by any means necessary. They employ denigration, defamation, slander, insults, false labeling, misidentification with "Stalinism" or "Fascism" (depending on the particular context) bought trials, and so on.

**Under Attack. Preparing a Counteroffensive**

At some point, Putin, as the leader of a great country, and the Eurasianist ideology, as a conceptual apparatus that accurately describes the challenges and goals of the current geopolitical situation—where old ideologies (Left and Right) no longer work—fused into a shared object of all-encompassing hatred in the eyes of the entire Atlanticist network. Anyone who supports Russia or even criticizes the West simultaneously becomes "Putin's agent", "Russian spy", and a "Eurasianist." At the same time, it is worth noting that when we mention the so-called fifth column in Russia and the network of Atlanticist agents,
we are instantly bombarded with accusation of paranoia and conspiracy theories.

But look at the mainstream-media headlines in the West: the search for “Putin’s fifth column” is in full swing, there are lists of Russian spies, and there is a direct campaign to identify all those who are sympathetic toward Russia on the basis of a hacked Eurasianist email. What is our small heroic network of those who oppose today’s Liberal world order in comparison to the trillions of the Federal Reserve System, Liberal universities, the latest technology, global mainstream media, as well as the tens of thousands NGOs and agents of influence within the European and Asian elites? But this network inspires rage and fury in the enemy. After all, Russia is with us. And Putin leads Russia. Our people and history stand behind him. No longer does a handful of enthusiasts carrying Novorossia’s flags and Putin’s portraits on the streets of Europe seem so pathetic. This is the alternative civilization—that of the Land, of the Heartland—arising from slumber. And it will continue to arise until fully awakened.

This is a calm before the storm. The situation in Novorossia has reached a dead end. Pressure on Russia is growing by the minute. We are under a powerful onslaught. Anyone who actively supports Putin, links up with the Eurasian network, and defies the American Beast, is currently under attack. Under heavy fire. This fire grows. Pressure becomes increasingly strong. Betrayal is particularly unpleasant in this situation. It is unfortunate when the enemy is well aware of how dangerous you are to him, whereas your potential friend seems to be unaware of your usefulness. Herein lies the real test. One can endure it only through a powerful idea. Despite psychological tricks and complex network games that our opponents use to strangle us.

We have established and will continue establishing Eurasianist networks throughout the world. We have worked and will continue working against American hegemony in order to undermine it. We have supported and will continue supporting all alternative players in Europe and Asia that stand for Tradition (for us, Russians, this is Orthodox Christianity, first and foremost), justice, freedom, and a multipolar world. Despite the aspirations of today’s West: there is not one, but many civilizations; there is not one (Liberal), but many ideologies; there is not a single humanity, but a rich diversity of cultures that do not accept globalization and will fight it to the bitter end.

God is with us, you, nations, prepare for battle and be shattered, for God is with us! (From Isaiah 8:9-10)
IT’S EURASIA INTEGRATION VS. EMPIRE OF CHAOS

Pepe Escobar

Talk about a day that will live forever in history: Tuesday, November 18, 2014 in Yiwu, Zhejiang province, China. The first China-Europe Block Train, carrying 82 containers of exported goods, leaves the massive industrial warehouse of Yiwu to Madrid, with arrival planned for December 9, 2014.

Welcome to the China-Europe choo choo train, the longest freight train route in the world, way longer than the legendary Trans-Siberian Railway – crossing China from East to West and then Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland, Germany, France, and finally Spain.¹

You may not have the faintest idea where Yiwu is, but every businessman plying his trade across Eurasia, especially Arabs, is absolutely hooked on Yiwu (“Where amazing happens!”).² We’re talking about the largest wholesale center for small consumer goods not only in China but arguably on the whole planet.

Yiwu-Madrid is a spectacular game-changer in more ways than one. It’s an efficient logistics channel. It’s geopolitics with a human touch – knitting together traders and markets. It’s a graphic example of Eurasia integration on the go. And most of all it’s the first building block of China’s New Silk Roads – the greatest trade story in the world for the next 10 years.

Go West, Young Han. And one day, all this will be yours on high-speed rail; China-Europe in two days instead of 21. As the Block Train left Yiwu, the D8602 bullet train was leaving Urumqi to Hami, in Xinjiang, China’s far west. That’s the first high-speed railway built in Xinjiang, and more is yet to come in, what else, dizzying speed.³

As global container trade (90% of the total volume) still ply the oceans, Beijing has counterpunched overland, boosting Eurasian railway freight and, just as an aside, starting to provide stiff competition to European companies which still rule the sector. This embryonic, still relatively slow New Silk Road is the first step towards an overland, trans-continental container trade revolution.

And then there’s the proverbial voluminous basket of “win-win” deals; lower transportation costs; Chinese construction companies expanding their already booming trade with the Central Asian “stans” and Europe; an easier and faster way to have uranium and rare metals transported from Central Asia; and all

¹ http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/CEN-01-171014.html
² http://www.wowyiwu.com/yiwu_guide/why_yiwu/
It’s Eurasia integration vs. Empire of Chaos

Pepe Escobar

those myriad new markets harboring hundreds of millions of people to be opened along the way.

So Washington is “pivoting to Asia”? China is pivoting to Europe — across Eurasia.

Defect to the East, everybody

The speed this is all happening is absolutely staggering. Chinese President Xi Jinping launched the New Silk Road Economic Belt in Astana, Kazakhstan, in September 2013. One month later, he launched the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road in Jakarta. Beijing defines the overall concept as “One Road and One Belt” — when it’s actually a myriad of parallel roads.

We’re talking about national strategy – milking the pull of the legendary, historical Silk Road, where trade was the prime bridge of civilizations – as the base for a post-modern, pan-Eurasian economic cooperation chessboard.

Already a $40 billion infrastructure fund — overseen by China Development Bank — got the go-ahead to build and expand roads, high-speed rail and pipelines in assorted Chinese provinces.1 The fund will expand to cover projects in South Asia, Southeast Asia, the Middle East and parts of Europe. But Central Asia is the key immediate target.

Chinese companies will be investing and bidding for contracts in dozens of countries along the New Silk Roads(s). After three decades developing at breakneck speed and sucking up foreign investment, China’s strategy is now to spread capital flows along its neighbors.

China has already clinched $30 billion in contracts with Kazakhstan; $15 billion with Uzbekistan; has given $8 billion in loans to Turkmenistan and $1 billion more to Tajikistan. Relations with Kyrgyzstan have been upgraded to strategic level in 2013. China is already the largest trading partner of them all, except Uzbekistan. And as much as the old Soviet pipeline network still reign supreme, new instances of Chinese-driven Pipelineistan – such as the gas pipeline from Turkmenistan – will keep developing.2

Competition between Chinese provinces will be fierce. Xinjiang is being configured by Beijing to become a key hub. Guangdong – the “factory of the world” – hosted in early November 2014 the first international expo for the Maritime Silk Road. No less than 42 countries joined the party.

Shaanxi, Xi’s home province – which harbored the start of the historic Silk Road, in Xian — is now being enthusiastically sold by no less than the President, in person. He already made his pitch to Tajikistan, the Maldives, Sri Lanka, India and Afghanistan – all salivating with the economic prospects.

Just like the historic Silk Road, the New Silk Road(s) are a maze of branching out. A key stretch runs through Central Asia, Iran and Turkey, with Istanbul as a key crossroads. Another follows the Trans-Siberian, with Moscow as a key crossroads. In the Trans-Siberian high-speed rail remix, travel time between Beijing and Moscow will plunge from the current 6 days and a half to only 33 hours.3

The Maritime Silk Road will start in Guangdong province, en route to the Malacca Strait, the Indian Ocean, the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea and the Mediterranean. The meeting of the roads is in Venice – Marco Polo in reverse; but then there is branching out to Rotterdam, Duisburg, Berlin.4 German business just can’t get enough of it.

China’s Silk Road fund will start turning China’s humongous reserves not only into real credit – but, crucially, into soft power, which China needs badly; China still lacks a clear identity to present to the world. When Xi hails the push to “break the connectivity bottleneck” across Asia, he’s implying Chinese credit is now available all across Asia.

And all this is slated to finish by 2025.

Now mix the New Silk Road(s) strategy with accelerated cooperation within the BRICS; accelerated cooperation among the members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in security, military, economic, and cultural terms; accelerated developing world cooperation inside the G-20 and the 120-member Non-Aligned Movement (NAM); and no wonder, across the Global

2 http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/KL24Ag07.html
4 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2014-10/18/content_1 8763827.htm
South, there’s the perception the world is defecting to the East.¹

**ECONOMIC NATO? WE’RE OUT**

There’s no question the recent APEC summit in Beijing was a major Chinese success story.² Yet the big APEC development was virtually unreported in the U.S. 22 Asian countries approved the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) — only one year after Xi himself proposed it.³ So this is yet another bank — as the BRICS Development Bank — which will finance Asian projects in energy, telecom and transportation with an initial capital of $50 billion, and China and India as the main shareholders.

That’s the China/India counterpunch to the Asian Development Bank (ADB), which started in 1966 under the aegis of the World Bank. BRICS members China and India insist on “justice, equity and transparency” of the new bank, a stark contrast with the Washington consensus. Everyone in Asia knows how the US-supported international bank maze was used for decades to benefit the expansion of Western multinational corporations and keep away the former USSR sphere of influence in the former Third World.

ADB remains a US-Japan affair (31% of capital, 25% of voting power) — and its decisions are far from representative. Not to mention ADB won’t finance the Asian infrastructure push. That’s where AIIB comes in. Once again, China is already the top trading partner of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh; in second place with Sri Lanka and Nepal; and the top with virtually all ASEAN members. ASEAN is where 600 million people in Southeast Asia meet the convergence of China’s 1.3 billion with the Indian subcontinent’s 1.5 billion.

Guess who did not approve AIIB; Japan, South Korea, Indonesia and Australia, all under immense pressure by the Obama administration. Still, they ended up sidelined by yuan diplomacy.

What Washington has to offer in contrast is economic NATO — for both Asia and Europe. APEC signaled the virtual death of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) — the trade arm of “pivoting to Asia”. For Europe, it’s more of the same, as then Dutch Foreign Minister Frans Timmermans made it quite clear last May in Washington: “The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is not a free trade agreement. TTIP is a geostrategic agreement. When you have TTIP in place, it will change the nature of the game globally. Because then the United States and Europe will set the rules of the game, and the others will follow suit, including China, Japan and others.” No wonder the overwhelming majority of Asian nations want nothing to do with a NATO trade/commercial dictatorship.

**WHEN DRAGON MEETS BEAR**

Russian President Vladimir Putin had a fabulous APEC. After Russia and China clinched a $400 billion gas mega-deal in May — around the Power of Siberia pipeline — they clinched a second one worth $325 billion around the Altai pipeline in western Siberia.

These two mega-deals by no means signal that Beijing will become Moscow-dependent on energy. They will represent 17 per cent of China’s gas needs by 2020; and natural gas is still only 10 per cent of China’s energy mix.

But the extrapolations are quite something. As Russia and China signed mega-deals, Beijing offered Russian banks under stupid US/EU sanctions access to Chinese credit, and committed to accelerate a common push to replace SWIFT. On the military front, Russia and China will increase large scale joint military exercises.⁴ And finally those S-400s missile systems will make their way to Beijing.⁵

No wonder the “evergreen tree of Chinese-Russian friendship”, in Xi’s words — or call it Putin’s strategic ‘pivoting’ to China — is driving Washington/Wall Street elites literally crazy.

Russia and China are not only protecting their core national interests but advancing their complementarity. As noted here¹, Russian excellence in aerospace, de-

² http://russia-insider.com/en/2014/11/19/09-11-07pm/apec_was_china_triumph
⁶ http://russia-insider.com/en/military_business/2014/11/26/12-01-58pm/russia_will_sell_modern_s-400_air_defense_system_china
fense technology and heavy equipment manufacturing matches Chinese excellence in agriculture, light industry and information technology.

Russia and China — backed by the institutional weight of BRICS, SCO, CSTO and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) — are more than a match to the Atlanticist block in political, economic and military terms.

In Pipelineistan, for years it's been clear that Russian — and not Western — pipelines will prevail across Eurasia.

That's crucial: for the first time in the post-Cold War environment, Moscow has discussed in Beijing, leadership to leadership, the Soviet-era doctrine of collective security in Asia as the key pillar of the new Sino-Russian strategic partnership.

And last but not least, Putin has repeatedly emphasized, “we’re moving away from the diktat of the market that denominates all commercial flows in U.S. dollars. We’re encouraging in every way the use of national currencies”. The direct challenge to the U.S. dollar as global reserve currency cannot but be interpreted by the indispensable nation as the ultimate affront.¹

**BYE BYE, UNIPOLAR MOMENT**

All these interlocked developments conform a massive geopolitical tectonic shift which U.S. corporate media cannot even begin to understand.

Predictably, U.S. establishment is in panic. That good ol’ exceptionalist moment is “unraveling”.² The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission has nothing better to do than to blame China for being “disloyal”, adverse to “reform” and an enemy of the “liberalization” of their economy.³

The usual suspects carp that upset China is upsetting the “international order⁴, will finish with “peace and prosperity” for good and may be creating a “new kind of Cold War” in Asia.⁵

And China remains a “threat” even as the Pentagon spends almost $1 trillion a year and keeps the sprawling Empire of Bases intact. It’s never enough to remember that China is encircled by myriad U.S. bases, and China’s military bases exist only inside China.

None of this is surprising when we know that Obama shaped his foreign policy speech at a West Point graduation ceremony to appease this superpower elegy.⁶ As for the “upstarts”, they were already being vilified way back in 2009.⁷

Of course China must face titanic problems. Energy supply and transit security are seen in Beijing as extreme threats to stability; thus the massive investment in Pipelineistan – from Central Asia to Siberia; the “escape from Malacca” diversification of suppliers to include Africa and South America; and the offensive in the East and South China seas, which Beijing is betting could become the “second Persian Gulf” – ultimately yielding 130 billion barrels of oil.

Here is a decently summarized road map of China’s “must do” reforms ahead.⁸ Here is Xi’s latest major outline of China’s “results-oriented” path for the next ten years.⁹ And here is a reasonably fair evaluation of areas in which China will continue to excel.¹⁰

Xiaolu Wang and Yixiao Zhou, authors of the academic paper Deepening Reform for China’s Long-term Growth and Development contend it will be very hard for China to jump from middle-income to high-income status — a key requirement for a truly global power. This will imply an avalanche of government funds to social security/unemployment benefits as well as healthcare, which only account for 10.5 percent and 6.1 percent of the 2014 budget, respectively.

² [http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/142202/richard-n-haass/the-unraveling?cid=nlc-foreign_affairs_this_week-111314-the_unraveling_5-111314&sp_mid=474707036705&sp_rid=c2Nob2x6LWhqQGdteC5kZQS2](http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/142202/richard-n-haass/the-unraveling?cid=nlc-foreign_affairs_this_week-111314-the_unraveling_5-111314&sp_mid=474707036705&sp_rid=c2Nob2x6LWhqQGdteC5kZQS2)
Still, anyone who has closely followed what China has accomplished for these past three decades knows that China won’t fall apart.¹

**SPOT ON**

So the facts are stark. China is proposing Eurasia integration (for a quick summary of what Xi is planning check out the biographer of former president Jiang Zemin).²

The Washington/Wall Street elites are proposing what I have chosen to call Empire of Chaos;³ a dysfunctional system that breeds chaos (Libya, Syria, Ukraine, the 2008 financial crisis) and is simultaneously devoured by chaos blowback (Afghanistan, Iraq).

So no wonder New Cold War is very much in the air (see here).⁴ Still, Washington’s seemingly bipartisan agenda to ‘isolate’ Russia is doomed to failure. First of all because Moscow is the only power capable of negotiating a global strategic balance with Washington.⁵ NATO puny “threats” don’t count even as a bad joke. And China still lacks that strategic clout.⁶

Russia — like China — is betting on Eurasian integration; no less than 40 nations are interested in clinching free trade agreements with the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), which complements the Chinese New Silk Road(s) strategy.⁷

But what’s really at the heart of the great story from now on until 2025? Let’s talk about SPOT. SPOT involves two key vectors.

1) The Washington/Wall Street elites are planning what strategy, policy, operations and tactics (SPOT) must be deployed, urgently, now, to bomb the development of China-Russia instruments of national and world power.

2) The Washington/Wall Street elites are planning what SPOTs are essential to maintain U.S. hegemony — financial and military — even as the BRICS advance all sorts of mechanisms, from currency swaps to trade in a basket of currencies, to bypass the U.S. dollar, the T-Bill and the petrodollar.

Meanwhile, the global systemic crisis keeps metastasizing — still under of the aegis of the casino capitalism/neoliberalism world-system.⁸

A change in dynamics, already perceptible in Germany, may lead Europe to eventually distance itself from the warmongering logic of the US-led West. After all German business/industry want to do business across Eurasia, which means essentially Russia and China; the endgame will arguably be the future BMB (Berlin/Moscow/Beijing) alliance.⁹

So the choice, once again between two “models”, is stark: it’s Eurasia integration or Empire of Chaos. Ladies and gentlemen, the die is cast.
DREAMING OF AN EMPIRE. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN GEOPOLITICAL STRATEGY IN THE WORLD

Jamal Wakim

ABSTRACT:

The world is living nowadays in a period of high tension on a line stretching from Ukraine in the North, past the Middle East in the center, all the way to the African Horn in the South, and from Tunisia in the West to Afghanistan in the East. Added to this, the world is witnessing high tension in the Far East. In all these conflicts, the United States of America is being implicated and playing a leading role in them. To its side we see powers like the Western Europeans and Turkey, while the powers contending with American supremacy like China, Russia and Central Asia had joined forces under the Shanghai Cooperation organization. The current situation seems as if it is a continuation of the Cold War, and Western Hostility towards Russia seems to be as strong as before in spite the fact that it relinquished its communist ideology. My argument is that the Western and mainly American Apathy to Russia are much determined by geopolitical factors, so is the Western attitude towards the rest of the world. Hence, in this article, I review the classical Western geopolitical thinkers who have affected Western and American strategies in the past 2 centuries, with Hostility towards Russia being its most constant feature.

CLASSICAL EURO-CENTRIC SCHOLARSHIP

When Samuel Huntington wrote his article “the Clash of Civilizations” in 1996, many scholars around the world got enraged at the ideas promoted in this article, and later expanded in a book by the same title. At a time when Western scholars like Francis Fukuyama were propagating the idea of end of History and the end of ideological conflicts in the world, and at a time when they were celebrating the final victory of liberalism, this article seemed to propagate for an ongoing conflict to the detriment of the dreams of idealists. In this article Huntington considered that the world in the 21st century will be dominated by cultural divisions among humankind. He considered that conflict will be witnessed on what he called the fault line between the various civilizations. He bluntly stated that “the US must forge alliances with similar cultures and spread its values wherever possible. With alien civilizations, the West must be accommodating if possible, but confrontational if necessary”. In addition, he identified eight major civilizations which are: Western, Japanese, and Confucian, Islamic, Hindu, Confucian, Islamic, Hindu, and Confucian.

3:31.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African civilization. For him the fault line between the West and the Slavic-Orthodox Civilization extends from Finland in the North past the Baltic States, Poland and cuts through Belorussia Ukraine and Romania to cross through the former Yugoslavia which he considered as a fault line with Islam. And he concluded that the West which included Western Europe, North America and Australia had reached an unprecedented supremacy over other civilizations and should face the challenge of them trying to undermine it either by accommodation or even by reverting to force.

What Huntington stated in his article was a rephrasing of traditional Eurocentric scholarship that considered itself a byproduct of Christian heritage, which was a continuity of the old classical Greek and Roman Ages. Scholars like Edward Gibbon, Oswald Spengler, Arnold Toynbee, among others, saw that Civilizations evolved in parallel lines and not in an interactive way. Edward Gibbon, in his most famous book, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Edward Gibbon praised the Roman Empire, but considered that the loss of civic virtues of its citizens led to its fall at the hands of Barbarian People, concluding that the British had to avoid this failure to protect their superior Empire against the people that they dominated. In his Book the Decline of the West, Spengler identifies eight different civilizations that evolve and act as organisms separate one from the other. Among these civilizations there are eight “high cultures which are: Babylonian, Egyptian, Chinese, Indian, Mexican, Classical Greco-Roman, Arabian and Western. Arnold Toynbee goes in the same line to identify Major Civilizations which are The Egyptian, Sinic, Sumerian, Andean, Hittite, Indic, Mayan, Hellenic, Greek Orthodox, Western, Arabic, Persian, Hindu, Mexican, Yuatec and Babylonian, Polynesian, Ottoman, Spartan, Eskimo, and Nomadic. He argued that a civilization would prosper if led by a creative minority, and would fall if this leading minority would lose its creativity.

Hence the European civilization evolved separately from the Arab – Islamic Civilization, the Slavo – Orthodox Civilization, and from The Confucian, Hindu and other civilizations. This keeps guiding the attitude of Western Europeans vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Hence, to understand the attitude of the Europeans, and of the United States, which considers itself part of the European world, we need to go back to Roman History. It is noteworthy that Romans were able to extend their hegemony over the Italian peninsula before challenging Carthaginian Hegemony in the Western Mediterranean. Three major wars over a period stretching between 264 B.C. and 146 B.C. enabled Rome to extend its hegemony beyond the Italian Peninsula into Spain, and North Africa between the Atlas Mountains and Cyrenaica. In this latter region, desert served as a good protection against people in sub Saharan Africa, and against Ptolemaic Egypt. However, the Romans had to worry about their lines of communications between Spain and Rome mainly in Gaul, and in the Tirol region against the Macedonians. It was this concern that made Rome anxious to delimit its Eastern borders in Western Europe, Northern Italy, and Even in North Africa at one point. This concern was the driving force behind taking over the Balkans and Greece in the late second century B.C. and in the Julius Caesar campaign in Gaul in the mid first century B.C. by this century the borders of the Roman Empire were already safe in North Africa after taking over Syria and Egypt. The same was true in the Aegean Sea after taking over the Balkans and Anatolia, and the Roman borders seemed to be inviolable all along the Rhine and the Danube Rivers. This was the separating line between the civilized Romans on one hand, and the Barbarian Germanic tribes on the other hand.

For nearly four centuries, Roman defenses stabilized along these borders, more or less. It was only in the late fourth century – early fifth century that Germanic tribes were able to cross these borders along the Danube in the Balkans. Manipulated by the Roman Emperors of the Eastern Part of the Empire with Constantinople as their Capital, the Germanic tribes would be manipulated to spare the Balkans and the Eastern Part of the Empire, and to invade Northern Italy, Rome, Spain and North Africa.

It was the trauma caused by these invasions that would cast their spell on the conscience of the Romans and the Roman Catholic Church. This latter, whose bishop had started to claim supremacy over other bishops due to his residence in the old Roman Capital, would play a major role in shaping the drives of later Western Europeans. The great Popes reformers of the eleventh century would

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1. Ibid. 32
2. Ibid. 36
3. Ibid. 42
4. Edward Gibbon, The History of Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, (Penguin Classics, 2001)
cause the final schism in Christianity in 1054 when they insisted on their supremacy over the rest of the Christian world, as the Eastern churches bishops, encouraged by the Byzantine emperors, refused to acknowledge this supremacy. This schism would determine much of the hostility of Western Christianity towards Eastern Christianity. In addition, the Roman Catholic Church would claim to be the true upholder of Roman heritage and with it the Roman concern of delimiting the Eastern borders of Rome and of Western Christianity. The 7th century’s Islamic conquests of North Africa were of less consequence on the sense of Western European identity than the waves of invasions that swept through Eastern Europe in the later centuries. After all, the Mediterranean Sea separated Europe from Islam, except for the case of Southern Italy, Spain and Portugal.

This might explain the fierceness of the crusades waged in this regions and which lasted for centuries and were characterized by systematic persecutions of Arabs, Muslims, Eastern Christians and Jews alike. The crusades would also be directed against the Levant, but also against Central, Northern and Eastern Europe. They were successful in enforcing the roman catholic faith on Scandinavia, Germany, Poland and parts of Ukraine and the Baltic, but were short of achieving success further beyond that realm, or in the Balkans, in spite the fact that one crusade was directed against the Byzantine Empire, and ended with the sack of Constantinople, which rendered the city a shadow of its glorious past. Vasilev quoted Nicetas Choniates, an eyewitness of the sack of Constantinople saying: “even the Muhammedans had been more merciful towards the Christians after the capture of Jerusalem than these men who claimed to be soldiers of Christ.”

By the 13th century the European Roman Catholic realm would get stabilized in the West, South and North, but would witness another major trauma through the Mongol invasions which ravaged Ukraine, Poland and Hungary. This would determine the later concern of Europe delimiting its Eastern borders all the way till our present time. This would be the driving force for the Teuton incursions into Russia in the 15th and 16th centuries, and would lead major European conquerors to exhaust themselves in wasted campaigns on Russian soil, starting with the Swedish Emperor Charles XII in the early 18th Century, then with the French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte in his famous invasion of Russia between 1812 and 1814 and in the twentieth century with the Nazi led invasion of the Soviet Union during the second world war. All three wars would be decided to the favor of Russia in battles fought on or around Ukraine Soil, 1709 in the Battle of Poltava against the Swedes, 1812 in the Battle of Maloyaroslavets against the French, and in 1943 in the Battle of Kursk against the Germans.

**Emil Reich**

In this sense it is important to review what major European and American scholars wrote in the field of geopolitics and how they influenced Western attitude towards the rest of the world. And it would be good to start with Emil Reich who gives a modern foundation of what Europe is. Emil Reich had a great impact on European and American geopolitics. Born in 1854 to a Hungarian Jewish family that immigrated to the United States, Reich became a famous historian who would later settle in Great Britain and teach at Oxford University. He wrote extensively on European and Western history, and considered that the History of the United States was an integral part of European history. He summed up his ideas in a set of lectures in the early 20th century which were compiled in a book titled Foundations of modern Europe, which was based on several lectures delivered at the University of London, Emil Reich considered that the “American War of Independence is one of these international, or inter-European events of the eighteenth century, terminated by the (second) treaty of Paris, 1783.” For him geography is a constant that has a priority and impact over all other elements which are considered as variables, including humans themselves.

For Reich the real reason behind the drive of the American colonies to acquire their independence was not to seek freedom from the yoke of British authoritarian rule, but rather the eagerness of the colonizers to colonize new territories to the West, which was blocked by edicts from the British court. He also focused on the importance of naval power and decisive role of the French naval power assisting the colonials in the independence of the 13 British colonies in North America which would become the United States of America. He stated that “the Americans kept losing in front of the British as

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3. Ibid 461
5. Ibid. P 8.
6. Ibid. 9
7. Ibid. 9
long as the latter were able to transport their troops unhindered across the Atlantic Ocean, and it was only after they lost this capacity due to the intervention of the French fleet that the British would lose their first land battle against the colonials in Saratoga in October 1777. New York and central and Southern colonies had to wait until September 1781 when “the French, under the Comte de Grasse prevented British Admirals Graves and Hood to enter Chesapeake Bay to relieve the forces of General Cornwallis besieged in Yorktown which led to a major victory to the colonials after the naval battle of Cape Henry”.¹

He awarded several chapters to the French revolution and to Napoleon Bonaparte role in the formation of modern Europe. This revolution was possible due to the homogeneity of the French people achieved in the 18th century.² Napoleon was able to install himself as master of Europe until the fateful invasion of Russia in 1812. The disastrous campaign in Russia and the defeat of Napoleon encouraged European monarchs to form another coalition that eventually defeated Napoleon in 1814, and again in Waterloo in 1815. Being apathetic to the old feudal system in Europe, Reich stated that “for over thirty-five years after Napoleon’s downfall the whole of Europe was kept under a regime of the most abominable reaction”, until the revolution of 1848.³

Other than the French Revolution, Reich listed other developments that contributed to the rise of modern Europe, which are:

- The Rise and Downfall of the Second French Empire with Napoleon III
- The fall of the Austrian Empire from its former greatness
- The defeat of the Russians by the English and French in the Crimean War in 1856, which directed Russia Eastward
- The Unity of Italy
- The Unification of Germany

Reich observed that the 19th century would lead to the rise of a fractured Europe which would only be bound together by common cultural values, Russia being excluded from this realm, and he considered it to be a modern Hellas, alluding to ancient Greece which was incapable of getting united under one political authority. Hence Europe would never unite and would only serve as a modern “Hellas”. In the United States, the reverse of this was being achieved as homogeneity of language and of political authority was being achieved. “And we may now indeed say of Europe that it is a greater Hellas. As in the times of the ancient Greeks, small Greece or Sicily contained hundreds of autonomous, absolutely different, hostile, and mutually irreconcilable city-states, so Europe is”; he saw the impossibility of absorbing Europe into the “The Slav Realm” while he predicted that Europe would be absorbed economically by the United States of America.⁴

### JOMINI

Prior to Reich, Baron Antoine Henry Jomini would be highly influential on Western geopolitical thinkers, like Alfred Thayer Mahan, Halford Mackinder, Nicolas Spykman and others. A Swiss nobleman born in 1779, he joined the French army and served under Napoleon Bonaparte, before he moved to the Russian army where he served for the rest of his life. His experience in the army of the greatest land powers of their times granted him with great experience that would eventually make him one of the most famous geopolitical thinkers of his time and the forefather of modern Geopolitics. He elaborated his ideas in outstanding writings, the most famous of which would be “The Art of War”. In this book his Eurocentrism was bluntly expressed as he considered that wars of invasion “without good reason like that of Genghis Khan, is a crime against humanity, but may be excused if not approved, when induced by great interests or when conducted with good motives”.⁶ Hence, a non European like Genghis Khan is criminal for he is deprived by Jomini from good reason, leaving us to conclude that European conquerors had good reasons for conquest. In addition, Jomini subjected Religion to politics and considered that it is often used to obtain political power. Hence “The successors of Mohammed cared more to extend their empire than to preach the Koran, and Philip II., bigot as he was, did not sustain the League in France for the purpose of advancing the Roman Church. We agree with M. Ancelot that Louis IX., when he went on a crusade in Egypt, thought more of [ⁱ](#footnote-1) [⁵](#footnote-5) [⁶](#footnote-6)
the commerce of the Indies than of gaining possession of the Holy Sepulcher". Jomini defined strategy as "the art of making war upon the map, and comprehends the whole theater of operations. Grand Tactics is the art of posting troops upon the battle-field according to the accidents of the ground, of bringing them into action, and the art of fighting upon the ground, in contradistinction to planning upon a map". Though having served in land armies, it is interesting how much Jomini appreciated the sea and naval powers. He added that "The vicinity of the sea is invaluable for the transportation of supplies; and the party which is master on this element can supply himself at will".

**Mahan**

Jomini had a great impact on American Geo-strategists. Alfred Thayer Mahan, a prominent admiral of the second half of the 19th century who argued for the expansion of US navy and to the transformation of the United States into a naval power since becoming a naval power was the key to world hegemony. In his book, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History he considered that the historians had given little attention to the impact of the Sea and maritime strength upon historical event, and he considered that the control of the sea has been "a great factor in the history of the world". Counter arguing both Historian Arnold Toynbee and Writer Sir Edward Creasy whom he considered failed to see that the key to the failure of Hannibal to defeat Rome in the second Punic War, and of Napoleon Bonaparte to enforce his will on Great Britain, was not the military genius of neither the Roman General Scipio nicknamed Africano nor of the British General Duke of Wellington. It was rather the mastery of the West Mediterranean by Rome that protected its line of communications while it was receiving one defeat after the other at the hands of Hannibal and made it eventually capable of defeating Hannibal in Zarma. It was also the British mastery of the Maritime lines of communication that enabled Great Britain to resist Napoleon's attempts to subdue it until he was exhausted from long years of war. For Mahan the control of maritime lanes was directly linked to the control of maritime trade which is the most important source of wealth for nations.

For Mahan the Sea is not hindered by crowds of people contending over the possession of land and hindering the free passage of goods and services. The sea "presents itself from the political and social point of view is that of a great highway; or better, perhaps, of a wide common, over which men may pass in all directions, but on which some well-worn paths show that controlling reasons have led them to choose certain lines of travel rather than others. These lines of travel are called trade routes; and the reasons which have determined them are to be sought in the history of the world". In addition "both travel and traffic by water have always been easier and cheaper than by land". For him it was imperative for the United States, which was becoming a great economic power to extend its navy to protect its maritime trade.

He considered that the elements that affect the sea power of nations are:

"I. Geographical Position. II. Physical Conformation, including, as connected therewith, natural productions and climate. III. Extent of Territory. IV. Number of Population. V. Character of the People. VI. Character of the Government, including therein the national institutions".

In his book "The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future", he warned of the threat posed by China, even when China was living through its "century of humiliation" under the hegemony of various European and American powers. And he argued for the importance of Hawaii as a forefront to defend the American West Coast, and therefore Western Civilization against "Chinese Barbarism". For this purpose he said that the Americans had to value maritime power to protect their markets abroad, had to dominate the Panama Canal that links the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean as it will increase commercial activity in the Caribbean, and is a forefront along with Hawaii to defend the American West Coast. He also emphasized the need for an alliance with Britain, and the shared values with Europe, and warns of the danger of the rise of Japan and China as great powers.

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1. Ibid. P 25
2. Ibid. 30
3. Ibid. 145 – 147
5. Ibid. P iv
6. Ibid. P 1
7. Ibid. P 25
8. Ibid. P 28 – 29
10. Ibid. 1
11. Ibid. 5
12. Ibid. 10-11
13. Ibid. 45 — 46
14. Ibid. 51 — 52
15. Ibid. 97
**Mackinder: British Legacy**

American geopolitical thinkers have also identified themselves with Great Britain. They have always called for a cordial relationship with it.\(^1\) And they have always identified themselves with the British Empire; for this reason American geopolitical scholars were mainly inspired by British geopolitical theorist Halford Mackinder (1861-1947). Mackinder was fond of geography which he taught at several universities, and became the first principal of University of Extension College, which became the University of Reading. Later he was one of the founders of the famous London School of Economics and became its director. He wrote extensively on geography as a determinant of politics and history and was much concerned about the challenge that was posed to maritime powers by the development of railways and the prospects of the rise of massive land powers that would challenge the hegemony of Great Britain, being a maritime power. In this he had special concerns about the Trans-Siberian railways that linked for the first time Moscow to Vladivostok and made it possible to assert the potentials of Russia as a world power. His journey culminated in writing an extensive book about the geopolitics of Britain titled “Britain and the British Seas” which became a landmark in British literature. In this book he clearly identified Britain with its empire and sees that the navy has a vital role in upholding the hegemony of the British people.\(^2\)

Later he ventured into many British colonies trying to discover them and assess them from a geopolitical perspective. He joined Oxford University before he got appointed as the director of London School of Economics and Political Sciences. In 1910 he got elected to the parliament on the list of the conservative party during World War I he wrote a paper titled “the geographical pivot of history” in which he argued that interior Asia and East Europe are considered as the major land mass or Heartland that is the strategic Centre of Eurasia or “world island”. Due to technological advance there was a decline of maritime powers with regards to land powers. That was why “The role of Britain and the United

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\(^1\) Ibid. 11

States, was to preserve a balance between the powers contending for control of the heartland. And to stabilize world order to the favor of maritime powers he urged the need to separate Germany from Russia by buffer states in East Europe. He argued that the Pivot area was a region that cannot be reached by the sea powers. It is surrounded by an inner crescent that stretched from Eastern Europe into Turkey and the Near East, Iran and Afghanistan, India, South East Asia and China and Eastern Manchuria which is part of East Russia. British politics aimed at forbidding a Russian German alliance in order not to unite Eurasia. Whoever controlled East Europe could control the Pivot Area and whoever controlled the Pivot area could control Eurasia and whoever controlled Eurasia could control the world. Later he insisted on creating an Atlantic community which got embodied later in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization “NATO”, in order to check the rise of Eurasia. Though he wrote many books, his most influential work would be an article published in the early 1900 in which he argued that human history has revolved around Eurasia and that whoever controlled Eurasia would control the world. The article was highly influential on British, American and even German Geo-Strategists and was enhanced by Mackinder over a period of four decades until the late 1940s. In this article Mackinder considered that the period stretching between 1492 and 1904, which he called the Columbian Epoch was essentially a “period of expansion of Europe against negligible resistance”, whereas “medieval Christendom was pent into a narrow region and threatened by external Barbarism”. Expressing deep Eurocentric tendencies he bluntly considered that the “only history that counted was that of the Mediterranean and the European races, for it was among these races that have originated the ideas which have rendered the inheritors of Greece and Rome dominant throughout the world”. Raising concerns about the threat posed to Europe by Asia he called on looking “upon Europe and European history as subordinate to Asia and Asiatic history, for European civilization is, in a very real sense, the outcome of the secular struggle against Asiatic invasion”.

For him European history was “the harvest of results produced by a cloud of ruthless and idealless horsemen sweeping over the un-impeding plains, a blow as it were, from the great Asiatic hammer striking freely through the vacant space” which is the plains of Eastern Europe. He gave as an example the Mongol invasions of the

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1 Halfford Mackinder: The Geographical Pivot of History, the geographical journal, Vol. 170, no 4, December 1904, 298 — 300.

Middle Ages, the crusades in the Levant helped stir up a united Europe, which also served to advance Europe in the East against pressures from Asia. For him the result of “the discovery of the cape road to India was to connect the West and East coastal navigation of Eurasia and in some way to neutralize the strategic advantage of the central position of the steppe nomads by pressing upon them in the rear”. This age of European expansion was a continuation of the age old division of Europe between a Latinized Western part and a Greek Eastern part, the Americans and Western Europeans inheriting the Latin World, while the Russians inheriting the Greek World.

The technological advance of the 19th century saw the development of steam power which revolutionized navigation, and railways which revolutionized land transportation. He had special concerns about the development of transcontinental railways across Russia which “are transmuting the conditions of land power”. In the 20th century “Russia replaced the Mongol Empire” as a threat to Europe. And concluded that whoever controlled Western Europe could command the Pivot area where the Russian Empire lays. And whoever controlled the pivot area would command the world island which consisted of Eurasia and whoever controlled Eurasia would control the world.

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KARL HAUSHOFER AND HITLER

Mackinder was highly influential on the most prominent German Geopolitical thinker of the 1920s and 1930s, Professor Karl Haushofer. A descendant of a German Noble Family of Bavaria, Haushofer, though he was influenced by the German Geopolitical Scholar Frederick Ratzel and his Swedish pupil Rudolph Kjellen, to have interest in Geopolitics, and to look at the state as an organic entity that have birth, expands and dies, yet he would rely on Mackinder’s Theory to build a German geopolitical strategy that called for a confrontation with the British and Americans, and for an alliance with Russia and Japan. He considered that the most important change of the early 20th century was the formation of a strong continental bloc that included Europe, North and

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2 Ibid. 304 — 308
3 Ibid. 309
4 Ibid. 310
5 Ibid. 311
6 Ibid. 313
East Asia.1 As he served in Japan prior to the First World War, he became fond of the Japanese Civilization and was among the earliest European scholars to write an article about the geopolitics of the Far East in 1920, predicting the rise of Japanese Hegemony in that region and its eventual clash with the United States.2 He considered that the Anglo Saxon world was spiraling around the world like a snake to encircle this continental bloc, and called for an alliance of Germany with Russia and Japan as this would add the strong Russian and Japanese fleets to strong German Navy which would lead to a reversal of the balance of power in the world and to the end of Anglo Saxon Hegemony.3 It is noteworthy that this part of the book was written in 1940 when Germany was still bound by its non aggression agreement with the Soviet Union. However, Haushofer was professing ideas contradictory with that of Hitler. Haushofer would remain valid for the Nazi Germans until Hitler decided to attack the Soviet Union in June 22, 1941. After that period he got marginalized. Still the Japanese were true to his preaching and never turned against the Soviet Union throughout the war, directing their main thrust against the Americans in the Pacific Ocean. At the end of the war Haushofer tried to distance himself from the Nazi crimes by writing an apology of German Geopolitics in November 1945, few months after the defeat of Germany.4

It is noteworthy how much the book, that Nazi German Leader Adolf Hitler wrote, was in line with a fragmented Europe that Emil Reich talked about. Having been born an Austrian in the Austro – Hungarian Empire where Germans were the dominant minority, he believed that only a skilful strong leader could hold the empire together.5 The Habsburg Dynasty, in an attempt to save its domain, tried to appeal to the majority Slavic people which was considered by Hitler as a threat to the dominant German majority and led to a rise of the Pan — German movement in the Austro – Hungarian Empire.6 He talked about the time he arrived in Munich in 1912 and was delighted for it was a pure German city, and different from the “racial Babylon” Vienna.7 He was concerned about the rise in German population of 900,000 a year and “how to avert the impending danger of hunger – pauperization in time”.8 In addition, he was concerned about what he considered the higher birth rate of “culturally inferior people but superior in energy and activity” in taking the lead from Europeans and Germans in particular. Reflecting in his writings elements of social Darwinism he states that “either the world will be ruled according to the ideas of our modern democracy, and then the stress of every decision falls on the races which are stronger in numbers, or the world will be dominated according to the law of the natural order of energy, and then the people of brute strength will be victorious”. The solution for him lied in colonization of the land, and as German territories worthy of cultivation were limited, it was imperative for Germany to expand.9

Therefore Germany had to colonize territories to the East and expel the “less cultured Slavic people” from them. Projecting his experience in the Austro – Hungarian empire on a wider scale, Hitler could only see a continental Europe, fractured along nationalist identities, governed by authoritarian rule by Germany, the way the Austro – Hungarian Empire should have been governed by the German minority in order to survive, not by democratic means.10 Being influenced by the British Racial theorist Chamberlain, and by his own tendencies to make Germany a land power not a maritime one, Hitler had special admiration for England and saw that it would be Germany’s only ally in Europe,11 of course against continental European powers, but mainly against Russia.

**Spykman: Like US like Britain?**

On the other side of the Atlantic, Mackinder would also influence American Geopolitical thinking and lead it to have a global outlook. After all Mahan focused only on the United States as needing to become a maritime power to protect its expanding trade, he had a certain influence on elaborating an American strategy in the Caribbean. However American strategy after World War II would be highly influenced by Nicholas Spykman who also relied on Mackinder Geopolitical Theories to forge an American Strategy for Global Hegemony. Spykman was a Dutch Journalist who immigrated to the United States and is considered as the father of the theory of containment. Having taught at Yale University, he was much interested in geopolitics and was influenced by

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2 Ibid. 165 – 183.
3 Ibid. 116 – 117
4 Ibid. 155 – 164
6 Ibid. 121
7 Ibid. Chap 4
8 Ibid. 168
9 Ibid. 174 – 176
10 Ibid. 181
11 Ibid. 183
Mackinder’s theory, however due to the influence of the Second World War he came up with the theory of the rim land which encircles the heartland from East Europe, through the Middle East into the Far East. He divided the world into a Heartland that contained much of Russia and Central Asia, the Rim land already described above and equivalent to Mackinder’s inner or marginal crescent, and the offshore Islands and continents, analogous to Mackinder’s outer crescent. Unlike Mackinder, he considered that he who controlled the Rim land would control the Heartland and hence the world. Therefore, British, Russian, and US power would play the key roles in controlling the European littoral, and thereby, the essential power relations of the world. Spykman considered that the rim land was the source of troubles and that the US should prevent the rise of power that could control it for it control Eurasia and hence the world.¹

Nicholas Spykman considered that the United States could be considered as an island like Britain as it is bordered by two weak neighbors, Canada and Mexico, which could not pose a threat to it.² Due to its huge resources and industrial development it is the most important military power in the Western hemisphere with no contenders whatsoever.³ The US would be worried about the rise of an Asian power that could endanger its West coast, and a continental European power that could pose a threat to its East coast.⁴ This made the US after WWII keen on not letting any Eurasian power extend its control and reach the Mediterranean, the Atlantic, the Indian Ocean or the Pacific.

BRZEZINSKI: US HEGEMONY?

The end of the cold war in 1991 paved the way for the United States to impose its hegemony over the world under various pretexts. Oil was of much concern to the United States and the Middle East contained 61.9 percent of world oil resources especially that the global petroleum need will increase to daily 120 million barrels until 2030 and the US will have to pay 150 billion US Dollars in

³ Ibid. 65
⁴ Ibid. 194
2029 for its oil imports. China’s imports were to increase by 100 percent while the EU depended on imports by 92 percent of its needs. These factors make it essential for the US to keep controlling the Middle East. Therefore it was imperative for the US to ensure continuous flow of this oil at ‘reasonable prices, while preventing the rise of a big power in the region. This was how the war on Iraq was explained by analysts. For this reason the US had to restructure this Middle East, which stretched from the Atlantic Ocean to the borders of Xinjiang desert in Western China, as it needed to check the rise of Europe, Russia, and China. With the rise of China’s economy in the 1980s and 1990s, it was clear that there was a shift of economic centre of gravity to the East. Establishment of US hegemony in the region would render it capable of obstructing the formation of a Eurasian bloc that could marginalize the United States, and obstruct its plans to be the major power in the world. In this regard, former American national security advisor Zbigniew pointed out in his book The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy And Its Geostrategic Imperatives that Eurasia is the key to control the world and the great battle for global domination would always hover around it. He gave special importance for Middle East, as it separates Europe from Africa, and to create a rift between Russia and Europe. This would also create an impregnable barrier against Russia’s intentions to access the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, and at the same time prevent China from accessing Africa.

1 Levent Gokdemir, Gulf War, US, Great Middle East Project and Turkey, 271 — 276.
2 Ibid. 277 – 279.
Controlling the European part of Eurasia through oil and security could allow Washington to control Africa while the economic control over Russia would facilitate the control of Asia, and thus control Oceania and the Indian and Pacific Oceans and the North and South Poles. In this book Brzezinski points out that Eurasia should never be united under the hegemony of one power, and that the United States should be the arbiter of divisions and conflicts between contending powers in Eurasia which is the “chessboard on which the struggle for global primacy continues to be played”. He continues saying that “it is imperative that no Eurasian challenger emerges, capable of dominating Eurasia and thus also of challenging America”. For him the state of affairs in the early 21st century is as follow: NATO Links developed Europe to the United States making the latter a key power in European affairs, and Japan is bound to the US through economic political and military ties rendering it “an American protectorate, and the US controls key areas in other parts like the Persian Gulf and South East Asia and balances the state of affairs in Eurasia and the rest of the world. The International Monetary fund and the World Bank, in addition to the United Nations play accessory roles to the US influence.

He considers that Eurasia is the chief Geopolitical Prize. For the first time a non European Country, The US is the primary actor in Eurasia and it should remain as such, and agrees with Huntington who says that “A world without US primacy will be a world with more violence and disorder and less democracy and economic growth than a world where the United States continues to have more influence than any other country in shaping global affairs”. He divides Eurasia into a Western one that includes Europe, a Southern one that includes the Middle East, an Eastern one that includes East Asia, and a Middle one that includes Russia. And he considers that Europe is the bridgehead of the US into Eurasia, and that the real challenge is to draw the middle part into the Western orbit, while preventing any Eurasian power to have exclusive control of the Southern part or to exclude the US from it. He quotes Mackinder again saying that “Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; Who rules the World-Island commands the world.” In this sense Ukraine is highly important as its existence as independent country “would help transform Russia”, Hence enabling the US to affect the course of events in Russia proper. Without Ukraine, Russia would no longer be a Eurasian power but mainly an Asian power and would be drawn into central Asia where it would have to compete over influence with China. On the other hand, if Ukraine “loses its independence”-meaning if it falls under Russian influence— then this would have immediate consequences for Poland and central Europe. For him central Asia and by extension the Middle East is the Eurasian Balkans which is the potential geopolitical prize for Eurasian Supremacy, as the Balkans were the potential geopolitical prize for European Supremacy. Hence the US should not be excluded from this region, and should not allow any Eurasian power from having exclusive dominance over it. This would enable the US to be the arbiter of global affairs.

In another book, Strategic Vision: America and he crisis of global powers, Brzezinski considers that there were anomalies in American Politics that were most evident in the way the US handled the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. This led to the financial crisis of the United States in 2008-2009. This crisis “shook global confidence in the United States capacity to sustain its economic leadership over the long haul”. This internal problem had its causes and impact on American hegemony in the world. Several problems cause American anxiety over US capacity to sustain such a dominant role in global affairs such as national debt, financial structural problems related to the incapacity to reduce spending and increase revenues, widening social inequalities, decaying national infrastructure, public ignorance about global affairs, and “gridlock and highly partisan political system”. Yet according to Brzezinski the US still has assets summed up in its overall economic strength, innovative potential, demographic dynamics, reactive mobilization, geographic base and democratic appeal.

For the former national security adviser America failed to benefit from the era of post Cold War to establish an order that fits its interests by being reluctant to resolve problems within its sphere of influence like the Arab-Israeli conflict, or to engage Russia in a positive partnership with the US. But the world cannot live without America which acquires for Brzezinski a messianic role.

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1 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard, American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives XIV.
2 Ibid. 27
3 Ibid. 30 – 31
4 Ibid. 35
5 Ibid. 38
6 Ibid. 46
7 Ibid. 124
8 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Strategic Vision, 45 — 51.
9 Ibid. 52 — 55
10 Ibid. 65
11 Ibid. 102
Since “if America falters, the world is unlikely to be dominated by a single preeminent successor, such as China. While a sudden and massive crisis of the American system would produce a fast moving chain reaction leading to global political and economic chaos”. This is enhanced by his assumption that China is not ready to take over the leading role in global affairs due to its location, and encirclement by hostile neighbors and due to issues related to population and economic development.

According to Brzezinski “China is ambitious” and its neighbors, Russia, Japan and India are not ready to accept a Chinese leading role and might turn to US to obstruct the rise of China to prominence. For him the global system would become unstable without a US leading role, and “East Asia and South Asia will be the region’s most vulnerable to international conflicts in a post American world”. America is bordered by only two states Mexico and Canada. In case US gets weakened Mexico will become more volatile and will become a source of threat to American national security. China might benefit from a receding American role to enhance its relations with Brazil, hence getting into the backyard of America. For him “the most immediate foreign policy threat to America’s global status and the longer range challenge to global geopolitical stability arise on the Eurasian continent”. The immediate threat is located in the region East of Egypt’s Suez Canal, West of Xinjiang province, South of Russia’s post soviet frontiers in the Caucasus and with the new central Asian states.

Therefore a renewal of American domestic dynamism is possible while America by working purposefully with Europe, can shape a larger a more vital West, especially that “the Europe of today is still unfinished business, and will remain so until the West in a strategically sober prudent fashion embraces Turkey on more equal terms and engages Russia politically as well as economically”. Such an expanded West can help anchor the stability of an evolving Eurasia, as well as revitalize its own historic legacy. On the other hand the new Asia will most probably be like old Europe “obsessed with interstate rivalry and eventually the victim of self destruction and the cause of a global catastrophe”.

What was presented by Brzezinski as messianic mission for the US to preserve global peace was put more bluntly by George Friedman in his book “the Next One Hundred Years”. In this book he clearly states that Danger to US interests comes from China and Russia. China being a paper tiger for it is having a huge population, an aging one in the next two decades, a Western industrialized and an East that is still mostly rural, the West being drawn into the economy of the pacific. Russia is de-industrialized and relies on oil and on military sales; it is checked by Poland in Europe, by Turkey in the Caucasus and by Japan in the Far East. Therefore in American Geostrategic thinking Turkey would have to play a role in checking the advance of Russia and China Westward towards the Mediterranean and Southward toward the Indian Ocean.

This explains why President Barack Obama gave special importance to partnership with Turkey, which was most evident in his April 2009 visit to Ankara, less than three months after his election as president. The US indicated Turkey, which is called the “Moderate Islam”, as the example to the countries of the Middle East. In return of this Turkey might be granted several rewards including: To be admitted to the World Trade Organization; to sign free trade agreement with the US; and to be admitted to the membership of finance centre that will be established for the Middle East. Yet the prospects of conflict between the US and Turkey might arise if Turkey grows beyond certain limits as to enforce its hegemony over the Middle East which endangers US and Western interests.

Robert Kaplan: Upholding US Legacy

As Mackinder echoes in Spykman’s writings, and the latter in Brzezinski’s, and so Brzezinski echoes in the writings of Robert D. Kaplan. In his book, The Revenge of Geography, he considered that the Middle East stretching from Morocco in the West to Afghanistan in the East is passing through a crisis of central authority, and that History testifies that Tunisia and Egypt were always co-

Ibid. 75
Ibid. 79
Ibid. 81
Ibid. 85
Ibid. 103
Ibid. 109
Ibid. 123
Ibid. 132

Ibid. 155
Ibid. 101-119
Stephen Larrabbee, Turkey’s New Geopolitics, 176.
Levent Gokdemir, Gulf War, US, Great Middle East project and Turkey, 280 — 284.
hesive, unlike Libya, Yemen, and Syria. Regarding the world in present time he considered that the Post Cold War Era started in the 1980s with the revival of the term, Central Europe, which marked a fracturing of the soviet bloc. This region is a sort of a crush zone between Atlantic Europe in the West and the Eurasian Heartland with its continental outlook. The US, being located between two oceans, had access to the maritime highways of these two big oceans. Whereas Germany stood at the very heart of Europe, a land and sea power both, and thus fully conscious of its ties to maritime Western Europe and to the Heartland Russia–Eastern Europe. For him Central Europe regained its importance in European geopolitics after the end of the Cold War due to the resurgence of a united Germany and German influence over Poland, The Baltic states and Eastern Europe, while Mediterranean Europe and the Balkans “lag behind”. In addition to its expansion Eastward, Kaplan sees that Europe is moving Southward to encompass the Arab World in North Africa. Yet Europe is still hindered by its inner conflicts especially between France and Germany.

On the other hand Russia is still the world’s largest country, a land power that feels under perpetual threat due to the fact that it has little natural boundaries. As they have no maritime boundaries except in the North pole and in the East on the shores of the Pacific, the Russians always feel that they have to keep expanding or else they will be conquered. And Kaplan predicts that Russia which is blocked from expanding Westward by NATO would turn to central Asia where it has to compete over hegemony with China. The Caucasus remains a pivotal area for Russian interests. This made Russia always look to have access to reach maritime borders and sea lanes.

On the other hand Kaplan considers that China does not pose an existential threat to the United States and that the possibility of war between China and the US is “extremely remote”. And he expects that China will be turning its attention to its immediate surrounding including central Asia and Manchuria where it could collide with Russian interests. And he expects that the rivalry between China and the US will be determined by the direction that India takes, whether it would be to the side of the US or China. He notes that as Russia dominates the sparsely populated landmass of Eurasia, it would be surrounded on its peripheries by four densely populated areas which are: Europe, India, South East Asia, and China.

Kaplan also notes that the Middle East is the area where Europe, Russia, Asia, and Africa intersect: “with the Mediterranean Sea and the Sahara Desert to the West; the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Caspian Sea, and the Central Asian steppe-land to the North; the Hindu Kush and the Indian Subcontinent to the East; and the Indian Ocean to the South”. This area is not united politically and it contains 70 percent of the oil and gas resources in the world, and is highly unstable. But he notes that there are two pivotal areas in this region, the first and primary one being Iran, followed in importance by the Anatolian Plateau which constitutes a bridge between Iran and Europe.

**Counter Mainstream Scholarship**

It is noteworthy that a counter mainstream scholarship has evolved in the past decades to counter argue the mainstream Imperialist school in the United States and in the West in general. Works of scholars like Edward Said has provided an alternative theoretical ground base for anti Eurocentric scholarship. In his book “Orientalism”, Said discusses extensively the bases of Eurocentric scholarship and argues that Europe, in order to exist, has created an anti-Europe against which it could identify itself. This anti-Europe is not confined to the Arab-Islamic East but encompasses it to other Asian and African countries. Based on this we see scholars like Janet Abu Lughod writing an important book about the pre Eurocentric world analyzing the World system in the 13th and 14th centuries, before the rise of European hegemony. Gavin Menzies went as far as to claim that the new World was in reality discovered by the Chinese in 1421 rather than by Christopher Columbus in 1492. While Martin Bernal worked extensively on the role of Afro-asianic in urging the rise of both the classical

**Notes**

2. Ibid. 5 – 6
3. Ibid. 9
4. Ibid. 32 – 33
5. Ibid. 80
6. Ibid. 145 – 149
7. Ibid. 155 – 158
8. Ibid. 165 – 166
9. Ibid. 200
10. Ibid. 228 – 232
11. Ibid. 259
12. Ibid. 284 – 285
Greek and the roman civilizations. And the list goes on of scholars who worked hard to counter argue the Eurocentric oriental perception of world history and to argue that the History of Civilization is a history of interaction rather than conflict.

**ERIC HOBBSBAWM**

By the dawn of the new millennium, the US strategists became anxious about their position in the world. The presidency of George Bush (r. 2000-2008) reflected this anxiousness. Taking a pretext of the 9-11, 2001 incident, when al-Qaida activists attacked the world trade center and the pentagon, they ventured on implementing their strategy at controlling the Middle East. They first invaded Afghanistan in late 2001 and early 2002, a year later they invaded Iraq. However, this megalomaniac US policy has destroyed the “political and ideological foundations of the former hegemonic influence and left the US with little to reinforce the heritage of the cold war era but an admittedly frightening military power”. This made the US isolated and unpopular among most governments and peoples. Hobsbawm considered that this military strength underlined “the economic vulnerability of a US whose enormous trade deficit is maintained by Asian investors, whose economic interest in supporting a falling dollar is rapidly diminishing, and the relative economic clout of the European Union, Japan, East Asia, and even the organized bloc of third world primary producers”..... this unilateralism indicated a growing crisis within US society, the biggest since the civil war (1859-1865) which was reflected in “a sharp geographical division between the globalized economy of the two seaboards and the vast resentful hinterland, the culturally open big cities and the rest”. And in a prophetic way Hobsbawm stated that “American global policy is aimed inwards, not outwards, however great and ruinous its impact on the rest of the world. It is not designed to produce either empire or effective hegemony”. Democracy was a mere veil to American geostrategic directives and as Hobbsbawm stated it “that all of which can be described in the words of the great Thomas Hobbes’s leviathan as insignificant speech, the word democracy means this standard state model”.

This comparison between US and Britain is considered a fallacy by late British historian Eric Hobsbawm (1917-2012). Hobsbawm considered that there are many differences between these two states, for Britain is an island while the US is a continent, while Britain has sent emigrants all over the world, the US remains a receiver of immigrants. He considers that the US is more compared to Russia than to Britain. And unlike Britain the US never saw itself as a power among other rival powers and has never had colonial dependencies. The US had a huge home market unlike Britain that had to rely on world market. In addition the US is a messianic power as it was the byproduct of revolution unlike Britain which was a colonial power. That is why the US thinks that it is endowed with a messianic mission. Furthermore, Britain has built its hegemony based on the centrality of law while the US has built its glory on a tradition of outlaws. The US had no national ancestors to serve as a national past, Britain expanded overseas while the US expanded on land, and as British economy was linked to global economic, it played a central role in the development of nineteenth century world economy, while the US economy has no such organic connection with the world economy. Finally the US is a debtor unlike the case of Britain in its heydays, and the US unlike Britain has always had to rely on its military muscles, for Britain knew its limits while the US aims at being a world empire. The United States has been obsessed by the prospects of the rise of China. As the late British Historian Eric Hobsbawm stated it, “the danger of a major global war, probably arising out of the unwillingness of the US to accept the emergence of China as a rival superpower, has not receded, although it is not immediate”.

**CONCLUSION**

In conclusion we see that the American policy in the world has been conducted throughout the 20th century according to the guidelines set by Halford Mackinder over a century ago, and refined by Nicholas Spykman during the Second World War. The United States considers itself as an extension of the European world. This makes it inherit a constant apathy towards Russia, the power that occupies the core of Asia, where all “Barbarians invading Europe came from”. Another factor that determines the behavior of the United States is the fact that its elite considers themselves similar to the British Empire in the sense of being a naval power that should have sole control over maritime trade routes. In this sense, as Britain had to prevent any continental European power from

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2. Eric Hobsbawm, Globalization, Democracy and Terrorism, 46-47.
3. Ibid. 96
4. Ibid. 57 — 61
5. Ibid. 62 — 70
6. Ibid. 41
having a full control of the European landmass by playing off one power against the other, so the US, operating at a much larger scale, considers that to preserve its hegemony by preventing the Eurasian landmass from uniting and isolating it from global affairs. Hence, as The Low Lands served the British in the past as a bridgehead into Europe, so Western and Middle Europe serve the United States as a Bridgehead into Eurasia. The Middle East, stretching from Egypt in the West to the Chinese Desert of Xinjiang in the East separate Europe, from East Asia, and blocs Russia from having access to the Indian Ocean and the East Mediterranean. Henceforth the United States should either fully dominate this region, or should not be excluded from having strong footholds in it to serve a higher objective which is to separate Europe from East Asia, and bloc Russia inside Eurasia. It was according to these directives that the United States won the cold War in 1991. As soon as the Second World War ended, the US started to encircle the Soviet Union and its East European Allies with a set of alliances, NATO to the West, Cento in the Middle East and the South East Alliance in South East Asia. The fiercest competition took place in the Middle East which became the hottest spot in the world during the cold war, as it witnessed the eruption of five major wars between the Arabs and Israel (1948, 1956, 1967, 1973, 1982). In 1974 the US achieved a major success when Egypt under President Anwar Sadat cut its relations with the Soviet Union and shifted to the orbit of the US. The Soviet Union tried to substitute this loss by invading Afghanistan, but this proved to be a costly war of attrition. The USSR, unable to break the isolation imposed on it blocking it from having access to maritime trade routes, imploded and led to an American victory. The new directives are aimed at World Hegemony at a time when powers like Russia, China, and other powers are trying to contend with American Supremacy in the World.

Citation

THE FPÖ IS AGAINST CENTRALISM IN THE EU AND ADVOCATES A EUROPE OF FATHERLANDS

Johann Gudenus

Our position on Russia, the EU and the USA, and in particular on the neutrality of Austria, is clear: Politics in the EU may not be run at the behest of the USA, which can and will only cause damage to European countries in the long run. Brussels must lift the sanctions against Russia without delay and seek a solution to the Ukraine conflict together with Putin. Only if the EU and Russia pull in the same direction will both sides benefit. US interests may not stand in the way, that is a clear demand from the FPÖ. The powers-that-be in Europe must finally realise that the important axis required by Europe is not Brussels-Washington but Paris-Berlin-Moscow.

In accordance with Austria’s national identity and image, the FPÖ considers itself neutral, and is now the only party in the country that upholds the principle of neutrality. We gladly share our thoughts and views with anyone, and warn of one-sided partisanship in the strategic interests of others. At the same time, the FPÖ calls upon the ruling Austrian parties to conduct themselves in line with Austria’s neutrality. Foreign Minister Sebastian Kurz and Federal Chancellor Werner Faymann must determine their positions in accordance with this neutrality and should not blindly follow guidelines from Brussels.

The Ukraine crisis and the sanctions against Russia have highlighted something else too. This EU is on the wrong track. One almost gets the impression that they genuinely want nothing other than to get rid of Europe’s diversity and create a standard a European people. The national differences that are the source of Europe’s spiritual and cultural wealth are to be eradicated in order to smooth the way for a new dictatorship of the EU lobby and large corporations, making this as easy as possible. The FPÖ is fighting not against Europe, but against this EU egalitarianism.

What is more, Brussels must finally stop playing the global moral police role. Serbia for example, an EU candidate country, recently learned how Eurocrats comment on any and all political activities that they are not really responsible for, and even try to regulate them. Neither Brussels nor Washington are in a position to judge how Serbia welcomes a guest of the state like Vladimir Putin or which bilateral agreement between decades-old trading partners should be signed. Brussels finally has to stop commenting on and watching like a hawk every step the Russian President takes on European soil.

Europe can only prevail if it desists from all efforts to create a constitution for a centralist European super state, and sets the goal of establishing a Europe of free and independent countries within the framework of a federation of sovereign nation-states. Furthermore, effectively protecting Europe against threats such as terrorism, aggressive Islamism, superpower imperialism and economic ag-
pression by means of low-wage countries should be just as much of a priority as putting an immediate stop to immigration from outside Europe in all countries of the European Union, also under the umbrella of “family reunifications”. And that can only happen with the support of reliable partners, as Russia has been over decades.

The emancipation of the EU from US efforts to achieve hegemony would also be an important step forwards. Confidant of Helmut Kohl and former defence spokes-

man Willy Wimmer explained in an interview that the Americans have very precise information – seen in 2000 – as to how they would imagine Europe. They wanted to draw a line from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, and from there towards Anatolia. Everything west of this line should be under the influence of the USA. This was explicitly declared at a conference in Bratislava hosted by a US government department. This is exactly how Eurocrats in Brussels are acting, and this approach is damaging for Europe and its individual constituent economies – as shown by the current sanctions and their impacts. We should not just give in so readily to pressure from the USA on the EU.

In the meantime, the EU’s anti-Russian stance has claimed its first victim: the South Stream pipeline project that has been underway for years has now been abandoned by the Russians because the EU has not deviated from its official opinion that the construction of South Stream would contradict EU regulations. This blockade mentality of the EU is incomprehensible and a risk for each and every Member State. The mere announcement by former EU Energy Commissioner Oettinger that he would do everything to delay the work on South Stream was an open affront to Russia. The government in Sofia was the first to comply with Oettinger’s request and stopped construction on the pipeline.

Bulgaria was the first country to meet this call. It remains to be seen how much we can talk about blackmail from the EU in this context. That said, it is clear to all that Sofia is reliant on funding from Brussels and it would be rather ill-advised to oppose the mighty EU.

By putting a stop to the pipeline project, countries such as Serbia and Bulgaria are stiff-armed into acting against their own economic interests and following the EU’s lead, but this also harms the Austrian economy. Austrian energy company OMV and steel manufacturer voestalpine are partners in the pipeline project. According to market estimates, voestalpine’s contract alone is worth EUR 100 million, which has just gone up in a puff of smoke thanks to the ignorant actions of the EU. For Serbia, the project being ended by Kremlin chief Putin is an economic catastrophe. Seven years were invested in the project – and now the EU candidate country can sit on the bill. It is out of the question for South Stream to be used as a bargaining chip in the Ukraine crisis.

Brussels seemingly has a significant interest in ensuring that gas continues to flow to Europe through Ukraine that is under western control. This is lunacy given the instability of the country that the EU is partly responsible for. At the same time, we must not forget that Ukraine has repeatedly used the transit pipelines to exercise political pressure. Some 63 billion cubic metres of gas for up to 38 million households in Europe would have been transported via South Stream, ensuring a significantly secure supply. The interests represented by the Eurocrats in Brussels are clearly not those of EU citizens. Since Turkey will likely be the beneficiary of the abandoned South Stream Pipeline, it is clear who profits from the blockade mentality of the EU. Evil unto him who thinks evil of it.

Former Soviet President Michael Gorbachev, who is one of the “fathers of German unification”,

issued such a warning in an interview with the newspaper “Rossijskaja Gazeta”: “No-one may engage themselves in a new Cold War.” A warning that evidently fell on deaf ears, especially at the EU. Gorbachev urgently called for the lifting of sanctions against Russia.

It is high time to listen to those who have already had a decisive influence on history, for the benefit of the whole of Europe. We Europeans must adopt a clear approach for the good of all citizens and the European community of values.
RUSSIAN NATIONALISM AND EURASIANISM: THE IDEOLOGY OF RUSSIAN REGIONAL POWER AND THE REJECTION OF WESTERN VALUES

Matthew Raphael Johnson

The recent flurry of writing on Russian politics, nationalism and Alexander Dugin shows the contemptible inability of western savants to apprehend any idea beyond the cliche’s of stagnant neo-liberalism. Worse, “Russia specialists” in academia are now tripping over themselves trying to “analyze” Dugin and the Eurasianist idea. Bereft of the vocabulary to understand the concept, they merely apply fashionable labels from western political thought onto Russia in a pathetic and pretentious attempt to show how “dangerous” such ideas are to “European values.”

Reading A. Toynbee, especially Volumes IV–VI of his Study of History, lead one to question both the “civilizational” fundament and, later, his “higher religion.” The problems are not that, at such a level of analysis, he is inaccurate. Such an epic level of perspective cannot be held to the sharp standards of accuracy that a study of, say, the state of New Hampshire might be subject. The very nature of such a sweeping history means that, in the main, he might be seen as “more or less” on the right track. That is as far as one can go. However, that begs the question, since the very concept of such an epic orientation is open to doubt.

Equally sweeping is the general criticism of P. Sorokin and others, namely, that such a view of history is problematic because it isolates a few variables from the rest, making them extremely important. This means that others are minimized. This criticism gains force to the extent that one sees the knowledge required for any epic vista of history to work at all. One cannot know that much about global history to come to such conclusions. Those specializing in an element of a civilization (such as Hellenistic aesthetics) will easily annihilate sweeping generalizations. Hegel’s desire to label entire epochs of history with one word means that such an approach cannot be true; unless one is willing to reduce epochs of civilization to slogans about them.

In the case of this present author, the concern has been to refuse such grand historical panoramas and focus instead on a single nation, or elements within a nation that lend themselves to detailed study. There, the actual living conditions of real people can be analyzed. The sweep of Toynbee, Hegel or Marx is interesting, but if the result is to then force all societies to follow that general model, then they should be left unread. Few deny the ability of Eric Voegelin, but again, outside of specialized studies on Plato or Marx, Voegelin’s sweep is such as to make it interesting, but a fatal temptation to the study of actual historical life.

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This preface is needed because the Eurasians fall into the same problem. They too, deal in civilizational norms, though their interest is very specific: defining the Atlantic civilization as against the Russian one. At the level of elite society, this is useful. Western elites, generally speaking, are of one mind in their commitment to science, secularism, individualism (in theory), capitalism, positivism and empire. There is nothing strange about this. Toynbee, in areas in which he is well schooled (such as Greek antiquity), becomes extremely important. When he generalizes this experience to medieval Hindustan, however, he becomes less tenable.

Identity and foreign policy go hand in hand. Domestic and foreign policies are closely linked. In Russia’s case, her sense of corporate selfhood has changed radically since the fall of the Marxist empire in the early 1990s. Russia’s foreign policy has changed as her global status has changed, and the debate among the different factions of Russian life has dominated her foreign policy. The purpose in this paper is to define, in specific terms, the nature of a Russian, Eurasianist foreign policy. Eurasianism is a popular foreign policy idea in elite Russian circles and therefore, must be taken very seriously by scholars (Shlapentokh, 2007).

Russia is a state and nation. It is also a broader based civilization taking in many ethnic groups to herself. This means that its values and virtues are far more than the result of specific historical conditions, but are, in some sense, eternal virtues that give life meaning. There are “civilizational” values that take what is crucial in those nations the civilization encompasses. These are not ethnic groups (which are much smaller) but refer to “imperial” ideologies that can rule many different groups and are formulated precisely to justify the rule of a large and diverse policy. Examples of such civilizations might be Chinese, Indian or African. These go beyond historical experience and are supposed to contain greater truths.

The concept of a “Russian civilization” undergirds the vision of the Russian Eurasianists. This is both a political theory and a source of foreign policy decisions. The “imperial mission” of a society is not about local values, but cosmic ideas. In politics, these “imperial ideologies” serve as the foundation of global rule.

Eurasianism as foreign policy refers to Russian geopolitical space. Russia is a “cosmos,” it takes smaller “solar systems” under its wing to create a loose federation of allied nations and states. In some instances, it rejects the very notion of “nation-statism” in that a true civilization can be only a federation, not a state.

**Ideological History of Eurasianism**

Prior to the well known Alexander Dugin, Eurasianism has a rich ideological heritage unknown to those who cannot read Russian. PM Bitsilli (1953) took a broad look at global history. “Rhythm” is specific to a people. It is dialectical both in that it is becoming (rather than being) and takes the familiar trinity as undifferentiated unity – fragmentation – reflective unity. This also was essential to the metaphysics of Karsavin. Rhythms differ radically, but they still partake of the same formula.

Finally, inertia is the third element. Dialectic, rhythm and inertia govern the historical process. Tribal life is unreflective, yet, historical forces and local conditions force a chaotic mixing of tribes that are more or less compatible. Finally, in the construction of the ethnics, a reflective unity is created as conditions now exist for reason, thought and the development of the historical person.

In his “Tragedy of Russian Culture,” Bitsilli takes the common Eurasian position that “progress” and “history” are both loaded and ideological terms which contrast all existence with that of the west. That is to say, the lineal development of mechanized and commercial capitalism is the standard of global development. For Bitsilli, culture is the “self-disclosure” of the personality en masse. It is an overcoming of history in the sense that this self persists through time.

PN Savitsky (1968) focused his research on the prymordial argument for national, that is, ethnic development. Tribes mix together to form ethnicities. This mixing is not arbitrary, but can only take place among groups who share significant elements in common. This mixing, further, is also not arbitrary due to its context. As is common in this doctrine, climate, topography and local resources are extremely significant in the development of a decentralized tribal life into early forms of ethnic groups. Organizations of peoples, as they come out of their tribal background, take from local conditions. Thus, territory is significant and becomes a part of the development of the national unit.

The soil literally is incorporated into the flesh of the people. Local resources, soil conditions and the general environment become a part of the physical makeup of ethnicities. Soil conditions are aspects of topography
in that they are dependent on it. The ethnic group then becomes like its surroundings: an organic whole.

Ethnicities developing near the shoreline, all other things equal, develop into mercantile states. They think globally in terms of markets and resources. Russia, on the other hand, is a land and forest based community and does not, as a result, develop the trading ethic to the extent that the Greeks or Phoenician have. This is not to argue that these conditions determine outcomes. They only provide dispositions.

Savitsky stresses that the Mongol occupation was not destructive for Russia, but quite the opposite. The Horde was a culturally advanced people who protected Russia from the inroads of western religious ideology. All occupied lands, so Savitsky and Most Eurasians would argue, did well under Mongol administration.

In terms of politics, Savitsky argues that linear progress is a myth. Social organisms run in cycles, repeating some basic institutions but adding and subtracting others. The state, in the sense of its Cultural Constitution, requires a unity of religion and basic moral foundations in order to carry out even minimal tasks. The cultural and religious unity obviates the need for a strong state, administratively speaking.

Most importantly, Savitsky argued as early as 1928 that the future belongs to Asia. After World War I and storm clouds brewing over Europe, this was not a ludicrous idea. It is even more significant now. The simple idea that can be drawn from the prophetic words of Savitsky is that Europe destroyed itself in two world wars, went broke during the “Cold War” and, as of 2014, has little to offer the east. To reject “Europe” is to make a realistic judgment about the state of their finances, elites and economic foundations.

Of course, the most significant Eurasianist, and the most verbose, is Alexander Dugin. His work is generally more esoteric than the rest, arguing that the ancient symbolism of east and west points to two sorts of civilization: the sea based and the land based. What makes Dugin attractive to those who can read the language is his use of Plato to ground a new vision of the nation and its context, the civilization.

What the west lacks is the concept of higher meanings. Nominalism and positivism, the two official ideologies of western thought (in general) see objects per se. Nominalism argues that there are no necessary connections among things in society or nature, there are merely individual acts, people or institutions. Using Plato, argues that the “object” is merely phenomenal, not real. “Realism” is the view, assumed by positivism and nominalism, that there are two entities only: the observer and the observed. This is naive because there can be no way to prove the existence of actual objects solely based on perception.

The nominal has no purpose. They are random individual things that might form a system for “mutual advantage.” Its social applications are obvious. However, to oversimplify, objects and particulars exist only in a context, and that context soon becomes the All, or the single set of relations that make up the cosmos. Each is dependent on all. Dugin’s critique of the west, given this simplistic model, is that western man has been trained to see objects as “facts,” brute givens that are only provided with meaning by man, and that usually refers to a political or scientific elite. All is reduced to the “practical,” and as a result, all meaning is lost.

The west replaced natural law with markets. Markets took science and make it an appendage of commercial dominance. The concept of pure mechanism, the product of the Renaissance, was to create a world, one imposed upon the real one, that reduced matter to a machine that can be taken apart and put back together in the form of man-made technology. This is the essence of capitalism (and has no relation to the market model). Capitalism is based on egocentricity, the denial of private property except for the few, and perhaps most important, that morals and culture have no place in “rational” economics.

Socialism is quite similar. It is obsessed with technology, science and production as ends in themselves. Power may be reached by different means, but it all comes down to economics. Capitalism and socialism depend, not on intelligence, but on deviousness. The Marxist critique of capital is correct as far as it goes. Economics is inherently historical, egocentrism can never create stability and capital functions by using labor as a tool.

These are not the only options. Eurasianism, as economics, is based on the concept that economics is not a field in itself. It may not make its own rules, but is subordinate to the common good of the community. Competition always has a place, but so does cooperation. Production is culturally specific in nearly every way, only that globalization has gone very far in standardizing its methods.
Nations exist. They create states. However, with the possible exception of great states such as Russia and China, autarky is not rational. Regionalism is the response. For Dugin, several civilizational spaces exist: Eurasia, Africa, the Far East and Europe. These are now the actors in history. Nations retain their autonomy within their civilizational space, but the regionalism of Dugin seeks to retain the gains made by globalization while retaining local and regional sovereignty. The result is a multipolar world.

Globalization is western ideology and scientific culture masquerading as “reason” itself; as science per se. It is the rebirth of Atlantis, the necropolis, the world of Twilight, or unreality. Both Dostoevsky and Gogol used these metaphors to describe St. Petersburg. Atlantis lives on, deriving from the Phoenicians, and leading to the ruse of Venice in the High Middle Ages, then concluding with the English and institutionalized as a “global ideology” under the US.

**Basic Concepts of Eurasianism and the West**

The discussion above does not even scratch the surface of the richness of Eurasian thought. It is a summary of some of the Russian-language literature. In a more understandable way, much of the Eurasian idea can be summarized in these points:

- Communitarianism against nominalism. Identities are necessarily collective.
- Non-alignment in global affairs.
- Eurasianism holds that while nations exist, they are not self-contained. The political unit is the civilization, which is a federation of complimentary nations.
- Culture is the essential tie among people in a nation or civilization. The quantifiable aspects of rule are highly limited and secondary.
- Russians are not Europeans, or at least not entirely European. Russians are mixtures of Slav, Mongol and Turkish blood that help inform their genetics. This means that Russians are genetically related to the Caucasian and some Central Asian peoples. In addition, this “third world” blood makes the Russians an ideal intermediary between Asia and Europe, or even Europe and the third world. (cf. Shlapentokh, 2007 for greater detail)
- The state (in its true sense as the cultural collective) should put its stamp on the economy. In general, public-private ownership mixes are essential for larger and strategic industry, while private ownership remains for small business.
- The Eurasian idea is one that both defines those within it as well as excludes those without. In this case, the “other” is the “West.” In the broadest of terms, the cardinal ideas of the West are these:
  - Egocentrism manifest as abstract rights rather than function, station or vocation. Rights are more rhetorical and strategic than real.
  - Democracy as necessarily proceeding from nominalism. This is not merely a “procedure” but a state of affairs. Democracy exists when liberalism does.
  - Materialism and secularism in public and economic life. In general, since rights have no discernible origin, utilitarianism becomes the official ideology by default.
  - Liberal Messianism is crucial: liberalism needs to be imposed by force.
  - The west defines “state” as that which is bureaucratic and administrative.
  - Liberal rhetoric sounds merely procedural. This is to mask the ideological core of liberalism which is essentially totalitarianism.
  - Politicians serve as window dressing for economic elites. When the economy fails, the politicians, who control nothing, are said to be at fault.
  - Evolution is part of the west’s official ideology. It serves to a) secularize society, but more importantly, b) justify colonialism, industrial capitalism and “competition.”
  - “Rationality” is defined in purely economic terms.
  - “Science” and the “scientific establishment” are treated as identical. Science is defined as that which deals with formal and quantitative properties. This, in turn, is identical with the concept of “intelligibility.”
  - Liberalism rejects the “nation” as fiction, yet, holds formal quantity, the “international community,” and the isolated ego as palpable realities.
These two views of the world are antithetical. The west views itself as the apex of human liberty while seeing the east as in need of western assistance. Evolution is leading the world to the western idea, which was the purpose of the Darwinian system from the beginning. It is no accident that this view of the world arose from the height of English colonial rule and industrial development. Capitalism sees the world merely as a series of markets or resource bases to control. Peoples are treated in purely quantitative terms.

Representative government, which is radically distinct from “democracy,” is an important factor in Eurasianist thought. The Eurasianist movement evaluates the “democracy” ethic as being a mask for economic power. Elections are competitive races among economic factions speaking for “the people,” a collective abstraction that does not exist. A strong Russian executive can help filter the demands of the moneyed class and seek the common good. Putin’s approach has mirrored this demand (Shlapentokh, 2007).

“Russian pluralism” is a vision that motivates Russian domestic policy (Tolz, 1998). Eurasianism as a political theory revolves around the concept of civilization over ethnoses. A pluralist society would imitate the look of a federation, using the most significant elements of nationalism without its tribal negatives. A Russian Eurasianism stresses the fundamental autonomy of these ethnic groups within a broader state, and these different groups would maintain a large degree of independence.

Russia under Vladimir Putin has been a strong supporter of the non-aligned movement. This movement seeks to improve the condition of the third world and build a global society based on the independence of nation states. This idea is a direct attack on Westernism. At the same time, larger states that are in various stages of development have taken the lead from one time to another, including Indonesia, Russia and India. This just means that these countries on the periphery of development have the size and potency to wring concessions from the central states such as England or Japan (Shulman, 2005). In Russian Eurasianism, the main foreign element is the “multipolar” world shared by the non-aligned movement and its dedication to alter global capitalism and westernism.

This “non-aligned” idea is central to Eurasianism in that the west, given their “New World Order” and “End of history” rhetoric, is implying that it and it alone has the right to shape the rules of the political game. It is not so much that these rules have been deduced from democratic elections and hence enforced, they are the rules that govern elections. Eurasianists make quite a bit of fuss about this distinction. Democracy is just as much a set of results as a set of processes (Nikitin, 2005). Russian Eurasianism and the non-aligned movement are closely related.

Russia cannot be considered as a “developed” or “developing” country since those terms imply an absolute standard. The Soviet use of domestic force to rapidly develop heavy industry (that may or may not have been appropriate for the time) makes her a developed country, though one that did not develop according to the typical pattern of European states. In fact, Russia’s industrialization drive in the 1960’s and 1970’s might (with some adjustments) be a model for the third world that wants to see a great state presence in the economy rather than just profit-seeking businessmen. Since Russia can be seen as the “periphery” of the European Union, she shares some elements in common with the third world.

In the (2010) work of Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, the above concepts are restated in a way more congenial to the development of Central Asia. His essential political theory can be summarized in five points:

A strong, independent state is required for both development and sovereignty over resources. “Self-regulated” development is part of the concept of independence, since anything else would give development priorities to others. The public good should always take precedence over private profit.

Within any Eurasian Union, a specific Central Asian bloc needs to be formed to focus on issues concerning this region. This is a part of Nazarbayev’s emphasis on Eurasianism being practical and loose rather than federative (see below).

Free trade should focus on regions and culturally similar peoples. Central Asia is a good example. Free trade should be pursued with common policies on substantial economic issues. Its purpose is to keep foreign forces out of the area. In areas where Central Asia is impacted the most, even other members of the union, such as Russia, should stand aside.
Any decision made by the Central Asian Union, as well as, presumably, any Eurasian Union including Russia, will require a 4/5 vote.

Slowly, regional groupings will consolidate basic laws on development policy.

Nazarbayev’s main concern is a practical one: the modernization of the Central Asian states with no reciprocal duties in any specific direction. His view is guarded and cautious due to his concern for Kazakh independence as well as its stress on modernization. In fact, convergence is not an issue here except as a matter of fiscal law, and he goes out of his way to stress that there is no single ideology nor any sense of unitarism. While this is consistent with Eurasianism, Nazarbayev’s emphasis on practical economic programs aimed at modernization is not.

Even more, he stresses that, in terms of basic policy, each state within the union should retain the option to remove itself from any law it deems problematic. At best, The Kazakh program is based on a loose structure. Since there is no “doctrine” of Eurasianism on these matters, it remains an open question. In general, Eurasianists remain national in their focus.

The problem which Nazarbayev points out is that the states to be a part of this Union are far from homogenous, and remain at different levels of development. Hindrances to any union he sees as primarily based on a lack of strategy. There is no method of dispute resolution, nor does there seem to be any connection among ministers dealing with these issues and their own governments.

Relative to currency, the President argues that it needs to be based explicitly on production and the development needs of the societies involved. While it should be kept out of the hands of private bankers, no specific state should control it either. He advocates that all branches of government be involved in currency decisions, since these are so essential to economics and development. Keeping the currency out of the hands of speculators seems to imply that he wants the regional currency non-convertible.

**Concepts in Eurasian Foreign Policy**

In the work of Professor Vera Tolz, there are three basic concepts of Russian Eurasianism that can serve as the basis of foreign policy. In all cases, the idea of the USSR lies at the root. The USSR was an empire promising basic independence for each of its republics. In other words, the official position was that all ethnic organizations under the Soviet system were to be permitted autonomy within the broader society. This approach, thought honored only in the breach, is very close to Eurasianism. These views Tolz calls “revisionist” in that they seek to challenge the west and its increasing hegemony in various ways:

The USSR was a noble enterprise that went awry. This was because the Bolsheviks thought they could run the country from a central source. This was incorrect and led to tremendous distortions in the economy. The USSR needs to be reborn, but on a far more decentralized and humanitarian basis.

Russian civilization can develop along the lines of a limited federation of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.

The third concept is traditional ethno-nationalism, where the state develops to incorporate all Russian speakers contiguous to her borders.

Dugin, in his essay on Nikolai Trubetskoy, argues that both the tsarist and liberal approaches to the USSR are incorrect. He argues that Bolshevism derives directly from the revolutionary state pioneered by Peter I, and the Petrograd bureaucracy that failed to connect with the broader population. They accepted Bolshevism because it was a “vague, unconscious, blind and desperate desire to return to Old Russia, prior to the Romano-German yoke.” At the same time, the Eurasian idea rejects this movement as secular and anti-traditionalist. It was the westernization of the Russian elite, rather than any alien imposition on society, that served as the model for the revolution. In other words, the alien regime existed from the early 18th century onwards.

Trubetskoy saw the USSR as a basically positive phenomenon because it unified the Eurasian plain and maintained a multinational state dedicated to a unified economic end. In addition, in doing battle with western imperialism, it served to weaken the west’s stranglehold over most of the planet. Finally, in protecting Russians against the west, the USSR, despite itself, preserved much of Old Russia.

While often not mentioned in English, the Eurasian idea derives from the Old Belief. As this writer has also written, the Old Rite is representative of pre-Petrine Russia, and this state, given its limited resources, made war on the church no less systematically than the Bolsheviks.
After Nikon, the close association of the church with the bureaucracy made the love of Orthodoxy dependent on the love of the state.

While exaggerated, this is essentially true; the deposition of Nikon left Alexis in charge, only very soon after to permit Peter and the Germanic ruling class later to purge all national elements of the church. The followers of Alexis saw the Old Rite as ignorant fanatics and themselves, increasingly, as Enlightened westerners. The fact that the atheist and materialist Theophan Prokopovytch was placed in charge of reorganizing the Russian church under Peter shows just how far this process went.

These three visions are about recreating Russia as a powerful civilization on the ruins on both the USSR and the democratic capitalism of Yeltsin. These three concepts are different ways of making it legitimate. All three of these are anti-western in that they reject the liberal cosmopolitanism that serves to justify western expansion. None of these three are specifically economic, but use culture and political to situate economic development. Economics for the Eurasianist is but an aspect of the broader political idea (Tolz, 1998).

In a recent review of Empire (2000), by A. Negri and M. Hardt, Alexander Dugin remarks:

The essence of empire is corruption. Corruption, as destruction, is the antithesis of construction; it is a usurper. Empire is the perennial contagion in world history; it destroys life, but it does so through a highly complex and subtle system of control based on man’s base desires, individuality and freedom. As intellectual work is today crucial, the nature of production has changed. If the mind is the main means of production, then the machine and the brain slowly merge. On the other hand, new technologies such as the computerization of technique, have become an indispensable aspect of the human body, and soon, these two will also merge. . . Empires are not imposed from without, but they slowly create mental dependencies that tie man into their networks. These gradually serve as our sources of information that integrate ourselves economically, legally and psychologically. This implies a total loss of identity.

The connection between the physical world and the its mental analogue is common enough in western criticism, most famously in the early 20th century work of Bernard Bosanquet. Contrary to a naive realism, structures of social life and the means of their justification soon become organizing principles in the mind. This is the problem with recent work on Dugin and Eurasianism, these structures cannot manage the nature of the Eurasian critique of the western world.

**EURASIANISM AND DOMESTIC POLICY**

Building a new Russian nation with its own specific interests in the world requires a strong civil society. This concept, which has become cliche over time, primarily deals with the institutions necessary for the functioning of a state, any state. Even a state that uses the most strict criterion of ethnicity must maintain a civil society that undergirds that idea. All states and governments must, in some way, provide the population with institutions that give regularity and law to social forces regardless of their origin.

The great issue in building the new Russia is membership. In Ukraine, for example, the proverbial distinction between east and west Ukraine has almost torn the country apart. Western Ukraine is seen as pro-western, Eastern Ukraine seen as pro-Russian. In Russia’s case, the Eurasianists do not normally use an ethnic criterion of membership, but would rebuild Russia as a federation of ethnic groups that can serve to check and balance each other (Sengupta, 2009).

Even if Russian foreign policy were to center around gathering all Russian speaking areas under Moscow, this would not free the state from the rule of law or basic representative institutions. There is no clear connection between liberalism and representation, that is, there is no reason to believe that a democratic government is necessarily a representative government. The Russian nationalist movement in general, and Eurasianists in particular, normally holds that liberalism is about ideology and the interests of capital, not the protection of rights. A state can be highly representative without being a democracy, and a democracy can enshrine an oligarchy rather than “the people.” The Eurasianists are fairly cynical about western claims to tolerance and “universal values.”

Representation, at its root, is the “matching” of a constitution to domestic ideas of justice. A constitution is more than a scrap of paper. It is a living mode of thought that is meant to bind a community together in a world of shared ideas. Laws cannot come from mere self-interest or utility, but must be representative of the popular will. Popular wills are not necessarily manifest in elections,
but show the broader contours of social life over time. The General Will is the public good, and its differs, as in the work of Rousseau, from the mere counting of votes and might even be opposed to it.

Even more, a strong, new Russia requires an educational system that creates a firm foundation to the constitutional order. Education in the Eurasianist case should be tilted towards that which is useful for the society as a whole, rather than the liberal arts as a broad category of “classics.” The idea is that education brings students into the constitutional order and both, taken together, form a strong sense of national identity: a linguistic and cultural bond that brings people together in shared responsibility rather than abstract rights.

This concept of constitution is central to foreign policy because when “Russia” acts on the world stage, there must be some important and significant entity that is called “Russia.” The Eurasianist looks askance at the United States acting on the world stage for democracy and human rights. These are abstractions. For the Russian Eurasianist in 2012, the U.S. acts for the interest of the corporate bodies who control her (Sengupta, 2009).

Dugin, in his article on National Bolshevism, reduces the Eurasian-socialist idea to three:

For development according to Russian tradition, socialism, ethnic roots and an adherence to the constants in Russian history. These include the mir, sobornost’, a rejection of utility, universalism and the imperial idea.

Towards the restoration of the values of Old Russia, traditional spiritual culture and the doctrine of “The Third Rome.”

To build a society without classes, toward brotherhood, equality, solidarity and justice. It is a combination of the social ideals of the populists, communists, socialists, and the national anarchist revolutionary tradition (Dugin, 2004).

REGIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY

Regionalism is significant for Russia given her immense geographic distinctions. Eurasianism usually supports a strong sense of regional identity to balance centralized institutions. Regionalism for Russia has been an important problem since the Yeltsin administration because these were considered the more corrupt parts of the Russian polity. Regional governments were (and are) seen as the weak spots on the Russian body politic because of the older, clan-based models of both patronage and rent-seeking.

In the work of professors Phyllis Dininio and Robert Ortung, regional corruption has been the Achilles heel of Russia as a polity. In their 2005 article on the subject, there are two overpowering variables dealing with the regional idea: first, the size of the government and, second, the level of economic development. If Eurasianism is to enshrine regionalism as an essential part of its doctrine, then the problems of regional corruption need to be faced. While Putin has long promised to deal strongly with corruption, regional elites have been dug in through control over patronage and raw materials. In fact, the Dininio and Ortung thesis is that rent seeking increases in areas of great raw material production.

Corruption provides a great incentive to develop central institutions. The typical Eurasianist view is that internal moral virtues are just as important as external institutions. The “spiritual bonds” that the Eurasianist movement harps on continually is about the ability of local institutions to form virtuous citizens. A virtuous public would do well under even the worst form of government. In Russia’s case, internal virtue is needed to rebuild institutions since the decay of the state in the early 1990s.

Corrupt regions in Russia can be traced to large bureaucracies, tightly centralized, that can serve as rent protection for raw materials. The basic corrupt practice is that the bureaucrats use their access to the halls of power to charge a premium for those wishing to exploit or profit from it. This, in turn, strengthens the forces of disintegration and weakens the forces of the national will. While regionalism is important to the Eurasianist movement, it can never be the “cover” for an elite seeking to profit at the expense of the broader economy (Dininio and Ortung, 2005).

Regional corruption is an ideological issue for both the Eurasians and the Putin government because both share the sense of a strong central authority that represents a well integrated regional identity. Regional identity and proper central representation are not opposites, but rather require each other to function. Putin’s 2005 attempt to appoint certain regional leaders was seen as a way to correct this imbalance, yet, for the most part, American media treatment of the move was negative (Robertson, 2009).
Another reason why the regional idea is important is because it connects Russia to its “near abroad.” In a real sense, these can be called “regions” since—at least—they contain a certain proportion of Russian speakers. Ukraine is a powerful case in point. Ukraine was the center of the older Imperial state because her fertility fed the rest of Russia. To destabilize Ukraine and force it away from Russia is to wound Moscow tremendously. Ukraine is a region in the eyes of the Eurasianist, a region with legitimate cultural aspirations. Yet, there is no reason why she should remove herself from the Russian embrace and become the main agricultural supplier to the EU as a regional dependency (Shulman, 2005 and Bukkvoll, 1997).

Ukraine and other “regions” of the Russian near abroad show the significance of regionalism for Russian foreign policy. Eurasianism—and to a great extent the Putin presidency—wants to see a different sort of sovereignty. The Ukrainian national idea saw the world in black and white: either independence or empire. The Eurasianist sees it differently. As there is a “third way” in economics, there is also a third way in sovereignty, one that does not posit independence and empire as opposites, but rather as counterparts. In this case, a federative Russia sees Ukraine and Belarus retain basic control over internal cultural policy while serving a loose confederation of independent powers. Basic legislation is in the hands of regional elites, while foreign policy is maintained in Moscow. These federative concepts are a crucial element of Eurasian foreign policy, especially since both Ukraine and Russia have an active role in the Caucasus mountains. In both cases, the Slavic and Turkic connection is clear—the Slavs will be dealing with Asians as equal partners within a single “civilizational space” (Sangupta, 2009).

Ukrainian foreign policy as compared with the Russia shows many areas of overlap that display the significance of Eurasianism even for Kiev. Ukraine sees Russia the way the Eurasanists do—as a powerful empire and civilization more than a nation state. On the other hand, Kiev sees itself as a “central European” state using and manifesting certain parts of Russian Slavdom for its own purposes. Ukrainian foreign policy centers around making sense out of the competing demands of Moscow and the western powers, whether in Washington or Brussels. The seemingly unending recession and depression since 2007 is making the western option that much less appealing. The Eurasianist—naturally—sees southern and eastern Asia to be the future. If Ukraine is to “turn to the west,” she might be turning to a moribund body too indebted to help her development. Eurasianists can easily point to the apparently terminal stage of western capitalism and seek compensation in Asia (MacFarlane, 2006).

Ukraine and Russia both need to deal with regions. In Ukraine, the far Eastern coal and steel areas remain staunch Russian supporters and, to a great extent, neo-communists. These do not want a recreation of the Russian empire, but seek an independent Ukraine in fraternal union with Belarus and Russia, creating a Slavic colossus and trading empire the west must respect on the world stage.

Ukraine and Belarus, in the Eurasian idea, are integral parts of a broader Russian federation. Such a federation is based on spiritual bonds and cultural history rather than economic self interest. Abstractions like rights and fraternity make no sense unless the spiritual bonds of the whole can be found in them. The concept of “home and hearth” is far more than a mere slogan of the bankrupt, but is crucial for any functional policy. Political debate implies a great level of commitment and consensus. Foundational issues must be settled before there can be any common ground to debate.

Conclusions

The Eurasian idea is central to Russian politics. While still only partially digested by western writers, Russians have been concerned with rebuilding. From the dust and ashes of an old empire a new identity is being forged, and, judging by the popularity of Vladimir Putin, the basic elements of Eurasianism seem to be significant (Kullberg and Zimmerman, 1999). The slavish imitation of the west is not an option, nor is going back to some kind of central control. The non-aligned movement, regionalism and the battles against corruption are but three pillars in a basic domestic and foreign policy that is to institutionalized many Eurasianist concepts.

In conclusion, we can see several things developing:

Russia will not copy the West. The Yeltsin administration saw a huge proportion of the Russian economy shipped to foreign bank accounts and be taken over by those who had no hand in creating it. Democracy can be a dirty word in Russia since it is the system partially imposed by Boris Yeltsin. It just meant that the well connected were able to take advantage of the vacuum in both political and economic power.
Eurasianism is a popular and coherent option. Russia increasingly sees the west to be bankrupt, both literally and figuratively. The rebuilding process itself—similar to the 1960s decolonization movement in Africa—requires both a strong state and a significant sense of membership.

The state will continue to be an important part of the national economy. This is especially the case in areas such as oil and natural gas. The state will continue to own enterprises and can compete with cooperative and private ownership. Simple economic self-interest can never be the foundation of a national economy. The common good (represented by the state, albeit imperfectly) is equally as important as efficiency.

The west is in trouble, and is likely to continue in trouble. Her debt is massive, and her dependence on foreign oil equally so. Increasingly large trade deficits with China are the price she has paid for her retail prosperity. To think that the “western option” is an obvious or automatic one for Russia is absurd. The Eurasianists have a point when they stress the significance of the east in terms of economic potential.

The shocking ignorance of American intellectuals trying to grapple with Eurasian concepts they do not understand underscores Dugin’s main concerns. The US does not have the conceptual apparatus to properly understand the sweeping ontology of Eurasianism. Western and westernized writers, such as Gene Veith, A. Motyl, Doug Sanders, Anton Barbashin, Hannah Thoburn, Anton Shekhovtsov and Marc Lippman display a disgraceful ignorance born of two things: first, their utter lack of intellectual preparation for the ontology and metaphysics of Dugin or anyone else outside of the western mainstream, and just as importantly, the fact that few of their readers know any better. This latter problem is everywhere, and gives the above a license to write as they please. This both frees them from actual understanding and insulates them from serious criticism.

Since Eurasianism does not proceed from familiar journalistic cliches and pseudo-academic pretension, they do not have a framework to understand – let alone criticize – any of the views laid out. It shows the total collapse of serious thought in the pursuit of recognition as an “intellectual.” These are the residue of mass society and the collapse of intellectual honesty.

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LANGUAGE AND THE CHURCH:
TWO PILLARS OF RUSSIAN SOFT POWER

Leonid Savin

In this article we will analyze two important tools of Russian soft power that have geopolitical significance and international attention.

LANGUAGE

Language and culture are the foundation of any society and their means of expression, communication, and the transmission of knowledge and traditions. Culture is the basic foundation of society, but language especially separates humans from the rest of the animal world.

Not by chance, an etymological connection between the basic terms that express the idea of the word can be found in many languages: Logos (Λόγος) is a Greek word, meaning, and statement at the same time, and in the Church Slavonic and Old Russian languages, the word “language” is synonymous with “the people” (or nation). i.e. “God is with us! Understand this, O nations, and submit yourselves, for God is with us.” (Isaiah 8, 9).

The image of the house is used in various sciences as representing the state, nation, ethnic group, geographic area, etc. Eminent German philosopher Martin Heidegger used this metaphor when dealing with language, calling it the House of the Being (das Haus des Seins). Language is not only a means of expression and communication, but it is a kind of distillation of ethnic psychology, culture, spatial images, religion, and ideology from the ancient times. Incorporating foreign terminology in the pursuit of modernizing a language often undermines the ontological foundations of the people. If globalization eliminates differences, then linguistic adoptions gradually squeeze them out. They borrow cultural idioms from a certain historical context and replace them with simulacras, which have no connection with the native landscape (not only geographically, but also in the broader sense – social, philological, ethnic, philosophical).

Languages were previously divided along racial and ethnic lines, but in the second half of the twentieth century, the impact of languages on people as political subjects (i.e. the study of ethno-national factors associated with linguistics) began to be talked about. As noted by Ferguson, the nation is an object that usually does not attract the attention of linguists, although it is ultimately a normal base for “communication networks, systems of education and language planning”. In addition to the utilitarian value of language, one should also note its mythopoetical, semiotic, and archetypal features that affect people’s perception of the world. Spatio-temporal categories are directly related to the place of development and the linguistic basics of the language of the people.

“Nature, among which the people grows and makes its own history, is the first

1 Вера. Этнос. Нация. М.: Культурная революция, 2009. С. 61
and obvious that determines a person’s national integrity. It is a permanent factor. The landmass: forests / ... /, mountains, sea, deserts, grasslands, tundra, permafrost or jungle, whether the climate is temperate or subject to catastrophic fractures / ... /, wildlife, vegetation — all of this determines the generation of work and life / ... / and the model of the world ... ¹

Thus, each people (nation) has its own particular view of the world, a matrix according to which reality is structured.

For Russian speakers, it must be said that over the centuries, the Slavs partook in extensive production and, more importantly, were the only people who began the expansion to the East, breaking the resistance of the Asian nomads. Prior to that, beginning from the invasions of the Huns in the VII century (which led to the Great Migration) and ending with the campaigns of the Horde in the XIII-XV centuries, the European part of the Eurasian continent faced massive pressure from the East. This forced the people to leave the European peninsula and venture out into the Atlantic.

It is obvious that this, together with the natural landscape and seasonal patterns, influenced the formation of the Russian mentality and the codes of the Russian language. In Russia, space is more important than time. Distance, breadth, the steppe, and the horizon, qualitatively, are more important than speed and the accuracy of time.

In modern political science, language pertains to soft power in world politics, where language is used to influence the political process of a state or group of countries, as well as colonies.

In history, there are a number of examples where a language-based people, which was a state, formed a dialect of imperial education or language that was imposed on the occupied and conquered countries, which over time eventually became their mother language. The example of the Roman Empire shows how the Latin language in its time, together with the conquests of the Roman Legions, transformed the Celtic language and formed modern French. Another example is how the transformed Spanish language spread far beyond Europe to Latin America, and the use of English in the British Empire as the language of administration, led to the fact that it became the state language (or one of them) in many of its colonies – the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, India, etc.

As for the development of the Russian language, it is necessary here to draw attention to the role of the Byzantine Empire, which by transferring its knowledge and skills, contributed to the emergence of a writing system for the Western and Eastern Slavs (before the reform of Cyril and Methodius, who were originally Tessalonica Slavs, a different runic alphabet had been extended throughout the territory of contemporary Russia). The Cyrillic alphabet was not sustainable for the Western Slavs, who were Catholics, but it became entrenched in the Eastern Slavs and some of the Turkic and Finno-Ugric peoples. “At the same time, the blueprint of the Christian Greek rationality was superimposed on the pre-existing field of the ancient Slavic rationality, which has its own structure, semantics, rules, and laws. The new way of thinking was not created out of nothing, but rather it build upon the elements of the old existing one. Therefore, Old Russian culture after the Baptism of Russia should be interpreted as a two-layer rationality, which must provide at least the pre-Christian, pre-Greek layer together with another one which was projected on it and on whose basis it is decorated.” ²

It should be noted that along with language, religion is also the second foundation of national identity and often a “cramp” for statehood. Together with language, religion and tradition create a so-called strategic culture that is an imperative for action (or inaction) for any nation in the sense of the state or for any empire in the sense of providing a unifying basis for its many constituent peoples.

In Russia and ancient Muscovy, Church Slavonic and Eastern Orthodox Christianity were a complex identity matrix for the Slavic population, affecting all classes from the highest political elite to the lowest level individuals. The dual function of language and religion formed the core of identity, which further contributed to the analysis and synthesis of public policy. This included the examples of war with European countries, relationships with fellow co-religionists, “Slavic brothers”, and the development of new lands in the eastern borders of the state.

¹ Гачев Г. Национальный космо-психо-логос// Вопросы философии, 1994, № 12, с. 63.
² Дугин А.Г. В поисках темного логоса. М.: Университетский проект, 2013, С. 9
The schism in the second half of the XVII century demonstrated the important role of language and religion in the Russian state. Beginning with the reform of the liturgical books and disputes affecting the etymological meaning of terms, it led to serious geopolitical consequences. As the authorities took the side of the group that supported the innovations against the opponents from the conservative camp, massive repression occurred. All adherents of the pre-reform strand of Orthodoxy (the Old Believers) were expelled, regardless of their social and class status. Many times, these individuals were executed, as was the case with the siege of the Solovetskiy Monastery’s monks who did not accept the new changes, as well as with a number of individual people. Some examples of the latter are priest Habakkuk and others who continued to denounce the New Believers, chiefly Patriarch Nikon and Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich Romanov. Large groups of Old Believers moved deep into the woods and to the outskirts of the Russian state. In a way, this promoted the development of new lands (Cossack Old Believers moved to the Caucasus and Siberia) and the development of mining, metallurgy, and so on (the Old Believers’ closely adhered to a vigorous labor discipline).

The Russian language was also affected by modernization. Together with the other reforms in the era of Peter the Great, the fields of diplomacy and science were also affected (e.g. Peter the Great founded the first European-style university, whose successor is the Moscow State University). The first reform of the Russian language was undertaken during Peter’s government, the second one was carried out by Mikhail Lomonosov, and the third and last one occurred in 1918.

But the Russian language has some problematic aspects associated with its foreign and domestic policies. The Russification of the Empire faced challenges from the remote areas and new territorial additions. This was due to two reasons. On the one hand, a clear political culture was still not developed and sufficiently formed in a number of places, and many ethnic groups were still in a state of transition. Some of them had a common history with Muscovy and had a quite familiar patois (home language), as was the case with the residents of Ukraine and Belarus, while others laid claim to a unique culture, such as the peoples of the Caucasus. On the other hand, a number of regions already pass through the process of nation-building, such as the cases of Finland (attached in 1909 after the Treaty of Hamina ended the war with Sweden) and Poland (which joined six years later). In order to differentiate between the various peoples of the Russian Empire, it was necessary to develop a specific legal term to separate the state-forming Russian (Slavic) people from other ethnic groups. Realizing the futility of rapid Russification for the people on the western outskirts of the empire, the word “foreigner” (inorodets), previously used in relation to Asians, began to be used in the early XX century. In a broader sense, the Encyclopedia of Brockhaus and Efron defined them as “Russian citizens” of non-Slavic tribes.

However, the Slavic component also had a potential problem. It once more raised the question of religious identification – the majority of Poles are Roman Catholic, and in Ukraine and Belarus, there are also numerous Catholics, as well as the strong influence of the Greek-Catholics.

The wave of political nationalism sweeping Western Europe at the time eventually approached the borders of the Russian Empire.

**UKRAINIAN QUESTION**

Ukraine has a particular specificity with regard to the Russian language. Since the right-bank territory of the Dnepr River was under the control of Poland and Austria-Hungary for many years, there were repeated attempts to eradicate both Orthodoxy and the Russian language. Despite five centuries of violence committed by Poland and Austria up until the late XIX century, Little Russian (Malorussia – a special term for Ukraine) culture in general did not show any anti-Russian tendencies, even in the Galicia and Carpathian regions. This is evidenced by the 100,000 inhabitants of Galicia who petitioned the parliament in Vienna in 1880 for the right to learn the Russian language. However, the efforts of Austria-Hungary to create a new Ukrainian identity had both political and scientific aspects, and the “Galician project” at the beginning of the 20th century began to exercise significant influence on affairs.

In 1914, Deputy A. Savenko, speaking at the State Duma, said: “The Ukrainian movement is a serious political movement that represents a threat to the unity and integrity of the Russian Empire”. This was due not only to the common roots of the Velikorussians (a term for the

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inhabitants of Russia itself) and Malorussians (the inhabitants of Ukraine), but also to the fact that for centuries the Russian Empire had elites that immigrated from Ukraine and there was a large flow of inhabitants from Little Russia to the deep outskirts of Siberia and the Far East. At the same time, Savenko pointed out that the loss of the non-Russian periphery (the Caucasus and Central Asia) would not be as much of a threat to Russia as a split within the Russian nation itself. Peter Struve, the author of the idea of “Greater Russia”, refers to both groups collectively as the ‘national Russian state’. He also believed that if the Ukrainian intelligentsia’s idea of separate nationality became a working ideal and the people’s will united behind it, then this would be fraught with “the greatest and unprecedented split in the Russian nation, which would be a real state … and national disaster.”

On the other hand, even in the same Ukraine, Russian identity is much more prevalent than Ukrainian identity. For example, in 1917, only 11% of Kiev students considered themselves as Ukrainians. The next peak of Ukrainization occurred during the 1920s and the period of the New Economic Policy. The ideas of communism were often distributed together with cultural and linguistic national projects, which in turn led to paradoxical changes inside of Russia. The project was only abandoned in 1932.

The next stage of Ukrainization took place during World War II and was carried out by the German occupational authorities (who also promoted similar policies of national separatism in other conquered areas under the tutelage of the Third Reich). The success of Hitler’s army led to almost all of Ukraine falling under German occupation by the end of 1942, which in turn gave new opportunities to the radical supporters of Ukrainization. With the help of the Germans, they banned the use of the Russian language in the press and introduced exclusively Ukrainian ones. Changes were also made in the educational system, and only those who knew the Ukrainian language were allowed to work. Those who did not know it were fired. Such discriminatory actions were financed by Germany and partaken with the active participation of German experts.

The next wave of Ukrainization occurred with Nikita Khrushchev, but by the time Leonid Brezhnev came to power, it had already passed. Without support from

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Language and the Church: two pillars of Russian soft power

Leonid Savin

state hierarchy, they became “Russian authorities”. “Loris Medikov is not an Armenian General – exclaimed the publicist – but a Russian General of Armenian origin.”

On the other hand, the term Russian and Rossiyskiy (it is the same word in English – L.S.) have been synonymous for centuries, which introduced some confusion in their definitions in relation to linguistic, ethnic, political, and administrative issues. Until the beginning of the October Revolution of 1917, the terms were not accurately used in the “national” context, whereas in the Soviet times, they came to refer to ethnic origin.

An important milestone in the role of the Russian language was the major state legislation that was passed. The legislative act approved on April 23, 1906 summed up the reform of the political system of Russia throughout the period of 1905-1906. It secured the state system of the Russian Empire, decreed the official language, created a supreme governing power, refined the order of law, laid out the principles of organizations and the operation of central government agencies, described the rights and obligations of Russian citizens and the Orthodox church, etc.

The Russian language was recognized as nationally encompassing in the Army, Navy, and “public and social institutions”. The use of local languages and dialects within these establishments were regulated by special laws.

After the outbreak of the First World War, the debate about the role of language in policy intensified. The emergence of new rightwing parties and movements and the increased tendencies of Russian (imperial) nationalism among moderates and liberals displayed a new phase of public policy. The imperial identity was eroded by a typically European bourgeois nationalism in a new “Russian” form because it betted on a conglomerate of languages and cultures.

The government set itself the goal of achieving complete unification of the empire after the war. It was required that what the government viewed as separatism (the control of differentiated supply networks by the outskirt areas) be relinquished. A further condition for national unity was that the state language was to be exclusively Russian.

These plans were implemented by the Bolsheviks, led by Vladimir Lenin, and the revolutionary government was far more radical and far-sighted than the Tsarist regime. Under the Soviet Minister of People’s Education Anatoly Lunacharsky, the Russian language was reformed in 1918, which resulted in the removal of some letters. A general education program was launched along with this project, which made it so that all citizens of the new Soviet state, regardless of gender or age, would be able to read and write. In the new Soviet republics where the primary language was not Russian (Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia), it was still necessary for the regional elites to learn it in order to facilitate political communication with the center.

The national press, the main newspapers of the Communist Party, and the radio were also agents of spreading the Russian language in the regions. The beginning of the industrial area in the Soviet Union also necessitated a standard language to conduct technical documentation, and Russian was selected for this role.

The post-revolutionary situation also had another important factor – large migration flows from Russia to the countries of Europe, Asia, Latin American, and the US. White immigration included the Army Corps, the nobility, and the aristocracy who did not wish to remain in Soviet Russia. Together with their migration, their native language itself also migrated and surged abroad. These individuals also took with them various cultural artifacts (e.g. a wide variety of rare editions of manuscripts and liturgical books, as well as fictional works from the Russian Empire that were owned by Russian migrants, can be found in the Slavic Department of the Czech National Library in Prague). In sum, this led to the emergence of a Russian diaspora that has multiple levels. Along with the monarchists, liberals, religious fundamentalists, and various experts and professionals who were not accepted into the new Soviet government also traveled abroad. This unique phenomenon not only contributed to the spread of the foci of Russian culture, but it also had an opposite effect sui generis. Part of the migrants became actively involved in the political struggle against the Soviet state, broadcasting propaganda through the Russian language. On the other hand, groups of Russian-speaking migrants also promoted ethnic separatism (Ukrainians, Armenians, etc.).

1 М.М. Грузино-армянские претензии и Закавказская революция. Киев, 1906, с. 27.
2 Бахтурина А.Ю. Окраины российской империи: государственное управление и национальная политика в годы Первой мировой войны (1914 — 1917 гг.), — М. 2004. С.337.
A TOOL IN GEOPOLITICAL TURBULENCE

Throughout the history of both the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, the Russian language was more than a tool for communication and interaction between the elites and a means of relations with the masses of the Russian population. It served as a link between the non-Russian people in both political entities. Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Russian language remains the language of dialogue between politicians, businessmen, and the average townsfolk in all post-Soviet states. Its status is regulated differently in the republics of the former Soviet Union, but in fact, even in the states that preach a Russophobia policy, its leaders used Russian, not English, to communicate with each other (e.g. the odious former presidents of Georgia and Ukraine – Mikhail Saakashvili and Viktor Yushcheko – privately communicated with each other in Russian).

The Russian language is not solely connected with the contemporary Russian and Russian-speaking population of some of the former Soviet republics and the Russian diaspora. The peoples of Northern Eurasia are unitied by history, culture, a common fate, their work ethic, similar moral and religious structures, and importantly, the Russian language. Central Asia and the Caucasus are also automatically included in this area, where there is still an historical memory of the Russian language and the imperial culture1. In general, there are still 275 million people who speak Russian throughout the world, placing it in 4th place for the most popular language behind Chinese, English, and Spanish languages2.

The Russian language might play a significant role amidst the contemporary geopolitical turbulence.

One of the latest examples is Ukraine. The crisis started because of many reasons, but the revolt of the Ukrainian Southeast began after the junta’s attempts to implement a discriminative law against the Russian-speaking population there. Any reverses that Kiev attempted were not able to save the situation, and the conflict was quickly polarized. A branching tree of intentions, reflections, and political ambitions arose from the language question: federalism, the call for justice, self-representation, the question of a different identity than the Ukrainian one, a turn to Russia, etc.

As the Russian philosopher and geopolitical Alexander Dugin wrote in his book “The Fourth Political Theory”: “Our language expresses meaning, beauty, truth, and correctness. But this is not just a gift, it gave us a debt that we must return. And therefore, we must carefully keep learning how to speak the sacred Russian language. This is the meaning of the Eurasian philosophy (not coincidentally, the first leader of the Eurasians was a linguist, Prince Trubutskoy), and this is not only a love for the language, it is a cult, a holy reverence to what is said in Russian.”

RELIGION AS A SHARED VALUE AND INTEREST

Religion itself had a major impact on the formation of political systems in the territory of the Eurasian continent. Even in Western Europe, which now is an example of secular states, until recently, public institutions have a solid background in the face of so-called Christian Democrats. It is recognized not only by supporters of the Conservatives, but even the most liberal approaches to international relations. Recently, in the article issued in CFR’s “Foreign Affairs” author pointed to the fact the EU crisis as the decline of ideas and culture of the Christian Democrats, rose from Protestant and Catholic European communities. And this, in turn, threatens to change the political map of Europe. He argues that “Christian Democrat” is a designation that sounds peculiar to anyone accustomed to a strict separation of church and state. The term first appeared in the wake of the French Revolution and in the midst of fierce battles about the fate of the Catholic Church in a democracy. For most of the nineteenth century, the Vatican viewed modern political ideas — including liberal democracy — as a direct threat to its core doctrines. But there were also Catholic thinkers who agreed with the French writer Alexis de Tocqueville’s insight that, like it or not, democracy’s triumph in the modern world was inevitable. So-called Catholic liberals sought to make democracy safe for religion by properly Christianizing the masses: after all, the reasoning went, a democracy of God-fearing citizens would have a much better chance of succeeding than one whose subjects were secular. Other Catholic intellectuals hoped to keep the people in line through Christian institutions, especially the papacy, which the

1 Дугин А.Г. Четвертая политическая теория. СПб.: Амфора, 2009
2 http://www.russkymir.ru/russkymir/ru/magazines/archive/2013/01/article0002.html
3 Дугин А.Г. Четвертая политическая теория. СПб.: Амфора, 2009
French thinker Joseph de Maistre envisaged as part of a Europe-wide system of checks and balances.\(^1\)

Confession is primarily a social institution that produces, distributes and supports in society a certain worldview. The lesson of Western Europe showed that the accelerated reform in the church life, together with the state policy in the spirit of multiculturalism primarily threaten the integrity of societies, erode its structure, dilute the cultural traditions for centuries were spiritual braces in states and regions. Migration from former colonies in Africa and Asia makes modern political processes difficult to predict. Jan-Werner Muller notes, that “yet both as a set of ideas and as a political movement, Christian democracy has become less influential and less coherent in recent years. This decline is due not only to the continent’s secular turn. At least as important are the facts that nationalism — one of Christian Democrats’ prime ideological enemies — is on the rise and that the movement’s core electoral constituency, a coalition of middle-class and rural voters, is shrinking. As the larger project of European integration faces new risks, then, its most important backer may soon prove incapable of defending it”. But nationalism is also a form of self-defense connected with ethnocentrism. So in the case of EU we see a paradoxical process: migrants have provoked the rise of nationalism that is hostile to Christian Democrats and they need to adopt an immigration policy to maintain power. We will see how this battle will be solved in near future.

Therefore, in Russia the preservation of the foundations of traditional religions and support of church institutions from the government is directly related to the interests of political and social stability.


\(^2\) Ibidem.

**RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH**

Now we will analyze the interaction of church institutions that belong to the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), the state government and the masses. Recently, the relationship of state authorities in Russia and the Russian Orthodox Church are the subject of much debate among political scientists, religious scholars and experts in the field of international relations. Often this theme is also used for a variety of speculations and distortions of information, sometimes intentionally and sometimes due to lack of reliable information or unwillingness to understand this complex issue. It is obvious that there is a relationship and interaction of church and state (ROC of the Moscow Patriarchy), including historical, cultural, geopolitical and social factors.

Primarily, this interaction is quite different from the Western experience, as well as from Muslim countries. Although Russia has a plurality of beliefs, it should be noted that among the traditional religions (which include Islam, Buddhism, shamanism and Judaism), Orthodox (Eastern Christianity) is the most powerful and plentiful, although in general, based on the percentage of people who identify themselves as followers of the Moscow Patriarchy we can not to say that now Russia is an Orthodox country because of the separation of church and state. But because in ancient Russia, and later the Russian Empire Orthodoxy was the main religion, it has a certain effect on the perception of Orthodoxy.

In addition, the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchy has a zone of influence around the world — directly on the territory of the former Soviet Union parishes (temple, infrastructure, as well as parishioners, i.e. citizens) are widespread in Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, the Baltic countries and Kazakhstan. There are numerous parishes in Western Europe, Asia, Africa, North and South America.\(^3\)

\(^3\) Orthodox in Greek means “the path of glory” and refers to the early period of catacomb Christianity. This word has become a narrative not only to Christianity, but also synonymous with conservatism for various religions. For example, you can often find the phrase “orthodox Jew”, although Judaism is different religion from Christianity, and during the life of Jesus Christ and his teachings and Judaism is an example of the irreconcilable antagonism.

\(^4\) You can see interactive map of the parishes at http://karta.patriarchia.ru/
**HISTORICAL BACKGROUND**

Historically the close relationship between church and state is associated with the Byzantine Empire, and was taken from the idea of the symphony of authorities.

This principle was formulated in the 6th novel of St. Justinian: “The greatest blessings granted to men of high goodness to God, the essence of the priesthood and the kingdom, of which the first (priesthood, church authority) is in taking care of divine affairs, while the latter (kingdom, government) directs in taking care of human affairs, and both starting from the same source, embellishing human life. Therefore, nothing is so much to the heart of kings as the honor of priests, who for their part serve them, praying continuously for them to God. And if priesthood will be well and pleasing to God, and government will manage the state entrusted to it with truth, there will be complete agreement between them in all that is the good and benefit of the human race. And so we make the greatest possible effort to guard the true dogmas of God and honor priesthood, hoping to get through it great blessings from God, and hold fast to those that have.”

Following this rule, the Emperor Justinian in his novels recognized the power of state laws for these canons.

The classic Byzantine formula of relationships between state and church power is in “Epanagoge” (second half of the IX century); “temporal power and the priesthood relate to each other as body and soul, are necessary for public order just as body and soul in a living person. Due to their agreement and connection consists the welfare of a state.”

In Russia, not all Byzantine doctrines and ideas have been unconditionally accepted. Especially after the signing of the Union of Florence in 1439 with the Pope and the fall of Constantinople in 1453 in Moscow strengthened the opinion that the Greeks (Byzantines) were punished by God for deviation from the faith, and only in Russia preserved the true faith.

In the early 16th century, monk Philofei from Pskov city in his letters to the Grand Duke of Moscow Vasily III expounds the idea of the religious-political mission of Russia, known as the doctrine of the Third Rome. Philofei argued that the historical successor to the Roman and Byzantine empires, which had fallen because of deviations from the “true faith” is Muscovy — “the third Rome” (“Two Romes fallen, and the third stands and a fourth will not to be”). This idea resonated among the nobility, and among the commoners. Later this idea was constantly mentioned in the works of Russian philosophers, politicians and thinkers. With particular vigour it was picked up first by Slavophiles and Eurasians, who criticized the Western European culture and offered to reconsider the value of the Mongolian Horde (something by and large true, Eurasians noticed that during the Russian principalities, depending on the Horde, Orthodoxy was not depressed, as in Europe, where people were religious wars, in Russia occurred dawn of religious art, and a number of political technologies were taken from the Mongols and applied in the context of local conditions).

However, interpretation of the symphony of powers led to serious problems, in particular to the schism in 1654-1667 in the Russian Orthodox Church. It started with a general reform of the Church, which is affected by changes in the canons and in an attempt to unify ritual on Greek charter. In addition, Patriarch Nikon was trying to assert his authority over the tsar Alexei Mihayovich that led to a quarrel between the king and the patriarch. As later wrote Catherine the Great — “Nikon wanted to become Pope ... Nikon introduced confusion and division in the domestic peaceful and holistic unified church. To use three fingers during praying forced upon us by the Greeks using curses, torture and executions ... Nikon did Tsar-father Alexei as tyrant and torturer of his own people.”

This schism itself led to the rejection of reforms by the majority of the population of Russia, which has been subjected to repression and persecution. A situation where the power was of New Believers, whereas the basic people at the bottom were supporters of the old rite.

However, when Peter First role of the church itself significantly detracted. Near decrees in the late 17th century monastic property was taken under state control, stopped payment of subsidies. After the death of Patriarch Adrian in 1700 new one was not selected and for his role was appointed locum tenens (Exarch). After some time, was a collegial body, called the Synod. As Peter sympathized with the Protestant religion, it caused a corresponding reaction in the people, and Peter was called the Antichrist.

1 Speech of the Empress Catherine the Great about Old Believers said at the general conference of the synod and the Senate, September 15, 1763.
Interestingly, the attempt to assert the ideal symphony in the new situation when the empire collapsed was made by Local Sobor (Council) in 1917-1918. In the declaration that preceded the relation of Church and State, the requirement for separation of church and state is compared with the wish that “the sun is not shining, and the fire is not warmed. Church by the internal law of its being can not give up calling to enlighten, to transform the whole life of mankind, imbue it with its rays.” In the definition of the Council on the legal status of the Russian Orthodox Church, the State, in particular, encourage the following provisions: “The Russian Orthodox Church, being part of the one Universal Church of Christ, in the Russian State reserves among other confessions predominant public and legal status, as its rightful greatest shrine huge majority of the population and as a great historical power that built the Russian State... Terms and legitimation issued for themselves Orthodox Church established in its order, since the publication of their ecclesiastical authority, power and acts of church government and the court recognized the State of legally binding and value since they not violate state laws ... state laws relating to the Orthodox Church, shall be issued except by agreement with the church authorities.”

Follow Local Sobors (Councils) held in situations when history made it impossible to return to the pre-revolutionary principles of church-state relations. Nevertheless, it was possible to return to the Patriarchy. The actual restoration of the Patriarchy happened in September 1943 by the decision of Joseph Stalin. Patriarch Sergius was elected by Council of Bishops. And Stalin targeting Russian Orthodox Church on the leading role in the acquisition of universal Orthodoxy (ie among other Orthodox churches).

Currently, there are 15 local churches, the number and role of which is significantly different from each other. Nevertheless, the value is the Russian Orthodox Church is really great.

**Church in Contemporary Postmodern Russia**

Russian Orthodox Church as an influential social institution has a special role in the formation and development of modern social change in our country. Modern scholars of church-state relations, we have witnessed two counter processes – desecularization of politics and politicization of religion. Power has turned its attention to the positive, unifying role of the Russian Orthodox Church as a vehicle of global values, and the Church has viewed politics as a means to achieve specific social, educational and religious purposes.  

After the collapse of the USSR the political situation has changed, and with it, the role of religious organizations. Some time various sects who were alien to traditional Russian culture tried to fill the spiritual vacuum. However, in the process of restructuring of the ROC from times of Yeltsin to Putin’s era by efforts of the different figures of the Moscow Patriarchy were resolved many public, social and political problems.

Today the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchy has offices at the United Nations and other international organizations. In Brussels was established office of the Moscow Patriarchy at the European international organizations whose goal is to dialogue with the European Union and other international organizations located in Brussels. In 2004, for the systematic work of the Russian Orthodox Church with the Council of Europe special representative of the ROC in Strasburg was established. In October 2007 was the official visit of Patriarch Alexy II in PACE, where he addressed the European parliamentarians and outlined in his report the ROC’s stance on the issue of human rights awareness, issues of peace and globalization.

ROC actively seek to maintain a dialogue with international organizations as well as the political elite of national states, where there are parishes. Maintaining a dialogue with the outside world is one of the main tasks of the Moscow Patriarchy and the execution of this and the role claimed by the ROC is not possible without the support and close cooperation with the State.

February 29, 2007 President of Russia Vladimir Putin had approved a law giving religious institutions of higher education the opportunity to state accreditation and the right to issue state diplomas. In fact, theological education in Russia was approved at the state level.

November 30, 2010 Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed the Federal Law «On the transfer of property to religious organizations for religious purposes under state or municipal ownership.» After the signing of the law, Patriarch Kirill said that “in the area of church-state
relations in Russia there was not a matter of principle, which would contain a kind of conflict between Church and State."

**THE CHURCH AS SOCIAL INSTITUTION**

At the Council of Bishops in 2000 the Russian Orthodox Church adopted a document entitled The Basic Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church. The preamble states that because of the change of political and social life, emergence of significant new problems for the Church in this area, the basis of its social concepts can be developed and improved. Range of topics covered is quite broad — it questions the relationship of the church and the nation, the secular law of the state, labor and property, personal and national, family values and morals, as well as issues of war and crime, the environment, globalization and secularization.

In the section devoted to the nation’s noted that “Patriotism of the Orthodox Christian should be active. It manifests itself in defense of the fatherland from the enemy, work for the good of the fatherland, the care order of people’s lives, including through participation in the affairs of government. A Christian is called to preserve and develop national culture and national identity... Orthodox ethics is contradict to divide nations into the best and worst and to belittle any ethnic or civic nation.”

The chapter devoted to the relationship between church and state also clarifies the position in relation to the secular authorities.

There it is stated that “the Church as a divine-human organism is not just a mysterious nature to the elements of the world, but also a historical component, comes in touch with the outside world, including the state.”

With reference to the teachings of the apostles notes that “Bible calls the authorities of the state to use power for restricting evil and supporting good, in which it sees the moral sense of the existence of the state.” The Church not only instructs to its children to obey state authorities, regardless of belief and worship of its carriers, but also to pray for it.

At the same time, Christians should avoid absolutization, to recognize the limits of its purely earthly, temporal and transient value conditioned by the presence of sin in the world and the need to restrain it. According to the teachings of the Church, the government itself shall not be entitled absolutes itself, expanding its borders to complete autonomy from God and established order of things by Him, which can lead to abuse of power, and even to the deification of rulers. The state, like other human institutions, even if aimed at the good, may have a tendency to become self-sufficient institution. Numerous historical examples of this transformation show that in this case the state loses its true purpose.

The Church should not assume the functions of state-owned resistance to sin by means of violence, use of temporal power, taking on the functions of the government, involving coercion or constraint. At the same time, the Church can approach the government with a request or appeal to exercise power in certain cases, yet the decision rests with the state.

The state should not interfere in the life of the Church, its government, doctrine, liturgical life, counseling, and so on, as well as all the activities of the canonical church institutions, except those parties is supposed to operate as a legal entity, to enter into certain relationship with the state, its legislation and governmental agencies. The Church expects that the state will respect her canonical norms and other internal statutes.

Legal sovereignty over the territory of the state belongs to its authorities. Consequently, they determine the legal status of a local church or its part, giving them the opportunity unhampered fulfillment of church mission or restricting such a possibility. State power thus in front of Eternal Truth makes judgment on itself and eventually foretells own fate. Church remains loyal to the state, but above this loyalty is God’s commandment to do the work of salvation in any situation and under any circumstances.

If the authority forces Orthodox believers to turn away from Christ and His Church, and to commit sinful and spiritually harmful actions, the Church should refuse to obey the state.

Areas of church-state cooperation in the present historical period are:

- a) peacemaking on international, inter-ethnic and civic levels and promoting mutual understanding and cooperation between people, nations and states;

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1 Церковь и общество [Электронный ресурс]: сайт отдела Московского Патриархата по взаимоотношениям Церкви и общества. URL: http://www.ovco.org/news
b) concern for the preservation of morality in society;

c) spiritual, cultural, moral and patriotic education and training;

d) charity and the development of joint social programs;

e) preservation, restoration and development of the historical and cultural heritage, including concern for the preservation of monuments of history and culture;

f) dialogue with the public authorities of all branches and levels on issues important for the Church and society, including the development of appropriate laws, regulations, orders and decisions;

g) care of the military and law-enforcement agencies and their spiritual and moral education;

h) works on crime prevention, care of persons in detention;

i) science and research;

j) Health;

k) culture and arts;

l) work of ecclesiastical and secular media;

m) preservation of the environment;

n) economic activity for the benefit of the Church, the state and society;

o) support for the family, motherhood and childhood;

p) opposition to the activities of pseudo-religious structures that pose a threat to individuals and society.

As we can see, the scope of the church is quite broad and it helps to the state to cover a variety of social strata and play the role of facilitator and regulator on various issues. As says themselves representatives of the Church, «today there are opportunities for cooperation between church and state to improve the social situation of different categories of the population through coordinated work of governmental and nongovernmental organizations, including religious ones. This family support, healthy lifestyle, preservation and development of the system of values, which ensures the continuity of generations and the social world.»

Church as civil society

Church can also be seen as civil society, because its parishioners — people who are citizens of different states. And since Moscow is the headquarters of the Patriarchy, Russia is also associated as the keeper of spiritual traditions. Naturally Russian citizens are actively involved in the activities of their communities and the various structures under the auspices of the Moscow Patriarchy.

Article 18 of the Federal Law "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations" gives the Church the right to carry out charitable activities, both directly and through the establishment of charitable organizations. The main feature of such organizations should be non-profit nature of the activity, which is consistent with the spirit of sacrificial love.

Thus, the Church can carry out social activities as completely independently and in partnership with government agencies and institutions.

Because civil society is often perceived as protection of rights and freedoms, we should to analyze this topic carefully.

Specific areas of cooperation between the Church and the State in ensuring human rights outlined in the Declaration of Human Rights and Dignity adopted by X World Russian People's Sobor (Council). It notes: "this cooperation should be the preservation of the rights of nations and ethnic groups in their religion, language and culture, defending religious freedom and the rights of believers to their lifestyle, confrontation to crimes on ethnic and religion issues, protection of the individual from the tyranny of the authorities and employers, care of the rights of military, protection of the rights of the child, taking care of people who are in prison and social institutions, the protection of victims of destructive cults, preventing total control over the privacy and..."
human beliefs, opposition to the involvement of people in the crime, corruption, slave trade, prostitution, drug abuse and gambling.\(^1\)

In recent years, their readiness to cooperate with NGOs government agencies, local authorities and commercial companies increased.\(^2\) The number of tenders and proposals to address the financing of social projects in Russia is growing from year to year, they are becoming more sophisticated, not only focused on a particular aspect of social life, but also on the selection of the best partners in terms of effectiveness and efficiency of resource use. For example, Moscow Charity Council for several years using such criteria for the selection of recipients of budget funds as achievable and measurable planned results, the economic efficiency of projects, etc. Organizations that can not imagine having a successful experience, describe the expected result, offer a reliable measuring instruments to assess the impact on the situation in the society and the economic efficiency of the chosen approach, can hardly expect to receive funds from budget of state.\(^3\)

Institutions of civil society in Russia enjoy the greatest confidence is the Church — 43% committed to it versus 4% of Russians skeptics. Human rights, charity (humanitarian), environmental, women’s organizations, trade unions and political parties rely only 17%, 16%, 12%, 10%, 8% and 3% of respondents, and do not trust — 4%, 5%, 5%, 5%, 13% and 23% respectively. Young people who are involved in their activities are more loyal to institutions of civil society.\(^4\)

Assuming that the church is the civil society that actively defends its position, it is necessary to note a number of areas in which work Orthodox organization. Based on the tenets, as well as oral and written traditions of Russian Orthodoxy, you can call this catechetical activity, responding to the challenges of globalization. In Russia, there are some basic movements that wary perceive the innovations. Attempts to implement e-government and related services are treated as a seal of the Antichrist.

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Some major civic associations although in form are not Orthodox, but in essence have a strong connection with the Church and the Russian Orthodox tradition. The most striking example is the Russian Cossacks, which is active in a variety of activities (from the protection of temples and monasteries to educational institutions and folk ensembles).

Importantly, the active actions of the U.S. and its satellites, in any way affect the interests of Russia are positioned as an attempt of Antichrist to destroy the last bastion of Christianity and the sign of the final times. A problem occurring within the United States and the EU is uniquely evaluated as a punishment for the Lord to the people of these countries. Supranational institutions such as the WTO, World Bank, IMF, NATO, Bilderberg club and others are called not only Masonic but frankly satanic projects that are created for the destruction of nations and states, and their activities bring Armageddon. Meanwhile, Russia is seen as a country Katekhon\(^6\) which holds away the coming of the Antichrist. And in the final battle at the Second Coming of Christ Russia will be the bastion for forces of good against the forces of evil, by which often refers to the United States, Great Britain, Israel, globalism, Zionism and the West in general. Interestingly, that position of Muslims in Russia on this point is similar. And often the prominent figures of Islam outside Russia also claim that true Muslims should support Russia and to unite with it against Dajjal.\(^7\)

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1 Декларация о правах и достоинстве человека // Журнал Московской Патриархии. – 2006.- №6. – С.77-78.

4 Holding in Greek language.
5 For example, Sheikh Imran Nazar Hosain from Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia): http://www.imranhosein.org/
Church as the Cultural Matrix

The Russian Orthodox Church can also be regarded as a treasure trove of tangible and intangible cultural heritage. Many temple complexes in Russia are protected as heritage under the UNESCO. There are funds of icons, books and church items that are assessed as cultural relics. Singing traditions and spiritual verses (especially among the Old Believers) are also unique spiritual monuments of Orthodox culture, which is transmitted from generation to generation.

Domestically, organized tours to famous historical sites associated with Church activities. From abroad come a lot of pilgrims to visit the holy places. You can also note the special missions related to bringing religious shrines to Moscow and other Russian cities from other countries (mostly from Greece). During these ceremonies of shrine visitation, they always have large numbers of people who come to worship from different cities. Festivals are also held on Orthodox commemorative dates or related (eg, family traditions). In July 2014 in Sergiev Posad city near Moscow was a festival dedicated to the 700th anniversary of the birth of Russian saint Sergius of Radonezh. This saint is known for having blessed Dmitry Donskoy and his army into battle with an army of Mamaia in September 1380 (Kulikovo Field, now a district of the Tula region). It is believed that this battle has begun strengthening Russian statehood, and previously scattered principalities began to unite under the Moscow principality, to stand together against external aggression.

These events may also be regarded as a political mobilization of citizens, since they are aimed at maintaining intragroup solidarity, promote information exchange among members of the Russian Orthodox Church and the common positions on various issues, including related to the state’s domestic and foreign policy.

In schools, the young are taught the basics of theology, which will create at an early age a positive attitude towards religious cultures and traditions of Russia.

Political Conflicts into Religious Dimension

Recently, with the activities of the Russian Orthodox Church, it has been associated with a number of conflicts and scandals.

February 21, 2012 members of the libertarian band Pussy Riot, known of provocations, committed performance in the Cathedral of Christ the Savior in Moscow in front of the altar. Church leaders saw this act as a shame with elements of blasphemy (according to church regulations women are forbidden to climb on the platform in front of the altar), and by the secular authorities qualified as hooliganism. After the arrest of two suspects and investigative procedures, the Western media began to accuse Russia of violating human rights, the pursuit of creative artists, concluding that the Kremlin is to blame for everything, and the tandem of church and state is nothing short of a symbiosis of totalitarianism. Parallel to this, there were articles criticizing the Russian Orthodox Church Patriarch Kirill directly. Known and no less radical actions of the Ukrainian group “Femen” (they were mostly on the territory of Ukraine and Western Europe) against the Russian Orthodox Church and Christianity in general.

These incidents have caused a debate in the community of experts and prompted a number of church activists to lobby for the introduction of a bill to ban anti-religious actions (which included not only Christians but also Muslims and members of other religions).

The law was passed by the State Duma, which caused another criticism from domestic and Western liberals.

Another type of conflict is linked to the coup d’etat in February 2014 in Ukraine and subsequent pressure on the representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church there with the new authorities and Ukrainian nationalist organizations. Ukraine is the second largest number of parishes after Russia. Naturally, the Ukrainian nationalists are interested in capturing the property or transfer clergy of the Moscow Patriarchy into Kiev Patriarchy (Kiev Patriarchy is not legally recognized by the World Orthodoxy, consisting of 15 local churches, but in fact there are temples in Ukraine, called the Ukrainian Orthodox Church).

In 2011 in Ukraine there were 12,043 parishes, 186 monasteries and 9680 clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church. For example — in Russian there is 17,042 parishes, 499 monasteries and 18,732 clergy (statistics for 2013). Now Ukraine representatives of the Moscow Patriarchy are under intense political pressure, and the Patriarch was forced to cancel several trips even in this country. It should be noted that in Western Europe there is a dichotomy seen in the political activity: among Ukrainians who want temples of the Greek Catholic Church pro-
ounced anti-Russian in a propaganda campaign\(^1\) and, while in the churches of the Russian Orthodox Church, they are not trying to affect policy issues with respect to Ukraine and have limited themselves to calls to establish a peaceful dialogue, to stop the fratricidal war and conduct prayers for the bringing of peace.

Recently, the Russian Orthodox Church is an important subject of informational, social, cultural and economic policy in Russia and abroad. On the other hand — is an object of attention, and often criticized by the liberal institutions, many of which are openly anti-clerical. Among many such institutions and foreign actors — from the media to prominent politicians. Obviously, strengthening the position of the Russian Orthodox Church is always a fierce (and often unjustified) criticism from its side.

At the same time the relationship between church and state in the country, a number of reforms and laws aimed at strengthening the Russian identity and contribute to the consolidation of the part of civil society, which does not accept the liberal pseudo-values and aggressive influence of foreign actors. The Russian Orthodox Church supported by a certain constant segment of civil society, which can be called conservative, various media, representatives of science, culture and art.

The church also has been active in the international arena, and its members are closely watching world politics and helping to develop a position on certain issues, which is both an internal cross-cultural factor, and an important element of public diplomacy.

\(^1\) In Ukraine, the leadership of the Greek Catholic Church was seen as anti-Russian propaganda and even incitement to violence. Particularly active propagandists are priest Michael Arsenitch and bishop Boris Gudziak.
SEEKING A MULTIPOLAR WORLD INSIDE THE QUITE UNIPOLAR INFORMATIONAL MEDIUM

Roberto Quaglia

In 2010 he won the BSFA (British Science Fiction Association) Award. As an essayist, he is mainly known for his monumental book “The Myth of September 11”, about the deceptions centered on the events of September 11, 2001, which has been translated and published in three languages (Italian, English, Romanian).

The big question of today’s global geopolitics is whether the world will go towards a unipolar world indefinitely dominated by the USA (Americans proudly — or arrogantly — call this Full Spectrum Dominance) or instead will move towards a multipolar world where different centres of power coexist.

From the economic point of view the world is already multipolar, the US share of the world gross product being just around 18% (2013 data), and constantly decreasing. So how come the US is still so dominant globally? Its gigantic military budget is not the reason, since you can’t realistically bomb the whole world.

The first magical tool that the US is using for its world domination is its dollar. The word “magic” is here not poetic license; the dollar effectively is a creature of magic since the Federal Reserve can create it in unlimited quantities inside computers, and nevertheless the world would take it as something valuable, still with the petrodollar in mind. This makes it an easy task for the US to fund with billions of dollars “coloured revolutions” and other subversions around the world. This basically costs them nothing. This is a major problem that any multipolarity — seeking world would have to address.

The other US super-weapon is their insane domination of the informational medium, a true close to absolute hegemony the dimension of which is escaping the imagination of most analysts.

Hollywood is the most amazing propaganda machine ever seen in this world. Hollywood is exporting into billions of brains worldwide the hollywoodistic standards for the understanding of reality, which include but are not limited to the way of thinking, behaving, dressing, what to eat and drink, up to how to express your dissent. Yes, Hollywood is even able to instruct us on how exactly to express our dissent against the American Way of Life. Just to name one example (but there are plenty), western dissidents frequently would quote the film Matrix when referring to an invisible network of control upon our lives, but even Matrix is part of the matrix — if I may put this in a comic way. Here is the hollywoodistic packaging of the process of our understanding that we live in a deceptive world. Using US-manufactured allegories, symbols and metaphors, you are still fully part of their system and thus you help make this real.
The US also has control over the mainstream news worldwide, the CIA having infiltrated most of the networks which count. German journalist Udo Ulfkotte who worked for Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, one of the main German newspapers, recently confessed in his best-selling book Gekaufte Journalisten to have been paid by the CIA for years to manipulate news, and that this is quite common in the German media. We can safely assume that this is also very common in other countries. This global grip on media allows to the US to dominate the war of perception to an extent that allows them easily to turn white into black in the eyes of the public. It was amazing how the US-controlled European media could twist facts during the recent crises in Ukraine. The Nazi-infected junta of Kiev which came to power with a coup was able to bomb and kill their own citizens for months while the Western media would always depict them as the good side — while at the same time Putin would be portrayed as the new Hitler for no reality-based reason.

To understand to what extent the domination of information is in itself sufficient to shape an effective reality, let’s remember this quote of 2004 credited to Karl Rove, at the time George W. Bush’s senior advisor: “We’re an empire now and, when we act, we create our own reality. And while you’re studying that reality — judiciously, as you will — we’ll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that’s how things will sort out. We’re history’s actors... and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do.”

As if all of this were not enough, most of the information circulating in the world today is processed by computers running US-based operating systems (Microsoft and Apple) while people — including those who oppose the US — communicate with each others via CIA-controlled Facebook, Gmail, and so on.

It’s exactly this close to total monopoly over information which makes the real difference. So even though US economic relevance has been sharply declining in the past decades, its informational relevance has paradoxically been growing. Therefore, countries today aiming to a true multipolar world should revise their priorities and start to seriously compete on the informational field, rather than focus just on economic issues. Power today is all a matter of perception, and the US is still the unmatched master of this game. We won’t have any truly multipolar world until other players with comparable skills enter the game.

There are already a few cases of non US-aligned news services with excellent quality and the ambition of a global audience, and the most notable are Russia Today and Iranian Press TV. But that’s still barely nothing compared with the ongoing tsunami of US-aligned audio-visual information which streams around the globe 24 hours a day. Russia Today is now planning to develop also channels in French and German. That’s progress, but still far from enough.

The US is not really bothered by countries bypassing it in their businesses, but it starts to get nervous if they use currencies other than dollars for their trades and it really gets mad when important non-aligned news networks appear on the information chessboard. Which sounds quite odd given that freedom of press is a central point of American modern mythology. But any non US-aligned information source is in fact jeopardizing their monopoly of reality. This is why they would need to demonise the competitors and label them as anti-American or worse. However, often non-aligned journalists or news publishers are just an un-American reality, not necessarily anti-American. But in the eyes of US hegemonists, any un-American information is by definition anti-American, since the consistency of their empire relies most of all on their monopoly of the perceived reality. Remember Karl Rove’s quote.

Thus non US-aligned countries which really aim at a multipolar world have no choice but to learn from their adversary and to act accordingly. Beyond the creation of their own state of the art news networks they should also begin to provide substantial support to independent information in countries where the news is currently US-dominated. Independent journalists, writers and researchers in Western countries today are doing their work merely out of civic passion, often unpaid and at the cost of public mockery, social marginalization and economical struggle. Vilified in their own countries and getting zero help from countries who supposedly are aiming to escape US domination; this is not a good beginning for the end of US Full Spectrum Dominance.

There is and there will never be a truly multipolar world without a truly multipolar range of point of views on the stage. A post-modern empire is more than anything a state of mind. If that state of mind will stay unipolar, so will the world.
Slavisa Batko Milacic

A briefing on the status and implications of the Russian and US policy on Serbia, and the increasing turmoil

Serbia is a country that is located in Balkan which has a geostrategic position that is very important. The Serbian people living not only in Serbia, but also in neighboring countries are an important political factor. The breaking of Serbia and its state sovereignty takes a long time, but now it is at the very end. At the same time, the American project of a Greater Albania, is coming closer to its realization.

These two facts are correlated: there is no Greater Albania without a small, mutilated and humiliated Serbia. The brother of the Albanian Prime Minister, has made this fall an unforgettable political provocation. He was at the football stadium of the Partizan team (14th October, 2014), during the match between Serbia-Albania, when he hung the flag of Great Albania on the small unmanned aircraft and thus interrupted match. This action has caused anger among the Serbian fans and the game was stopped. The Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama arrived on 10th November in an official visit to Belgrade, which is the first visit of the Albanian statesmen after 68 years. Despite the wishes of the Serbian side that the meeting pass in the peaceful atmosphere, Albanian Prime Minister continued with provocations. His statement, to paraphrase, “you must recognize Kosovo’s independence soon before we will be able to progress”, has caused anger among the Serbs. Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic immediately said that Serbia will never recognize Kosovo. But the Albanians were only performers of this provocation, the organizers were in US intelligence.

The reason was simple. In Belgrade on 16th October 2014, Russian president Vladimir Putin was scheduled to come. President Putin is the most popular politician in Serbia. According the program, President Putin was supposed to hold a meeting with the senior officials of Serbia and to attend a military parade of the Serbian army. Since the outbreak of the crisis in Ukraine, the US government is trying to show that Russia is isolated and how no one in Europe supports their politics. The fact that in the heart of Europe President Putin would be greeted by more than 100,000 people, is something that the US government wanted to avoid at all costs. The goal of the planned provocation which was to suspend the visit of the Russian delegation. But they failed, President Putin arrived, greeted by over 100,000 people, and everything went very well. But one very important contract was not signed, it is about the status of Serbian-Russian humanitarian center personnel which is located in city of Nis.

The Russian government was reportedly dissatisfied with the level of immunity, and the speculation is that the agreement was sabotaged by Angela Merkel. This story was published in German Der Spiegel, who announced that Merkel insisted that authorities in Serbia refuse the agreement, for fear that the Humanitarian Center grow into a spy center. According to unofficial information, the agree-
Slavisa Batko Milacic

Western countries were suspicious of the character of the Centre are there since its foundation, and even then they said it’s a Russian military base, the counterpart of American base Bondsteel in Kosovo. In Berlin and Washington, there is a concern that the Centre in Nis could spy on the American anti-missile shield in Romania. Document what was to be signed with Moscow, Serbian Foreign Minister Ivica Dacic compared with the status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) signed with the United States 2006, which regulates the rights and obligations of US soldiers during a temporary stay in Serbia. SOFA provides for customs and tax obligations of US personnel, their drivers license, and before which court will respond in the event of any legal violation. Their immunity is defined by the agreement. The immunity for US soldiers under the provisions of the SOFA agreement has often been the subject of controversy in international relations.

The Bush administration in 2008 signed such an agreement with the government of Iraq and then as a deadline for the withdrawal of US troops agreed to end by 2011. Washington expected that after the deadline, SOFA will be restored, but despite the readiness of the Iraqi Prime Minister to the United States, the Iraqi parliament was not willing to give effect to initiative. Serbia and NATO forces in Kosovo did not have an agreement on the status of forces, but Serbia signed 2005 an agreement with NATO that allows passage across the territory of Serbia. The signatories were the then Foreign Minister Vuk Draskovic and NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Shefer. The provisions under which the NATO troops may be used to access, railways, and airports, and which will, in relation to judicial and police authorities of Serbia have immunity, provoked public discontent. We must bear in mind how much harm was done by the NATO aggression in 1999, in Serbia and Montenegro. Here then we can see all the hypocrisy of the Western politicians, while they are looking for specific privileges and ultimately get them, yet at the same time they strongly oppose some privileges that Russia has certainly earned, but does not have. Because without a doubt the humanitarian Center in Nis has already helped countless people of Serbia in various disasters. On the other hand, the violence in Kosovo has created an ideal opportunity.

The US ambassador in Pristina has for several months been participating in obstructing the formation of a government. The parliament of the self-proclaimed state Kosovo cannot be formed, new elections are difficult to maintain because there are competing clans determined to go all the way, at the cost of major conflict. The solution to get out of this crisis in Albanian eyes is an attack on the remaining Serbs in Kosovo and its ethnic cleansing as was the case in 2004. In Macedonia, is formed Albanian paramilitary army that wants to patrol the streets of cities in Macedonia, where Albanians live. On the building of Macedonian government at 29th October were fired two missiles. Albanians are openly seeking partition of Macedonia and annexation to Albania. Serbia has military superiority in the region, but the Albanians have strong support from US and Kosovo has a strong US army military base Bondsteel. Albanians are not strong enough to lead a direct confrontation with the Serbian army and they know it. Because of that they specialize guerilla warfare, which is aimed to “bleed Serbia”.

The main problem for Serbia, which has the strongest army in the region of west Balkan, is in the fact that it has been implementing “reforms” on the advice of generals from the NATO alliance. It is thanks to these “reforms” that Serbian army, a once powerful army, which had resisted NATO aggression against Serbia and Montenegro, is now thrown on knees. In May, Serbia was afflicted with terrible floods, to the dismay of Serbian people the Army has been unable to respond because of disorganization and lack of equipment. Despite the fact that Albanians in Montenegro have all the rights, they constantly complain that they are threatened. What is consistently true here for the Albanians is that everything they do is on the orders of the Americans. The plan is simple, it is necessary to feign vulnerability and provoke incidents, in order to build more support from the international community, by which is meant ‘the West’. Given that the Albanians are under full Western control the result would be clear, the decision would be in Albanian interests, namely the US interests.

But times have changed, after many years of passive Russian policy in the Balkans, Russia is showing signs of change for the better. In the first half of November was
held joint anti-terrorist tactical exercise of the Serbian Army and the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, entitled “Srem 2014”. The Russian attended by members of infantry landing parachute regiment based in Tula, which is a part of the elite 106th Guards’ air Airborne division. This was the first joint exercises of Serbian and Russian army in the last 30 years. The exercises went excellently, with great synergy of Russian and Serbian special forces. But the exercise has sparked anger at Western embassies in Serbia. For them it was unacceptable that while they impose sanctions on Russia, at the same time Russia maintains military exercise in the heart of Europe. The status of Bosnia & Herzegovina is an ongoing crisis for Serbia since the peace agreement in Dayton 1995.

In the agreement Bosnia is divided into Republica Srpska and Federation of Bosnia & Herzegovina. In Republica Srpska (Serbian Republic) absolute majority of the population are Serbs while in the federation it is dominated is by Bosniaks and Croats. Bosnia & Herzegovina is an artificial creation, and as a result the conflict between these two entities is constant. Serbs from Serbian Republic want independence, but the Bosniaks and Croats do not allow it. They are strongly advised by the West to seek unitary state and abolition of the Serbian Republic. But the relations between Bosniaks and Croats are not good, frictions are constantly present. Croats want a third entity, which is unacceptable for the Bosniaks. Due to the fact that Croatia has entered the European Union, and that all Croats in Bosnia have a Croatian passport, now there is a large emigration of Croats from Bosnia to countries of the European Union. So now the Croatian position in Bosnia is significantly weakened.

The US government holds a double standard, while they say that Serbia must accept the reality on the ground, which is that the Albanians are majority in Kosovo and that they want independent Kosovo, being what the West with the United States enabled. At the same time the west led by the US government strongly prohibits the independence of Serbian Republic, telling them that they will never get independence. It should be noted that the Serbs in World War II suffered a genocide by the Croats and Bosniaks, in which about one million Serbs were killed. It is clear to notice that the policy of West for over two decades, has only damaged the Balkan region. Therefore, it is necessary that Russia strengthens its position and stop the destructive American policies in the Balkans.
THE EURASIAN IDEA
FROM A SWEDISH PERSPECTIVE

Tommy Rydén


Sweden is at the outskirts of the Eurasian geographical area, as it has been presented to us.¹ ² ³ For historical and practical reasons, Russia is in any case what comes to our minds when we talk about Eurasia from a Swedish viewpoint, since we are almost next door neighbours.

It has been said that "In the broader sense, Eurasianism can be considered as a form of continentalism for the project of the creation of a European-Russian common space — the Greater Europe stretching from Lisbon to Vladivostok."⁴ Sweden could play an important part in this, if she chooses to.

Known historically for its neutrality, or at least some form of independence from other nations war agendas, and with an enthusiasm for international diplomacy, Sweden was initially oriented towards German culture during the first half of the 20th century. With the outcome of the second World War this changed to USA and the United Kingdom. The German language was replaced by the English language as the primary second language in the school system, and with that followed that people tends to orientate more towards that culture than anything else, especially in popular culture. Yet, Sweden is in no way a carbon copy of the Anglo-Saxon mindset.

There is nevertheless a cultural and political obstacle in our way. Advancing the idea of an expanded friendship with the Russian federation and Eurasia must, in order to fully develop and survive in the long run, be done through presenting the idea relentlessly, by trade and cultural exchange: step by step.

For this long-term change to take place we must first and foremost plant the idea that it even could take place, among key decision makers, and above all in the minds of the younger generation who share an interest in business and politics and will be our future leaders and decision makers. We need think-tanks, we need young bold politicians who dare to question the status quo, various educational associations, the use of social media and anything else that will put this idea into the mainstream in a responsible manner. There is no need for any great popular movement, only that influential individuals and groups connect and gets the word out. Quality is more important than numbers in getting the work done.

The Swedish tradition, even if not without faults and lately quite sabotaged, of diplomacy and until recently also in its avoidance of any open military alliances,

could play an important role in the coming new world, as a liaison between Eurasia and the “lands of the sea”. There are some problems that must be dealt with in connection with this, one is about the NATO-partnership and another one is the incorrect image of Russia.

Sweden has unfortunately since the end of the Cold War in the 90s, increasingly abandoned its honorable tradition of neutrality and true diplomacy, and the governments of late have oriented even further towards the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Even European Union mutual agreements is seen by Sweden to include possible military assistance, if a member state who perhaps because of membership in NATO is subjected to an act of war. The Swedish Minister of Defense concluded in a speech five years ago that Sweden no longer, practically speaking, could be regarded as military nonaligned 1.

During the end of 2014 there was a sudden comeback in Sweden of the submarine hysteria from the 1980s, when the defense department once again, this time in coalition with NATO-friendly politicians, made claims about hostile submarines in the coastal area. They failed in actually finding a submarine of any kind, and did not produce any other proof that would stand up in court.

Yet, a survey in 2014 showed that 75% of the Swedes questioned believed the submarine stories as told by the media, certain politicians and the defense ministry. Only 11% percent said flatly no to the presentation 2. Consequently, the public support for NATO membership increased from 28% to 37% in 2014. 3 Although never proven, the underlying message was that these submarines were Russian. Fredrik Bynander, Associate Professor of Political Science at the National Defence University, commented it somewhat critical by saying “media coverage has been very positive for how the defense presented it. It was a lineup of politicians who supported the Armed Forces version of what had happened.” 4

For myself, who served as a conscript in the Swedish Army at Revingehed in the 1980s this sounds all so familiar. I remember how our commanding officer, a former Swedish volunteer in the American Rangers during the Vietnam war, spoke to us about sightings of “divers running across a small island” and “jumping into the sea at the other end”(!), indications of “submarines” or “suspicious sounds” in the coastal area, and we watched information films where “enemy soldiers” we all understood were the Russians although this was not said openly, in a fictional scenario cut the throats of Swedish key people, like fighter jet pilots at their doorstep. In preparation for an invasion of Sweden. But back then we thought we had valid reasons to oppose the Communist ideology as a real threat, and this made it difficult not to believe any and all bad news coming from that part of the world.

The cost for the hysteria in 2014, with hundreds of Swedish navy personnel and several battleships involved in a futile search, was at least 20 million SEK 5 and no submarine whatsoever was found. But facts have become irrelevant, the stories told now have their own lives, like folk tales, and with bits and pieces not related to the actual submarine search, are added as “proof” of the evil intentions of the Russian Federation and especially its supposed mastermind Vladimir Putin.

The most recent agreement between Sweden and NATO, which was forced upon the population without any public debate (many are even unaware about its existence), will allow NATO to deploy troops on the ground in case of an “emergency”, although we are promised this is to be finally determined by the Swedish government in a case-to-case scenario. This whole deal would have to be rejected since this kind of agreement do not serve any Swedish national interests but only the geopolitical agenda of Washington and makes us a pawn in their man-made conflicts with others. 6 In fact, it makes the peaceful country of Sweden a possible target for a military attack if there is an international conflict. The opponent would have to target their missiles on the non-Swedish NATO forces on Swedish soil in order to prevent these from taking off for their final destination.

Prior to this dilemma Sweden moved from regarding itself “neutral” to officially labeling itself “military non-aligned”, so this shift has been gradual, but by purpose. Nonaligned meant that we were supposed to not enter into any mutual defense guarantees and that Sweden was responsible for its own defense.

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1 http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/9497/a/138094  
2 http://www.nyteknik.se/nyheter/fordon_motor/fartyg/article3866625.ece  
3 http://www.thelocal.se/20141029/support-swells-for-swedish-nato-membership  
5 http://www.va.se/nyheter/2014/10/24/notan-for-ubatsjakten/  
6 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/27(finland-sweden-strengthen-ties-nato
The European Union leadership, not to mention Washington, will most likely resist our plan for a greater openness towards Russia. The very idea of the European Union since start was to simplify trade within the European Union, to form a bloc. But over time it has also unofficially come to serve as a proxy for the interests of Washington in this geographical area, due to some major member states close relationship with that country. There were also early warnings about EU changing from a free market economy into the creation of a super state that could end up serving other masters. Yet, “Binding together the EU as a whole is not only the self-interest of its national components but also the reality that no feasible alternative exists in the absence of a willingness to relinquish European identity as a distinct civilization.”

Nevertheless the marketing of business ventures in Eastern Europe, Russia and after that its neighboring countries will attract a growing interest among the many entrepreneurs who always want to explore new areas and escape the status quo of their own world. Not to mention tourism. We must not let the current political landscape lure us into believing this current situation will be for forever. There are signs that EU could implode in due time if changes are not made. “It’s nothing at all to do with Europe, it’s to do with the political construct that is the Union. An unnecessary, inefficient and disposable layer of government. So, let us dispose of it. There’s absolutely nothing at all wrong with Europe or any aspect of it. It’s the political system of the European Union that is the problem” as one European writer formulates it. In any case Sweden needs to see to its own best interests.

We have to expect many citizens in Sweden to react with distrust at first to this idea. Even for some considerable time. This is because of how they have been conditioned by the media and ruling political class. In Sweden there is an old distrust of the “Russian bear” which is of a much older date than the Cold War era, although the stated reasons for this stance has varied over time.

The Russophobia in Sweden, which clearly exist, is not easily explained. It is used from time to time to by politicians who wants Sweden to move closer to NATO, or used by other interest groups who for an example dislike the Russian rejection of postmodernism and wants the latter to adopt so-called modern European values. Old tales and even prejudice have been inherited and passed on to new generations. Presumed conflicts of interest are over time then added to the mixture as to prove that the original distrust of Russians is indeed called for. Very often one really don’t know why we have to distrust Russians, only that we should.

Replace Russian with “Jews” or for that matter “witches” and there would be a public outcry or laughter. But to demonize Russians, who for some reason are expected to be millions of exact replicas of the current political leadership in the Russian Federation and with no individual ability to think and arrive at their own conclusions, is regarded as more or less accepted behavior. Among minor curiosities this has also generated appeals in numerous charismatic Christian groups, who for years have traveled to the border areas but even into Russia, with copies of the Bible, in order to make those of Russian ancestry, and others, into “Christians”. Which proves their lack of historical and cultural knowledge as far as the old church and Eastern Orthodoxy is concerned.

To begin with, this approach towards Russia began even before the Russian defeat of the Swedish forces at Poltava 1709 although Sweden was humiliated for a considerable time with the defeat at Poltava. The German aristocrat Sigmund von Herberstein published a book named “Rerum moscoviticarum commentarii” already in 1549, after visiting Russia twice, This book was translated into several languages and was read by the political elite in Sweden. In the book “Mosovites” were described as more or less puppets in the hands of their ruler, with no mental ability to question anything. Human robots who could be a threat to all of Europe, or just anyone, in case they were ordered by their ruler to act. This image of the Russian man and woman is broadcasted very much the same today.

To Swedish minds an expansive Russia was viewed as possible geopolitical threat or at least a problem when the following tzars made Russia a greater and more unified country. Although there were from time to time intermarriages and good relations. But too be a friend of the Russian Federation or a friend of a country like Serbia, who acts as a bridge already between these two worlds, is in this authors opinion not to be anti-European, or subversive to our cultural heritage, but to
reconnect with the God of the old church, core values and even various cultural expressions Europe lost due to its divisive Protestantism and today's post-modernism. Gems that were preserved in Eastern Europe and Russia in spite of atheist rule.

Oddly enough, Sweden has been trading with Russia since the time of the Vikings and was by year 2013 one of ten largest direct investors in Russia. Participating in the Eurasian vision would be to take part in a project with a future, with all its resources and vast areas, where growth is to take place. Instead of merely as a pawn or outside player used by the western powers in their own scheme of divide and conquer.

An official partnership, similar to the one existing right now between Sweden and NATO, with the Russian Federation is too big a leap for the average man, and would not be workable at this time and age, perhaps not even beneficial to us or the Eurasian project at all if it was a mirror image of the kind of agreements we have made with USA and need to get out of. Sweden's traditional role of neutrality and diplomacy should be emphasized in my opinion. We can however take small but important baby steps in a direction that will build trust and friendship and make Sweden a neutral ground were the business world and politicians can meet up.

Do we, the Swedes and peoples of Eastern Europe and Russia, share any common cultural values of today or have we lost it all to post-modernism? Are we too different?

I dare say we do have a lot in common, and it was recently manifested in the political life of this nation. In the election of 2014 the self-described socially conservative political party, the Sweden Democrats (SD), became the country's third largest party with 13% of the vote. In a strength of power they voted down the new Socialist government's budget, forcing the prime minister to declare a snap election. Surveys showed SD could gain 16-20% in the upcoming snap election. However, this made the center parties, who lost the general election to the minority coalition of Social Democrats and the Environmental Party, cut an eight year deal with the government, promising to support the ruling Social Democrat/partner government in order to sidestep the elections results and prevent the possibility of SD getting even more support in a new election.2

Swedes, at heart and generally speaking, don't like to be bullied or manipulated by outside powers, we prefer to chose our own path. So do the Russians.

The party SD is described by the establishment media and various opponents as harboring people with negative feelings about immigrants, due to their opposition to liberal immigration policies, while the SD party leadership itself has promised to take action against anyone who promote a racist agenda.3 They view themselves as nationalists or lately preferably as socially conservative, and have gained considerable support among disappointed Conservative Party members and voters, since the latter party has moved to the center and can hardly be viewed as even traditionally conservative anymore.4 In this authors opinion it would benefit us all if they moved even more from a tendency of ethnic nationalism to a focus on values and aspirations shared not only by Swedes.

Despite decades of Swedish presumably Social Democratic or liberal governments trying to impose “equality” and dictating how parents should live their family lives, with women forced to work outside of the home as much as possible, they have not succeeded and have nowadays resorted to making threats to enact laws that will force women to leave home early and dad to stay home in the name of total gender equality. No matter if this is the best solution or not for the specific family. These ideas are shared by the leaderships of the center parties, with the exception of the Christian Democrats who still try to attract the more culturally conservative voters. Once again, these centrist politics can be seen as an expression for the Swedish habit of trying to achieve consensus, which now has ended up with the almost all the parties looking very much the same.

A survey in 2013 showed that 4 in 5 Swedes reject this forced gender equality idea when it comes to the family structure and thinks it should be up to the family not the government to decide.5 This despite the fact that the

2 http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/27/us-sweden-politics-poll-idUSKBN0K505120141227
4 http://www.dn.se/debatt/tidigare-moderater-ar-basen-i-sds-nya-valjarkar/
5 http://www.dn.se/nyheter/politik/majoritet-emot-delad-foraldraledighet/
equality agenda is promoted all the time in media and politics.

Unfortunately the leadership of that party is also somewhat caught up in the “distrust Russia” hysteria, but there are other more understanding voices in the youth league. Overall it’s in any case a positive indicator that something is happening in an otherwise sleepy Sweden. It would be healthy for the sake of cultural preservation, aside of pure economical reasons, to move closer to Russia and Eurasia.

Nevertheless, the electoral success since 2010 for this party is an indicator that a growing percentage of the Swedish population, in spite of a massive almost day and night assault by the media and the older political establishment telling them to vote against SD, likes the idea of preserving the traditional family and promoting other socially conservative ideals in a country where dissident conservative voices are suppressed, ridiculed or labeled in a negative manner. This indicator is important, although a political party should not be seen as a replacement for any long-term work at depth. In order for real changes to take place in a population, and not just end up as a temporary vote, one need to work from the bottom up, not from the top and down to not dissolve with any temporary political winds in the future. We can do this by involving key people, quality people, who get the message out to their respective groups, churches, associations, newspaper people or other places where they have some influence on their peers. Numbers are less important. Connecting with the right people who can influence others, and get the message out there through them, is far more important than hoping for the masses to wake up by themselves.

If we can convince a large enough percentage of the population, through the work of influential individuals and groups, that the countries who supports cultural preservation and core family values the most, not only in words but in action, are to be found in the East and not in the West, then it will help our cause.

This could be done with or without involvement of the European Union. It should be noted that many Swedes express doubts about the nations membership in EU. “Swedes in favors of being part of the union came in at 45 percent” in 2013, since the membership has given Sweden no visible benefits aside of making it easier to travel between the member states.\(^1\)

However, in order to make improvements between Sweden and Russia and avoid unnecessary conflicts we need to get rid of a bunker mentality which only our common cultural enemies can benefit from. A recent Russian poll showed that 36% of the Russians wish for Russian to distance itself further from the West.\(^2\) It is understandable and would perhaps even be applauded by those who think there can be nothing good in the West whatsoever. But the problem is this; in for an example Sweden people are made to believe the worst about Russians, and in Russia – due to the ongoing onslaught on that country from Western geopolitical interests – people tend to think the worst about the West, sometimes on valid grounds but also because of cultural and linguistic differences. A more hostile population on any side of this fence will in the long run only benefit those who wish to dismantle Europe as well as Eurasia.

Viewed from the outside, Sweden is an open democracy where everyone can express their opinion. But those who have lived here even a short time has quickly become aware that even if that is the case then there is an expectation that everyone should be in agreement. Anyone who deviates in any matter which the media and establishment determined the limits of, as for an example the message that the Russians want to harm us, will promptly be regarded as strange and deviant. It is not unlikely that in time they will consider those individuals and organizations who question the rapprochement with NATO and oppose the idea that the West is the savior of the East as subversive elements and a threat to national security.

When writing this in the month of February, Swedish TV viewers are bombarded every day with slanted news reports where the Russian Federation is presented in a negative light and repeatedly said to have caused all the problems in Ukraine, adding that the rest of us can “become the next target” for “Russian expansion”. They have completely forgotten the West’s major responsibility in how this conflict occurred. In the same breath we are told that the United States and Sweden will conduct joint air exercises because of the “growing threat” (from Russia).\(^3\) It is like preparation for a war, where the propa-

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1. [http://www.thelocal.se/20131211/swedes-less-certain-about-eu-membership](http://www.thelocal.se/20131211/swedes-less-certain-about-eu-membership)
ganda has taken over completely and people have lost their ability to think critically. They try to apply simple explanations to complex problems. “We” and “them”.

But we cannot let these sometimes dark clouds fence us in.

The core idea with the European Union was to encourage and simplify trade and travel between European countries. This was a noble idea. It’s an ever more grandiose idea, and truly more international, to open up for trade and cultural exchange with the Eurasia. Now it’s up to Sweden to decide which role to play in this new world, either as a bystander or important participator.
IS MAHALLA AN EASTERN ANALOGUE TO WESTERN CONCEPT OF CIVIL SOCIETY?

Saidbek Goziev

The present article examines the phenomenon of mahalla, a traditional social institution in Tajikistan: its social role, similarities with NGO and functions are discussed amidst the testing the possibility of the comparison between mahalla and civil society. The Eastern term of mahalla as a counterpart of the Western term of civil society elevates its pro-democratic potentiality, since civil society is regarded as one of the preconditions for the successful development of democracy. In opposite to the biased views on Islam, as a religion reducing the possibilities of the democracy for example popularized through the wide-known and wide-discussed Samuel Huntington’s book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, the mahalla in its turn highly secures the thesis on authentic capacity to organize community life in self-profitable way.

MAHALLA AS EASTERN ANALOGUE TO WESTERN CIVIL SOCIETY

In the beginning some comparisons are needed. For the contemporary Russian readers the presentation of the mahalla, the Tajik old-aged social institution, has to be comparative, better to say the first sketches of the definition will become clear with the assistance of the comparison with the phenomenon of civil society. So in what degree is mahalla similar/or identical/or a bit different, i.e. authentic regarding the civil society?

Some historical notes are needed. The very word mahalla derives from the Arabic word مـلأ (from the same root, لحـل), originally means a place where one makes a halt. Mahalla, therefore, came to have the special meaning of a quarter of a town, a meaning which has also passed into the Persian, Turkish and Hindustani languages (where the popular pronunciation is muhalla). In general terms, the term formerly applied to a quarter of a town: for example, in Egypt, the word of mahalla is regularly found as the first element in the names of towns and villages.¹

In the case of Central Asian countries, especially in Tajikistan, mahalla predominately means a council or community of people in which all local problems are discussed and resolved. Literally, in the English language, mahalla means “neighborhood”. According to Moryakova, the concept of the mahalla became visible in the 10th century. The first mentioning about mahalla was found in Narshakhi’s book “History of Bukhara” which was written in the X century in Arabic, and letter translated into Persian in the XII century.²

The structure of mahalla has been preserved in Tajikistan up until the current day. Nowadays every mahalla has its leader – rais of mahalla - chosen by the members of that community. Every street has its heads of streets, and they are subordinated to the chairman of the community. The meeting of rais and the council of elders usually has an informal character. Their meetings are held in social places (in gaps) or mosques, in tea-houses (choikhona), or other places where mature males meet and discuss their interests and their concerns about society. Another example of activity is collecting money for example for the purchase of vaccines aimed to protect all children living in one territory from the epidemic polio. Consistent with the tradition of Islam, the faithful members are obliged to spend 2.5 percent of their income to help needy people. This kind of charity is called zakat in Islam. Well, I have personally witnessed several times where wealthy people from one mahalla divide the collected zakat not merely for its poor members but among poor people from neighboring mahallas.

Every mahalla has some financial rites coming from the charitable contribution of the members of the community. The members of the mahalla often gather for mahalla meetings to discuss and solve the problems of the community. For example, they also have the power to decide using the funds if it is necessary to construct public buildings, hospitals, schools, mosques, teahouses, homes for widows, housing for elderly people, and other buildings. In the vast majority of cases, the source of this finance is charity contributions.

In its turn the concept of civil society has not been known for the Tajiks until the systematic change that began with the collapse of USSR in 1991. The Tajiks were introduced to these concepts only with appearance of the first Western aid organizations, which have already started to work there during the Civil War (emerged in 1992). For the managers of Western organizations coming to Tajikistan during that time and now, NGOs were the equivalent of civil society. Also, the idea of civil society with the NGO's brought with them resulted in changes to the legislation imposed by the Western countries and organizations such as OSCE. In the Tajik Law regarding civil society as an institution of such society takes into account the sole NGO's. The notion of civil society has become of raising importance not only in Western countries but in many parts of the world. It is a type of association in among the individuals and the state, a free area which is protected however not hindered by the state. Habermas' public sphere points to the meaning of civil society. According to him, public sphere first of all is a sphere of life world where public opinion can be shaped. Principally, the door to the public sphere is open to all people who then act mutually, they are not limited. In civil society people can meet together, associate and freely share their opinion. In this case, civil society can be illustrated as the arena of organizations, social movements, voluntary organizations and citizen associations, as the same time as public communication. Civil society therefore is separate from the economy, state and political society.

In Western countries, the survival of a public sphere reflects the double division of the individual with state in the public sphere, with society in the private. This notion of society symbolizes an opposition among the free individuals and associations which does not exist in traditional Asian thought. The Tajiks thinking like another Asian people pay far more consideration to the organic relation of individual with associations, state and places greater prominence on the obligation of the individual to the society or the state. It takes family, ties and world as a unitary whole, of which the individuals is only a part of it.

In contrary to the Western society, the Tajik society is based on the thought of community as earlier for the individual and on the moral code of the group of people governing the life of the individuals. The values as reason, self-interest and contracts do not tie individual to the community. In case of neighborhoods in communities, person is born in a community- it is not a creation of choice. The ties are of blood, affiliation, kinship and love. In such societies, the individual is not a autonomous totally or atom however rather a part of the community and submissive thereto.

In present time most researchers examining the absence of civil society in one country, take into consideration the number of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO’S), associations and etc. They are not taking into consideration the historical, cultural and social differences between countries (especially between Eastern and Western countries). All countries in these two parts of


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the World had their historical progress and their way of living. Every country has its specific feature. Therefore, I think that every country has its specific civil society. If we compare civil society in an Eastern country with Western society of course it is not possible that everything will be exactly like in the West. We can find some similarities and of course some differences. However, if we will compare the civil society or activity of some traditional communities with the classical theories of civil society, we can find similarities. Consequently, as it has been mentioned above, every country has its own typical civil society. For example: Chinese civil society, Russian civil society, Tajik civil society and etc.

These questions are legitimate because we arise them reflecting upon civil society. These questions also highlight the significance of searching for civil society's notion and definition not within the Western contexts but within the Eastern social environment. Orientation to the European model can be helpful for comparison, to emphasize similarities and differences between the Western and Eastern concepts of civil society, together in their theoretical explanation and their historical existence. Such a comparison is a requisite, as it gives the Eastern people more understanding about where they are and how they can help to provide a new framework which is culturally sensitive and is appropriate1.

Many Eastern scholars and researchers have proposed definitions of civil society. These researches estimate the elements and uniqueness of civil society in Eastern world as they measure up to Western values and standards. From my point of view these explanation, in context, specify a misunderstanding of the notion. The definitions rest on a collection of elements and notions of civil society as they exist outside the Eastern world. That is, they do not seek to discover the origin of the idea in the society itself. For finding the origin of the concept, it will be useful to examine its meaning in the specific language of the country which is a case study. Although most important how the idea has been applied.

Traditional model of civil society all the time has been a part of Central Asia, with some mechanisms reinforced and others concealed by Communist regime. In the past, the masjid (mosque), choikhona (teahouse), and bazaar (market) were places of community dialogue and discussion. Additionally, voluntary cooperation was a part of people's life in Tajikistan before Communism, during Communist rule and in present time, regularly referred to as hashar (assembling, community work). Before independence, and encouraged by Gorbachev's glasnost, informal modern civil society bodies and debate groups such as Ehyo (Renewal) and Ru ba Ru (Face-to-Face), from the urban intelligentsia, were also formed. This form of civil society is based largely on “trust and solidarity networks' associated with kinship ties”2. Mahalla presents a centuries-old tradition that is deeply enrooted not only in the social sphere. Its cultural components are expressed in Islamic religion that influences on the values, every-day behavior of the members of mahalla3.

**Mahalla tackles the bias and proves its pro-democratic capacity**

In my opinion, such an attitude towards the mahalla in the Western projection of civil society in Tajikistan is a consequence of the fact that the institution of mahalla is based on Islam. Already in the 1980s, Samuel Huntington was first to pointed out firmly that in any of the countries where the religion is Islam, there is no democracy. This view was echoed in the immensely influential book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order4 published in 1996. Under the influence of this book, it became a popular view in the West that Islam is the enemy of Christian civilization and its values. I believe that this thesis in its turn influenced the views of politicians, lawyers and Western managers who reject the idea that mahalla could be an important instrument for building civil society.

Reflecting on democracy in Muslim countries, the Westerners usually have adopted a misconception that religion is the impediment in the route to democracy. Both representatives of the extreme Christian rights and the followers of the ideology of liberalism believe that their values are universal. In turn, in theories of social change adopted in Western science, in general, culture is not considered as an agent of social change. For these two reasons, the dangers of political change in Central Asia proved to be susceptible to Huntington’s assertions about the role of Islam. Although Huntington himself, by criticizing the

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3 Ibid.
views of social sciences on the development of in the Third world societies, postulated the necessity to consider culture as an important factor in the processes occurring them. In my interpretation, Huntington did not provide the deep knowledge about cultures. This is reflected in the concept of civilization of which he operates. Till now as a result, the concept of civilization is overlapped with the concept of culture, which achieved a high level of development.

The only dispute was which cultural attribute had achieved this level of development. According to the tradition of the nineteenth century, the attribute of civilization would be literacy. In the twentieth century, following Australian archeologist Gordon Childe, the attribute of civilization was urbanization. Recognizing religion as the only attribute of civilization, Huntington has demonstrated that he understands neither the culture, nor the relationship between the concept of culture and the concept of civilization. In my strong opinion, he did not avoid the prejudice against Islam present in Western culture since the Crusades. His vision of the world, in which conflicts between cultures become inevitable, announce the conflict between Islam and Christianity. In this way, Islam in his discussion is always a potential enemy to Christianity, and Islamic civilization is a negation of the values upon which Christian Western civilization rests.

It is also needed to present a large number of the critical feedbacks Clash of Civilizations has invoked in the milieu of the scholars and researchers. I would like to sketch those that in my opinion are significant and reflect my own interpretation of the main theses of the work. Firstly, such grand works as Fukuyama’s End of History and Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations attempted to provide answers to the central political questions of the post Cold War world. However, both theses faced criticism for their particular assumptions. Fukuyama’s analysis was disparaged for not sufficiently weighing the national and religious revival that had taken place in the former Soviet Union and the wider world as societies emerging from the Cold War sought to reclaim their pasts and their cultures. These “spiritual” movements reflected the continuing appeal of alternatives to liberalism, and many were openly hostile to the West, rejecting Western liberalism as arrogant, exploitative, morally bankrupt, and obsessed with the satisfaction of individual material needs. The End of History thus represents an unjustified assumption of liberalism’s superiority and destiny as the universal civilization to which all would ultimately subscribe.1

Secondly, there are two basic problems with the Clash of Civilizations theory. First off, the methodological foundations of the thesis involve a program of categorizing the peoples of the world according to one, supposedly objective system. To classify individuals unhesitatingly as members of civilizations (for example as members of “the Western world;” or “the Islamic world;” or “the Buddhist world”) is overly reductionist and ignores numerous other affiliations, such as by profession, industry, politics, and education. Second off, the civilizational categories are far from clear-cut; the misreading of history attached to this categorization overlooks each culture’s complexities and neglects historical interactions between them. Around the world, there are nearly one and a half billion Muslims, most of whom are not Arabs, and whose priorities and cultures are very diverse. Moreover, the Islamic world, just like other civilizations, is divided into states, each with its own interests and cultural traits, and often engaged in conflict with each other rather than with the West.2

Thirdly, referring to Fouad Ajami, it is not civilizations that control states but, rather, states that control civilizations3. During the past several decades, the governments of two states in the Middle East that have most frequently invoked religion to legitimize their rule have been Saudi Arabia and Iran. Yet Saudi Arabia has remained a staunch American ally, while Iran has been labeled an active opponent of U.S. foreign policy. Moreover, following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, many major Muslim countries, including Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Egypt, acted against Huntington’s formula by joining the United States in a war against their fellow Muslim state of Iraq.4

Fourthly, among the recent publications there is the accent on the identity problem. The very attitude to the Muslims is prone to the building the image of the “others” where otherness is inevitably hostile, politically dangerous, in view of Chaklader Mahboob-ul Alam, an

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author of article Huntington Was Wrong1. The identity of Muslims constructed by Huntington is based on the religion – that is correctly plays a crucial role in the life of the Muslims – but the very approach is one-way, and because of this shortcoming this one-side identity is seen disadvantageous, and as result Muslims are denied from the possibility to build democratically-based society, to open dialogue with other nations from other parts of the world, in a short they are deprived from the goods enjoyed by the Western world.

For instance, the idea of the polycentric and the idea of the rights of nations might be examined under one guiding theme: anti-globalization of world order and pluralism of nations and can be added to the discussion/critique of Huntington's theory. In this regard, it is relevant to refer to Karl Schmitt, 20th century German political philosopher, lawyer and historian. The entire corpus of his political philosophy was saturated with the geo-political views and based on the concept of rights of nations (Volksrechte)2. The very concept is opposite to the liberal view and hierarchical divisions of strong and weak nations (countries of the first, second and third world) and in fact is amicable to polycentrism and pluralism where every nation has the right to express its cultural and ethnic peculiarity and to transmit this right to the land. The rights of nations implies the rights to land; the possession and cultivation of the land the nation exists on. Thus, the right to land is legitimated when and only when the land is inhabited by man, i.e. the nation, in general.

For his part, Samuel Huntington recalls Schmitt’s friend-enemy dichotomy of political relations and accentuates the political rather than cultural or ethnic undertones. Any political antagonism can be read in terms of friend-enemy relations (for Schmitt the friend-enemy relations are historically changeable). Schmitt's nomos is applicable in the context of the clash of civilizations, to understand the subsequent consequences of the latter: territorial expansion, wars and colonization, indeed intensify the thesis that the cultural (religious, ethnic) differences have served as the promoting factor. Albeit, again referring to the concept of nomos the expansion of area has been motivated by such driving impulses as the change of the spatial order of one community.

The religiously-motivated conflict – clash of civilizations - as a final phase in the relations between nations for Huntington – is presented as an inescapable form of relations between nations, culminated in war. Comparing this with Schmitt, Huntington’s political theory is seen as a simplistic one, where the idea of ‘the clash’ as elaborated by him, presents just one space in the line of conflicts/wars which are constantly changing each other throughout the history of humanity. The wars therefore happen periodically and define and signify the change of the world order (and the world map consequently). The final confrontation between nations are to end with the emergence of a big space (Grossraum); it can be a polycentric pan-national union of nations under Empire, leading by one political will rather than merely economic, cultural, religious or ethnic preconditions. 4

In my interpretation, the clash of civilizations implies the clash or old confrontation between East and West, as presented in a bright and detailed manner by the prominent scholar Edward Said in Orientalism. The orientalistic biases, which in Said’s view are of political significance, still are not removed from the agenda of the international arena. In the bipolar vision of the world, despite its cultural narrowness and explicit ignorance of its diversity, the multicultural premise is a type of justification for breaking up the conflicts from a local to a global scale. Apropos, Chaklader Mahboob-ul Alam refers to Said as an open critic of Huntington’s theses. He cites Said’s explanation of the core of his critique: the confrontation between two extremes is prone to ignore the interdependencies, the multiple-identities and the multicultural context of the ever-changing world: “ Huntington's categorisation of the world's fixed “civilizations” omitted the dynamic interdependence and interaction of cultures over the centuries.”

Reading the works of Western authors, I rarely found any of them to have a real understanding of the relationships that exist between the cultures of Muslim societies and the religion of Islam. Only a very few Western scholars are aware of the fact that the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam is

1 An article has been recently published on this issue in The Daily Star (31.03.2011)
2 The very concept nomos means the concrete spatial order of a community. It is a law on land which exists prior to any particular positive laws. Der nomos dererde is thus accurately equivalent to ‘world order’ or ‘the Law of the Earth’ and thus signifies a problem space in which notions of world order and international law coincide. See in Schmitt, C. (2003 ). The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum. New York: Telos Press.
4 Also see Alexander Dugin in Russian. Дугин, А. (2000). Основы Геополитики. Арктогея: Москва.
5 Ibid.
tolerant towards tradition. It accepted local customary adat and accordingly adapted to it, and did not change them. If there are no democratic institutions in Muslim societies, it is always characteristic of the culture, and it is not the fault of the religion. It is the fact that Islam encourages certain organizational and associational forms in which authority is chosen, as is the case of mahalla. Even in such radical forms of Islam such as Islamic fundamentalism, which seeks to restore the Caliphate, is the application of the view that the Caliph would be chosen by the believers.

Emphasizing that religion is the basis of the mahalla institution I should warn against any possible misunderstanding. The independence of NGOs lies in the fact that their choice of targets and methods of action are unfettered from the government institutions, business, sponsors, etc., but also from religious institutions. I think that there is a misunderstanding of Islam in the West. In my opinion, there is a tendency in the West to not be fully aware of differences between Islam and Christianity. In all its versions Christianity exists as a church, as a hierarchical organization. However, Islam is a religion supporting the self-governing communities. It is a historical fact that the Tajik people underwent not one attempt to subdue religious communities. For instance, in Tsarist Russia and later in the Soviet Union institutions towards that end such as: Duechownoe Uprawlenie Muzułman Sredni Azii i Kazachstana (Spiritual Directorate of the Muslims in Central Asia and Kazakhstan) has been founded. However, as I mentioned above, such attempts could not fully subordinate the mahalla which, despite the above discussed repressions, remained partially independent. In this striving for independence mahalla tries to continue to exist.

Thus, independent from some similarities between mahalla and the institutions of civil society in the West, there are differences in the purpose of their functions. However, mahalla produces a significantly higher level of trust between its members than is possible in the institutions of civil society in the West. Mahalla also differs from the Western civil society institutions in that it is not exposed to the fluctuation of participants in joint activities or their withdrawal, depending on the whim of the individual. In my opinion, it has a few unquestionable advantages over the Western civil society. In mahalla, where the members participate in the most important events in the life of each residents, such as marriage, birth of a child, the rite of circumcision, sickness, and bereavement, and where by reason of living together for generations, many families became related to each other by forming special bonds of solidarity. As it has been above-mentioned, there is also a very huge capital of trust.

The recognition of mahalla as a civil society institution, in my opinion, interferes with the convictions of managers of Western organizations, who hold the belief that modernization is the opposite of tradition. Mahalla is a traditional institution, however, due to its historical role in Tajik society, mahalla is capable of protecting the interests of its members better than the Western institutions (such as NGO’s) that have been introduced here recently. Despite the biases about the incapability for the building of the democratic foundations (the biases mostly based on the absence of in-depth understanding of the cultural and religious context of the Asian countries) mahalla by the proper organization and management of daily life manifests the long-ago presented preconditions for democracy.

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The emerging debate over the potential and application for a Fourth Political Theory in the United States is one of increasing concern and importance within the present world-crisis. In order for its potential and application to be understood, it must begin by addressing the following areas which contain questions in the form of both problems and possibilities.

In this piece we will explore the following five elements. First, an introduction to a way of looking at the problems and possibilities. Next, we will look at some of the material factors which indicate a crisis of legitimacy in the current US regime. Then, we will move on to a description of the elements of an organic process of developing a 4PT intellectual movement that comes from within the US. Moving on, we will look at some of the basic elements which frame the present discourse in the US. Finally, we will provide an understanding of popular political views in the US as being primarily Socialist and Libertarian.

An Interesting Conundrum

From the outset, we encounter what appears to be a very interesting conundrum. One the one hand, the US is the core of the Atlanticist Empire, and which has rigid control over media, academia, and -through its coercive mechanisms - the political life. On the other hand, a strong component of the ‘American’ mentality is a rejection of rigidity and frozen concepts, a flexibility and a willingness to experiment with new things, and even to take on new identities. This kind of flexibility and rejection of frozen concepts creates an extraordinary playing field, and will figure into both promises and dilemmas which will face the deconstruction of the US Empire. To understand it then, is to approach questions surrounding the scope of said possibilities.

One manner of approaching these questions is to make several distinctions. The first is that the US already has its own political traditions which at no time formally accepted anything after liberalism. Within this liberalism, however, upon closer examination, it is revealed strong influences both of the Second political theory, and the Third political theory, with a closer tendency towards the corporatist model of the third. At the close of the 19th century, there was something of a combination of the two found in the ideas of Edward Bellamy, the American
Knights of Labor, the Fabians, and the Guild Socialist movement. Much of these were metabolized and combined with early Corporatist thought at the dawn of the 3PT, and in the US were painted with the star-spangled banner and called ‘Progressivism’. Nevertheless, these are not justified typically upon the framework, formally, of those other models and theories. The US system has been presented thoroughly within the language of Liberalism, even where it has synthesized and fused elements of Socialism and Fascism.

Thus, it is already visible to us that there are at least two possible methods of application of a 4PT for the US. The first would involve a rather inorganic process of placing the European and Eurasian experience into the mold of the US. The second, however, would involve taking the core methodological framework of a 4PT, but creating it organically from within the US's own political culture and politico-philosophic history. First, this would have to take place at the academic level, where these ideas would gain traction, and become then the framework by which alternative media pundits and activists took their inspiration. The US needs its own figures to communicate ideas regarding its own radical transformation.

This second proposal seems the most prudent, because this is not only based upon a more popular approach to US political culture, but also one which promotes “isolationism” and “non-interventionism”. This non-interventionism is not only characteristic of the core US popular sentiment, and is closest to its own formally described philosophical origins, but also sets the right framework for disassembling the Atlanticist Empire in practical terms as well. Simultaneously, it would mean a smaller US, with different borders.

Outside of these two proposals or possible methods of application of a 4PT for the US, which will be explored later on in this paper, is the present and existential problem of the US as a viable entity. The need in the US for a new political theory and a new conception of itself will be driven not in the abstract, but by very real, very tangible issues confronting the US project.

To summarize then, there are possibilities on the level of theory for the development of a 4PT in the US, and there is an economic and ethno-demographic requirement for one as well. Even to confine ourselves to the economic and ethno-demographic problems in the US, we can see that the US suffers from a crisis in legitimacy. Understanding this, and the potential for further research in this area, will allow us to better understand how the US Empire can be disassembled and on what basis a 4PT can be introduced.

**A Crisis in Legitimacy**

In practical terms, the US is suffering a crisis in legitimacy internally, and cannot manage to create a coherent or sustainable economic policy. In our past work on this subject (cited as “[2]” below), we gave statistics relating to the rising cost of food and housing, which are critical objective analytic indicators of potential for unrest and major political and social disruption.

Since that time, Reuters news agency conducted a scientific poll which found that about 25% or one in four Americans want their state to leave the US. This figure is fueled by a number of facts which are only projected to grow in the coming decades. At a certain point, especially if this idea is vigorously promoted, it may surpass the 50% threshold. Following a similar legal framework which has hitherto justified the secession of Kosovo and Crimea, (though the former is highly questionable), we may proceed to invoke the same precedent in the US. Furthermore, contained within the US framing documents of the US, including the US Constitution and the Federalist (as well as Anti-Federalist) Papers, an internally coherent legal framework can also be derived.

This scientific poll conducted in September of this year (2014) used a sample size of over 9000, which is 900% of the sample size required for a scientific poll of this kind, resulting in a margin of error of only +/- 1.2%, and asked the following question [1]:

“Do you support or oppose the idea of your state peacefully withdrawing from the United States of America and the federal government?”

The results were, for US analysts and lawmakers, startling. Below is the breakdown of the results:

There are reasons which can help to explain this kind of result, which we will explore in brief. By in large, they relate to the nature of the ‘American People’. Oswald Spengler adequately described a critical feature of Anglo-Saxon political economy, being that Great Britain is primarily a multi-ethnic society (Anglos, Normans, Saxons, Picts, Welsh, Scots, Jutes, etc.) which is internally organized and self defined by socioeconomic class. This observation was made in relation to his critique of the Marxian analysis of class, which he saw as being overly
based in his observations of society in Great Britain and the British isles. Nevertheless, to the extent that this was arguably true of Great Britain and the British Isles, it is inarguably the case of the US which is comprised of people extraordinarily less related and less connected by geography and time; such as Latinos, African Americans, Arab middle-easterners, Anglo-Saxons, Western Europeans, Slavs, Native Americans, east Asians, and south-east Asians. Furthermore, within these larger groupings are contained national groups who in fact may have more animosity towards each other than they do to others outside of these larger groups; for example, Salvadorians and Mexicans, or Chinese and Japanese.

The United States has therefore not a ‘people’ (ethnos or ‘narod’), it is not a ‘nation’ bound by long standing historical, linguistic, cultural, familial, or experiential ties. It may be a in a process of ethnogenesis, but success in that project will depend on phenomenon which will likely take place over a length of time longer than the near-term political structures are able to accommodate. This latter question is one that must be considered in exploring the former. The fragile nature of the US ‘state’, and its hegemony within its continental sphere is predicated upon a number of technological devices, that promote a kind of cultural or sociologic conformity, whose lifespans are nearing an end. Specifically, the eventual obsolescence of old media and its continual replacement with ‘new media’ is one of the driving forces of change, which sees an end to the hitherto success of the hegemonic myth of a mono-culture, within the present-day borders of the US.

So, in looking at ethnicity and that ‘non-people’ nature of the US population (it is a population, not a people), we must also look at class. The US is not a ‘national’ society, but a ‘class’ society which uses extraordinary amounts of jingoism to masquerade as a ‘national’ society. The kind of struggle waged against the oligarchy in the US has primarily been successful when it was a class struggle. This was when workers, farmers, small land-owners, and small businessmen, have found common cause in a popular class struggle - across ‘ethnic and national’ lines, against the oligarchy. Thus racism has historically been used by the US oligarchy as a means to frustrate a kind of class struggle against it.

To help see that antipathy towards the United States and the federal government is connected to a potential class struggle, we can look at the second graph from the Reuters study. In it we see a direct correlation between class and support for disintegration of the US and opposition to the federal government.

It is also inarguable that the economic trends in the US are seeing an upward redistribution of wealth, away from the shrinking middle-class, leading to further polarization and instability. This is quite dangerous when combined with other factors, such as rising food costs and decreasing political legitimacy. This must be understood in relation to proven models of successfully charting instability, using the very same methods of analysis which the US relied on, somewhat successfully, to destabilize North-African and Middle-east countries during the so-called Arab Spring.
In our paper titled “Towards a New American Revolution”, we explained: “But history proves that there is only so much that people can take, before they rise up. In objective terms, an observed pattern indicates that uprisings are all but inevitable when food prices exceed the nominal FAO-UN index figure of 210 when combined with a government with decreased legitimacy in the public eye [2]. This threshold figure was first crossed in February of 2008, which directly led to the Arab Spring ‘uprisings’ in 2010. This high index figure was in all ways engineered: after the collapse of the Housing bubble in 2007, the massive and endless bailouts starting with QE-1 were used to generate a stock market bubble.” [2]

“Besides creating an important ideological fiction of a ‘rebounding stock market’, specifically perishable goods commodities futures markets were targeted for cornering. This resulted in an engineered spike in grain prices. Governments were forced to rebalance their internal economies in order to subsidize and correct for this sudden change. This is also no small part of the ‘sovereign debt’ crises in the EU periphery states, the PIIGS nations – Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain – which continue to experience a sustained condition of social upheaval which has been branded in different ways by various participants, pundits, and analysts (indignados, 99%/Occupy, etc.) [3]”

Indeed, in the face of a rising FAO index (food price index), and upward redistribution of wealth, we have seen a considerable increase in the number of those in the US population who receive direct government assistance to purchase basic food. We can see that this number is at about 50 million persons. That is despite several decades of austerity legislation which makes it more difficult to qualify for said assistance.

The following graph will show that after the QE1 ‘bailout’ of 2008, GDP grew, yet household earnings dropped significantly, demonstrating an upward redistribution. Not only is there a sharp shift, but it is rapid. The number of homeless and unemployed families in the US stands at an all time high, not only in numbers, but per capita as well.
To further illustrate this point, we ought to look at a race/ethnic demographic map of the US. While the largest three or four US cities are relatively ‘integrated bastions of multiculturalism’, the real demographic figures by states of residence are clearly visible along ethnic and/or racial lines. Taken in context with the poll regarding secession, we can begin to see the framework of more loose representation of the various regions embodying the states of the present-day United States. This map shows where the majority of African-Americans are concentrated. Session here would result in a confederation with a distinctly ‘African-American’ cultural essence.

The recent wave of seemingly racially charged police killings of African-American suspects, has further highlighted long standing racial antagonisms in the US. The federal government in DC continues to impose its highly centralized rule under the specter of a federal republic, and a new generation of black youths are becoming politicized and made more militant under these norms. In a secessionist scenario, the area shown in the map below would be in a position to ‘reset’ race relations, and solve any number of related problems. Furthermore, a conception of a ‘New South’ can be created, one which also takes into consideration some of the ‘confederate’ ideas of a new generation of southern whites who are themselves not racist, oppose supremacism, but who also view sympathetically the secessionist CSA of the 1860’s before and during the US Civil War. Economically, it would be most viable if it were able to integrate more closely with other actors in the Caribbean who also are of African descent, and to which the African-American intellectual elites and academics have already made significant political connections with, dating back to at least the middle of the last century. As a post-US and anti-imperialist state, it would also be able to integrate further with Cuba, and form links also with Afro-Brazilians.

A note should be made here, because in the state of Florida we would expect to find a high number of people identifying as both black and Hispanic (of Caribbean origin), and are therefore not included in this demographic map.

The next map shows the same, with the same consequences, for so-called ‘non-white Hispanics’ and ‘Latinos’. In post mid-century political discourse, this region is referred to as ‘Aztlan’.

With the exception of Idaho, Wyoming, Nebraska, and Washington, the states shown below correspond to the territories of Mexico prior to the Mexican-American war of 1846. Some legal basis for a secession of this ‘Aztlan’ territory or region can be made from the manner by which the treaty which formalized the peace process following the war - The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo - has been abrogated. These demographic trends are universally agreed to continue. In the near future, the southwest will be majority latino/hispanic. While it is not on the agenda, even a total closing of the border cannot change this eventuality due to birth rates.

When looking at these two maps together, several conclusions may come instantly to mind. It becomes clear...
that what will be left of the ‘US’ may be in the remaining area. What has not been discussed is the issue of Native American sovereignty. Native American claims on a legal basis are likely to be larger than the area indicated in the below Figure 7. However, it is important to understand that these reservations already exist as sovereign nations, which have accords with the US federal government. The tribes which live on these reservations are sovereign political entities, with their own police force and institutions for managing natural resources and other social needs. While they are largely impoverished, this is a result of conditions largely imposed upon them, in a manner similar to the colonial or neo-colonial Atlanticist model, and are not indicative of their innate abilities as a people (or ‘first peoples’).

When looking at ‘Native Americans’ or ‘first peoples’, there, in the US culture, is an all around sense of sympathy. It is a commonly held view that Native Americans have not had justice, and that the things which happened to them, and continue to happen, are wrongs which still must be righted. Here it will be important to continue to work with a new generation of tribal leaders who want to increase their people’s right to self determination in all spheres, sovereignty, and autonomy.

Conclusively then, we can now see where the areas of promising research and work on the subject are. The US faces a crisis in legitimacy, and the manner in which it is paradigmatically incapable of understanding the roots of these problems also creates certain opportunities. When we look at the number of people in the US who would like to have their state leave the US, and we look as well at the ethnic or racial demographic reality, the stark contradictions which characterize this aspect of the US alone are easily discernable.

THE ORGANIC PROCESS OF A 4PT IN THE UNITED STATES IN ACADEmia

When we understand a ‘Fourth Political Theory’, we understand the previous three - Liberalism, Socialism, and Fascism. Formally, the United States, unlike Europe and Eurasia, has only experienced the first. Socialism and Fascism are formally alien and European or Eurasian phenomenon (and ideas), which the US in formal terms cannot be said to have ever passed through. Upon more close examination, however, we can uncover the following: the US has maintained a formal framework within Liberalism, but there is more than this.
Indeed it still holds liberalism's primary values such as individualism/atomization, commercialism/materialism, and of course the strange combination of moral or ethical universalism and relativism (together). At the same time, its proponents and official advisors at the academic level, in each generation, were influenced in part by the developments occurring in Europe and Eurasia during the 19th and 20th century. Bonapartism had an influence on neo-federalism and neo-federalist drift; jumping forward a century, the rise of Socialism and Fascism also influenced (and indeed were influenced by) the concepts behind mass social organization and the related technical forms of mechanical and sociologic analysis (e.g. Weber, Marx, et al), useful to the maintenance and expansion of the Atlanticist project. This was seen in projects like Roosevelt’s Public Works Administration act of 1933, and the New Deal in general.

The 3PT in many ways came from a study of the US economy at the start of the Taylorist or Fordist period. Works like ‘The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State: 1900-1918’ by Weinstein also provide a coherent reference for understanding the incorporation or interpretation of Socialism and Fascism into an otherwise commonplace discourse on social organization and social progress. These occurred after the rise of Socialism (2PT) and before the rise of Fascism (3PT).

In that light, ‘progressivism’ from the same period as is covered by Weinstein’s work, can be seen as the American pragmatic metabolization of those deficiently modernist elements of Socialism and Fascism. Simultaneously, they also were a continuation of the ‘American System’ figures like Henry Clay and Jefferson Davis. ‘Progressive’ still to this day is the label which both radical liberals (left liberals) and liberal-communists (socialists, Marxians, etc.) use to describe themselves within the obfuscating mandates of politeness within Anglosphere political discourse.

In the US there are vulgarized forms of a nascent ‘Fourth Political Theory’ in academia, based in post-modernism, critical theory, and post-structuralism, already gaining prominence for some decades, coming to dominate the departments of philosophy at any number of the most ranked and prestigious universities. These have in some areas either surpassed or consumed the ‘analytic’ school.

It also acts as a kind of semi-affirmative response to Heidegger, through figures such as Marcuse and Camus (i.e. liberal-communist existentialism). Other students are introduced to Heidegger through Arendt. But at any rate, while problematic, it also demonstrates the framework for a common language and universe of ideas and concepts which, with the right efforts and direction, can be seen as a fertile ground for a more properly understood ‘Fourth Political Theory’. The ideas of Heidegger, as well as Husserl, Hölderlin (et al), are vigorously approached, even where in many sectors they are poorly defined or understood, and the views of Adorno and Marcuse are valued over Heidegger.

What does dominate, however, much of the US vulgar though nascent ‘4PT’ is a liberal (i.e. relativist) Nietzschean ‘transvaluation of all values’. While wrapped in liberal conceptions, there remains in sections of this milieu some very fertile ground. It is here that among US graduate students, young professors, TA’s, and lecturers - as opposed to mainly vetted and tenured professors - who have encountered A. Dugin and who already have begun to see him as a figure deserving attention. Because this represents the culmination of Continental European philosophy which was seen as the most appropriate way to approach a Cold-War mandated critique of Marxism, we now have in this period an unintended consequence, whereby mainstream institutions promoted the study of the Continental school at the expense of the Anglo Analytic school.

Simultaneously, Western Marxism was also, and in some areas is still, taught at the highest levels in US academia. Over the last several decades, many among the Marxians and Structuralists have become Post-Marxians and Post-Structuralists. Others have become ‘left-Nietzscheans’ in the image of Foucault, while others still have gravitated towards Soviet Marxism, and have become or remained “unreconstructed Marxists”. This next connection may be somewhat difficult for those not familiar with US academic and intellectualism. There was something of a flowering of Marxist and Structuralist academia and new interest which began vigorously in the 1960’s. At the same time that these pseudo-Leninists, Anarchists, etc. were nominally dedicated to a materialist view of history, epistemology, and ontology, there was also something else going on beneath the surface. There was also a significant increase in interest of the same milieu in Buddhism, Hinduism, “eastern philosophy”, Islam, and New Age. Based on their anti-liberalism and anti-imperialism, they were drawn to a center of resistance which appeared to be led either by the USSR or China. Simultaneously they were drawn to ideas which sought to redefine man’s relationship with modernity and
consumerism, and draw up a new interest in mysticism and esoterica. So in a number of ways this is and was similar to the milieus and circles which existed in Weimar Germany that gave rise to popular National Socialism; a simultaneous interest in questions like the mysteries surrounding human origin and human spiritual potential with a view towards the East, with an anti-capitalist and pro-socialist view of political-economy.

Furthermore, the influence of Marxism and the related ‘conflict theory’ in the field of sociology cannot be understated.

In many ways this was a product of the pro-market bend of the ‘Open Society’ initiative, which came to be dominated by Chicago school thinkers and writers. Karl Popper warned that it would be necessary to include liberal-socialist economic and political thinkers into this ‘Open Society’ as part of a broad liberal project, to include the US left and those associated with the Socialist (2nd) International. His warning was not heeded, and this contributed in part to the left/right polarization of academia, and helped to push those critical of market economics into the position they are today. This, in its own way, today can be seen favorably in that it will contribute to the conditions that will make a 4PT academic pole in the US possible.

While taking their ideas primarily from Continental philosophy, and as such being deeply immersed in Hegelianism and Existentialism, these are organically ‘American’ thinkers who already have publication networks and peer review journals, tenured positions within academia, with some considerable influence.

Entirely separately, and in a different direction, are the Analytic and Liberal philosophic schools. With some exceptions, such as communitarianism and analytic Marxism - both which challenge Rawls’ liberalism while still being modern - these are essentially liberal. Nevertheless, in this realm we encounter the primary Epicureanism which characterizes much of the foundational thinking in a truly US philosophy. There is less here that is obviously workable or compatible with developing a 4PT pole of attraction, but this should not be overlooked. Primarily because the core of US conservatism lies here, and in order to transcend the left/right paradigm means looking at where these ideas fit - from liberalism - and how these liberal ideas of the framers of the US constitution can be directed against the Atlanticist project. After all, there are any number of ideas contained here which are really not compatible with the Atlanticist project. The ‘universal’ liberalism is conceptually contained, of course, in the foundational discourse of the US project.

At the same time, concepts from the early 19th century, in J.S Mill such as ‘Experiments in Living’ can be seen as political-philosophical concepts which promoted federalism (today, confederalism) as opposed to a unitary state. These are anti-universal in nature, or rather, what is universal is ‘to each their own’. By ‘experiments’ Mill means really two things - heterogeneity or diversity, and independence or local sovereignty. Mill saw this valuable not simply in the liberal individual sense; giving rise to entrepreneurship, individual initiative and ingenuity, but between various towns, communities, and states. Anathema to him would be modern liberal universalism, which really puts an end to global diversity in living. Later, Mill would take more socialist views on economics, seeing the limitations of market economics when placed upon societies of scale.

The ideas of Mill, as well as Bentham and Locke, as well as of course Jefferson, (et al), really are not only compatible with a multi-polar vision of the world, but also hold the US accountable by the very same ideas and ideals which it claims to hold dear. These dig into liberal and its offshoot, libertarian thought, and can form of anti-imperial and multi-polar resistance to the Atlanticist project.

These ideas form some of the foundations of left-liberal, right-liberal, and libertarian thought today, which in many ways are alienated from the US radical left. Though both frameworks represent modernity - one bordering on pre-modern, the other bordering on post-modern - they are about equal in terms of adherents in the US, and both have significant influence on US political culture outside of what is represented in the mainstream, old media.

Taken together, what we have are the pieces required to forge a significant 4PT pole within US academia.

The political problem is that the US educational system is politically controlled by the dominant powers. So, it may be necessary to take a more radical course if it proves impossible to successfully penetrate the bureaucratic and political barriers. We have, however, some precedents to work from.

Contemporarily, we can see that Russia and Iran had been frustrated by their efforts to receive fair coverage
in the news-media within the US. Rather than push against this wall, they began initiatives - Russia Today and Press TV, respectively - to create English language news channels which both air on live television within the US. Similarly, in the past, in academia, we saw how the Frankfurt school was relocated out of Germany, and brought to the US at Columbia University once political conditions made their work too difficult.

Likewise, once (or, preventing this, before) a foothold can be established by a core group of supportive academics, a ‘NYU’ School or ‘UC’ School can be established, for example, in Belgrade, Tehran, or Moscow, with dissident professors. They would publish and hold conferences in English and would be American ex-patriots who form a nucleus of academic resistance. Their views, lectures, books, and articles, would be the focus of English language information distributed and projected across all mediums of new media.

**Basic Elements Which Frame the Present US Discourse**

In the practical political sphere within the US, there is not a struggle between liberalism and something else, but between two or three visions of liberalism. At the same time, there are kernels of something post-liberal and anti-modern within two of these. Presently there is simply a one party system with no opposition, and no mechanism for oppositional politics to positively influence the political outcome. This is the political system which now corresponds to a liberal form of capitalism which ignores or pretends to ignore sociologic formulae, and proceeds to give (or burden) all responsibility for the outcome of a person’s life on the ‘individual’. Politically, this one party has two faces - one Democrat, the other Republican. On the fringes of these parties however, both on the radical anti-capitalist ‘left’, and on the paleo-conservative, libertarian, and constitutionalist ‘right’, there is potential for a fertile ground as well. The area of mutual agreement which these two fringes have, which are otherwise apparently at odds, has grown rapidly and enlarged considerably over the last fifteen years. If we were date this, the “9-11” phenomenon might be seen as a starting point of this growth and enlargement of the agreement zone, if depicted on a Venn diagram.

It is, of course something to consider that ‘left’ and ‘right’ relate to the power of big businesses (corporations), the never ending wars (military imperialism and military industrial complex), the decline of living conditions (collapse of the middle class), and the erasure of constitutional rights in areas of speech, political association, privacy, and the consumerism and celebrity oriented culture.

There is another sphere of problems which both are in agreement about, but use entirely different terminology to explain, and assign different causes and solution to said problems. But this ought not be a source of frustration, but yet one that would require further work. These relate to the role of markets and even as to what the very purpose of society is. The radical left in the US has a conception of what the purpose of society is, which is closer to how Eurasianists view the question, in that it contains a criticism of liberalism and modernity.

There really is no 3PT pole in the US whatsoever, not beyond some exoticist following confined to virtual spaces, and with no influence at all on the political discourse. Europeans and Eurasianists often make the mistake of thinking there is one, because there are some racist or segregationist type groups, but these are purely identity based. Their view of society and economics is purely liberal in every sense. They are liberal racists. Their fascination with the Third Reich, in such cases, is based primarily upon television documentaries which present perspectives not only distorted in content, but fixated upon symbolism, military hardware as it relates to this, and aesthetics in general. Their numbers are extremely small, and the lack of academics, intellectuals, supporters, popular support, or even individuals capable of organizing has been well known and documented for decades. Anyone familiar with, for instance, the National Renaissance Party, is abundantly clear about the prospects of this sort of initiative.

Furthermore, it does not behoove a European or Eurasian 4PT supporter to make political alliance with this irrelevant milieu. From a public relations perspective, this can only result in extreme marginalization, and a total inability to ever gain real or meaningful traction. It also makes unworkable the tacit alliance with Latin American ‘National Communism’ such as Bolivarianism. The issues in the US of race, or even immigration, are not similar enough to its European version to warrant a similar approach. African Americans are not immigrants to the US, and were brought against their will, only to be subject to any number of well documented conditions. The
The Disintegration of the United States

Joaquin Flores

historic Anglo enforcers of white rule in the US are not indigenous to the US, and are not ‘defending’ the land from ‘foreigners’. The Native Americans and Mexicans, however, are the indigenous people. This obvious fact is not lost upon anyone seriously involved on any level in the US in bringing down the US Empire. This should not be misinterpreted as anything else, however. Given the mobility of the middle class in terms of choosing where to live, and given that in the US culture it is the norm to settle in a place other than where one is born or has family, there are few reasons to live in one place as opposed to another.

What we find that people choose to live in communities and parts of towns where the people bear a phenotypic resemblance to themselves. Given the phenomenon of ‘white flight’ in the 1960’s, where whites moved from cities into suburban areas as well as new developments and towns, combined with self-segregation, we are presented with reasons why in fact ‘White Nationalism’ (understood separately from 3P) has never taken hold in the US: people self-selected their neighbors, and the pressures are not really present.

**Popular Resistance to the Atlanticist Project - Americans are Socialists and Libertarians**

The main popular poles of resistance in the US are, on the radical ‘left’ - not to be confused with liberal left intelligentsia and gatekeepers; rather we look at the hard-line communists and to a lesser extent socialists and anarchists; and on the ‘right’ it is the Libertarians and Constitutionalsists, and to a lesser extent the paleo-conservatives and the militia-movement (which are respectively related to the former two). Both of these categories each represent many tens of millions of individuals.

Quantifiable evidence for both of these claims rests in this: In 2011 a scientific poll was conducted by the reputable Rasmussen polling agency [3], which found that 11% of all ‘Americans’ believed this:

“11% Say Communism Better Than U.S. System of Politics and Economics”.

As 80% of ‘Americans’ are adults in a population of 320 million, the number supporting Communism today stands at about 26.5 million. Another reputable scientific polling agency, Gallup, reported in 2010 that 36% (of an adult population), or 92 million, of all Americans had a positive view of Socialism, from which we can infer, would otherwise identify as ‘Socialists’ [4].

On the libertarian end, we are also able to quantify. Ron Paul ran on a purely Libertarian platform but as a Republican in the 2012 primaries, and came in fourth place, receiving about 2.1 million votes [5]. This process was widely understood to be have been rigged against Paul, and in a manner not too different from previous electoral riggings in the US, may have in fact been robbed. The Cato Institute however sheds some more light on this question with their study. They find that about a minimum of 14% of ‘Americans’ are Libertarian, with as many as 44% [6]. That gives us between roughly 30 million and 110 million, out of the universe of US adults, being 256 million.

What this means is that the formalized political system, represented nominally by Democrats on the center-left and Republicans on the center-right have a monopoly on a political process that actually does not represent the fundamentally socialist and libertarian nature of the US population. Communists and socialists are largely compelled to vote for Democrats, and Libertarians and Constitutionalsists are largely compelled to vote for Republicans. Separately, Anglo culture focuses on a passive aggressive form of politeness, and in public spaces it is rare for Americans do state their real views, under fear of passive judgment and concealed ostracization. Privately they will call themselves communists/socialists or libertarians/constitutionalists, but in public you will hear the terms, respectively, ‘progressive’ and ‘conservative’, even though they know they are essentially concealing their real view.

How we can interpret this data, is another matter, which will require further research. To wit, a majority of socialists and libertarians at present have a prevailing modernist and liberal worldview. Nevertheless, what we can understand better is what we are working with and working from. A 4PT approach in the US may begin with a Venn diagram of things which are common to 4PT and Socialism, and 4PT and Libertarianism. Furthermore, the anti-imperialist angle and the deconstruction of the Atlanticist Empire are by and large shared values among both libertarians and socialists.

On the outset, we can already begin to see a sketch of the sort of memetic campaign that would be required to popularize 4PT ideas within the US. Naturally, a 4PT permutation from within the US would have to entire-
ly reconsider Liberalism, and ultimately do away with most of its features. At the same time, some of the views and values of ‘Americans’, and even a few root concepts in Liberalism, are salvageable. Thus, we may see in a post-Liberal and post-Atlanticist US something very loosely analogous in the US to how Russia has today metabolized the Soviet experience.

The United States may need to deconstruct, and if it ever re-establishes as a power, that it is a land-power or continental power. A new covenant or contract with its old parts would need to be made, based on a different understanding of itself, its past, and the various ‘nations’ living in its different former parts. The process of US ethnogenesis is likely to be a long one, and it is more likely that the political project will fail, leading to contraction, centuries before ethnogenesis can take place. Given the unknowable future of technology and other developments, it is questionable if this ethnogenesis will ever take place. What seems more certain to be on the near-term agenda, is a deconstructed United States which will see a conversion into distinct zones better suited to the majority populations of each part. The forms this takes, naturally, are still unclear, whether they will nominally call themselves the US or not is not knowable, nor is it entirely fundamental.

Divisions of race and class in the US, combined with a liberal ideology which can no longer provide meaning, coupled with a sinking economic model, means that a significant change is on the horizon. These changes create the possibility for a Fourth Political Theory of some kind to take the place of the late Liberal theory which is failing today.

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EUROPE’S FUTURE: AT THE CROSSROADS OF EASTERN RELATIONS AND WESTERN FALL

Márton Gyöngyösi

These are historic times for Europe. The events of recent months have clearly revealed the fault lines and shown the different paths which had been barely analysed or even mentioned in academic political and economic essays so far. In Hungary, the so-called “Eastern Opening” policy has been known for the general public as well as politicians and academic research groups due to the rise of China, India or Turkey and the decline of the United States’ power. However, the question has become one of the most pressing issues of the present, not the distant future. It has been increasingly obvious that we are facing the war of two world orders.

Emerging powers have become real challengers of the old establishment. The ongoing war between them and their respective backers has economic, political as well as important philosophical and cultural aspects. Not only are we witnessing the emergence of new powers, we can also observe a significant conceptual difference between the United States and its European allies, the advocates of liberal democracy and their challengers, who build upon traditional values. It is clear that the two approaches can no longer tolerate each other within their own spheres of influence, the transitional period will soon conclude and a new world order will be established. What kind of new world order is it going to be, and where can we find its roots?

FROM A BIPOLAR WORLD TO THE FALL OF NEOLIBERALISM

It was a long road from the organic world order to the current situation. Throughout human history, the powers of Earth were typically organized into a multipolar system. However, the 20th century brought about a completely new situation: the political and military dominance of the two superpowers created a new, bipolar system, and the hegemons of each pole divided the whole world into two. The two forces were trying to achieve a monopoly in their own respective territories so that their political, social and economic systems could be the only long-lasting and sustainable one, which all other societies would eventually have to adopt.

In this particular aspect, both approaches, i.e. communism and liberal democracy were quite similar: both of them were characterized by an intensive presence of messianism, an unshakeable belief in having the best possible system and a complete lack of understanding the idea that different societies could develop along different courses. However, the existing form of communism has become obsolete by the 1990s, leading to the collapse of the part of the communist block which was directly controlled by the Soviet Union. For a brief historic moment, it seemed that the liberal West had won, and a monopolar world order could be established.
The arrogance of the liberal democratic block led by the United States of America was quite clearly demonstrated when it was heralding the end of all real power struggles in the world and the monopoly of the Western, Euro-Atlantic world order, drawing inspiration from Marxism’s concept of linear history and class struggle. Western think tanks seem to have fully believed the platitudes of their own propaganda machine. In their arrogance, they imagined that the fall of communism would enable them to subdue the whole world in an everlasting monopolistic system centred around the US and the West.

However, the downsides of the liberals’ overwhelming optimism in the 90’s were soon uncovered. The religious and ethnic conflicts breaking out over the ruins of the communist block and the economic failures of the post-communist countries were the first signs to show that a considerable part of the world is unable to adopt the neoliberal doctrines. Such new powers as Russia, China, India, Brazil or South Africa, which emerged in the first decade of the millennium, clearly demonstrated that not only were they unable to toe the monopolistic Washington line, but they were not willing to do so, either.

**Transition into a Multipolar World Order: War or Peace?**

As I wrote above, the nature of the current transition is not merely political. The reasons for the decline of the Euro-Atlantic world and liberal democracy do not exclusively lie in the inability of the United States and its close allies to continue financing their role as the world’s policemen (although it is a substantial reason indeed), but in the deep intellectual crisis of the West. Perhaps this intellectual burnout was the most difficult factor for Western ideologists and political leaders to comprehend and digest.

Western philosophy, which had abandoned medieval traditionalism and relied more and more heavily on Anglo-Saxon imperialism as the global colonization process advanced, has always been intolerant of other civilisations. Regardless of historical eras and ideologies, it established an ego- and West-centred belief system, according to which the imperialist European powers were not only waging wars for material gains, but they conducted a messianic civilisational struggle to deliver culture to the “barbarian peoples”. The enslavement of South American, Asian or African nations was presented as a cultural mission for the people of the Western countries.

The tyranny of the self-important Western world reached its peak upon the collapse of the colonial system. Raising the banner of liberal democracy and denying their own nationalist past and national “grandeur” derived from the exploitation of others, the former colonizers dealt the cards again, hiding behind “human rightism” this time. Offering the false promise of freedom, they created dysfunctional, religiously and ethnically divided countries behind unrealistic, arbitrarily drawn borders. Thus they sowed the seeds of war and instability in Africa as well as the Arab world for several decades. They seemingly pulled out, but they continued to blackmail the elites they had put into power, never failing to apply the principle of “divide and rule”. A typical sign of their arrogance is that they regularly accuse other countries of being undemocratic and call them to account for Western values, even though these countries have been living according to the norms of a completely different civilisation. Moreover, many of them were deprived of a chance for democratic development due to the Western powers’ prior actions to incite internal tensions and immorally support local oligarchs.

On a geopolitical scale, Western strategy has hardly changed since the age of colonization. Back then they achieved their goals through invasions, openly boasting about their modern nationalism. Now they are doing so by way of political arm-twisting with the help of propaganda machines, non-governmental organisations and foundations functioning as agents to incite coups d’état and revolutions. The outcome is the same: trampling upon the sovereignty of states, gobbling up countries and subjugating them into their sphere of influence.

Although the nationalist crest was soon repainted, it is still a question whether the seemingly liberalized West can truly abandon its narrow-minded approach and its delusions of grandeur and perfection. These two questions may be of key importance in the next few years. There are two reasons for that.

One is the intellectual decline mentioned above. Western liberalism has drifted so much apart from its own roots and the reality by now that its anti-traditional and anti-family approach as well as the promotion of deviant behaviours has created societies that are incapable of self-sustenance. Immigration issues and the deterioration of the celebrated multiculturalism into an underlying internal war of civilisations both derive from the fact that Western European and North American societies are unsustainable without immigrants, but
the valuelessness of these societies prevent them from being able to integrate foreigners.

The other reason is that the new challengers clearly see the decline of the West and they know that the token of their own rise lies in confronting the Western culture which has staggered to the brink of annihilation by depriving itself from all high values. Russia, China, or even the successful states of the Arab world are quite aware that a solid future can only be built upon the foundations of their own national cultures. More and more non-Western countries and societies have woken up and begun to question the world order brought about by the end of the cold war. In the meantime, their economic, political, social and military achievements justify their scepticism about Euro-Atlantism.

So the transition is knocking at our doors. Emerging non-liberal powers have already appeared in the scene and have been strikingly successful. The ever-shrinking US-centred block is constantly losing key positions. The question is whether they realize that they have lost their privileged, monopolistic status and that they would have to withdraw behind a sustainable border. If they do, will they accept a new status quo or continue to defend their declining empire “to the last bullet”? Their attitude will define whether the transition can be peaceful or not.

**Jobbik’s Evaluation of a Changing World**

In spite of being European, Hungary is one of the countries that have suffered the most from the arrogance of great Western powers. Today’s Hungary and Central Europe still bear the consequences of the narrow-minded Western approach up to this day. The Trianon Pact, which concluded World War I, was devised by the same powers that are the spearheads of liberal democracy to-day. These powers crushed an organic structure based on the traditions of a millennium. The territory of Hungary, which had been the key to regional stability until the early 20th century, was split up in order to create artificial state formations. It is not hard to realize that Central Europe’s internal conflicts are mostly rooted in this act: conflict-ridden makeshift country formations were in fierce rivalry with each other, exposed to the mercy of the great powers. Eventually, when they could not be held together any longer, they disintegrated.

In spite of the above, Hungary has canonized the subservient support of Western and Euro-Atlantic interests. Although Hungary’s national wealth was stolen under the aegis of privatization, which is considered as the cornerstone of neoliberal economic policy, and then the remaining industry was destroyed by forcing us to turn our backs on the post-Soviet region, and then we were required to abandon the Hungarian communities living outside our borders, yet the Hungarian governments, regardless of their ideological stance or the parties forming them, remained dedicated followers of Euro-Atlantism.

Established in 2003, Jobbik Movement for a Better Hungary was the only political force to confront this idea. Jobbik announced a completely new political agenda and emphasized the importance of Eastern opening, opposing the value-deprived West. Jobbik was the only party to realize and state that Western liberalism would complete the nation’s economic destruction, which would then be followed by cultural, demographic and linguistic annihilation unless we change the direction of our foreign policy.

Undoubtedly, Jobbik was the party to include the criticism of the Euro-Atlantic power axis in the public discourse as well as to represent a new aspect which centred around the protection of Hungarian sovereignty and the open representation of our national interests. Due to the reasons detailed above, this policy can only be implemented if it is coupled with a foreign policy of Eastern opening.

We have been representing these values in the Hungarian Parliament since 2010, and our efforts were not in vain. Although Jobbik has been working as an opposition party so far, we have grown into the second largest political force and were able to exercise sufficient pressure on Fidesz-led governments to consider, albeit half-heartedly, the ideology represented by Eastern emerging countries.

**Fighting Against the Propaganda Machine**

Of course, it has never been easy to accomplish the mission undertaken by Jobbik. Backed by seemingly unlimited funds, the Western propaganda machine has spared no effort to contain us. The reason behind our stigmatization has been obvious: while we were accused of racism, nearly all Western countries have experienced the rise and popularity of truly xenophobic forces. However, their Euro-Atlantic commitment has always protected them from the revenge of liberal propaganda. Meanwhile, Jobbik was constantly under attack, not for its alleged extremism but for its criticism of the West.
The greatest challenge for us currently is to get rid of manipulation and misinformation as well as to plant a new voice in the public discourse against the monopolistic views of Euro-Atlantism. The ongoing Ukrainian conflict was the grounds for us to do so. Jobbik was the only Hungarian political force to speak out for the rights of ethnic minorities living in Ukraine and to condemn the genocidal leadership of Kiev. While the other parties either remained silent or, betraying the ethnic Hungarian community of the Lower Carpathians, kept repeating pro-Kiev Western slogans, Jobbik called public attention to what was really at stake in Ukraine. The stakes are high: to extend Western hegemony over the territory of Ukraine and to provoke the emerging Russia and force the country into an open conflict. We felt it was our duty to voice our clear opinion about this issue. It was not only the concern for the Hungarians of the Lower Carpathians that prompted us to do so. It was obvious for us that there is more at stake for us than the future of great powers: our region, Central Europe and even the entire continent may suffer great losses if the United States manages to destroy our relationship with Russia.

**EUROPE AND RUSSIA BELONG NEXT TO EACH OTHER**

Contrary to the statements of US-controlled propaganda, Europe and Russia belong next to each other. Europe is not complete without Russia while Russia as a European power cannot turn away from Europe. Especially because Europe is in trouble.

The Western part of the European continent is controlled by the European Union, a conglomerate serving Washington’s interests. This organization is working relentlessly on depriving our continent from all the values that shaped it into what it is now. Europe is Americanized at an astounding pace: it is losing its roots and it is deteriorating from a community of national states into a pastless and futureless community of rootless consumers disowning their own nations. Albeit unconsciously, Central Europe still stands in defiance of this trend, but the region has no more powers left to openly confront liberal destruction. Of all European countries, Russia is the only one that has the necessary economic, military and political authority. Therefore it is Russia’s historical duty to set Europe back on the track of traditions.

Of course, it is not only an intellectual interdependence. Europe relies on Russia in strategic and energy related issues as well. While the idea of Europe without the United States is conceivable, Russia is indispensable for our continent. After the unnatural dividedness of the cold war, the United States now intends to create a new dividedness in order to isolate Russia from its natural environment, while also keeping Europe in a state of unilateral dependency.

The political agenda currently followed by most European countries is absurd, since the anti-Russia sanctions are contrary to their own interests. They cause enormous damage to their own economies, rendering themselves even more vulnerable to the United States. If the countries of the European Union do not intend to perish as American puppets, they must realize that the division of our continent is unnatural and is caused by the machinations of an external force.

Jobbik is taking on the mission to influence the current government of Hungary in such a way that enables our country to meet what is perhaps the greatest European challenge of the 2010s. That is to shake up the continent and make Europe realize: It is not going to work without Russia.
THE FIGHT FOR UKRAINE AND THE FOURTH POLITICAL PARADIGM

Orazio Maria Gnerre

For years, in certain circles, there is an assumption of a necessity to overcome the pre-existing political categories in favour of a new definition, which has been driven forward. This is an historical necessity, so it is fundamental to understand the structural nature, in order to become aware of the new political background in which we will have to take our place, to choose the field and determine the scope of the battle.

Such an assumption recognizes in the age of postmodern politics – today’s post-democratic phase – the terminological and narrative failing of categories such as Right or Left and the opportunity to formulate a new political paradigm, which could propose a theoretical line and a strategic path for one of the two poles of the new political antagonism.

The facts of EuroMaidan, the annexation of Crimea to the Russian Federation and the declaration of independence of Donbass, followed by the foundation of the statehood of Novorussia, have shown clearly this necessity, in particular thanks to the claptrap of particular cultural representatives of different political affiliations, who have quickly demonstrated how their arguments are unfounded, based only on the fruitless preservation of outdated political-strategical forms.

It is appropriate to highlight how our battle, on the basis of the constitution of a new political paradigm and in the context of a new polarisation, is eminently narrative. Our war must be on the front of the Sense. Our duty is to raise the ancient, wrinkled banners, which lie in the mud of the abandoned battlefield, in order to give them new lustre and renewed vigour.

TOWARDS A NEW HORIZON OF THE CONFLICT

Let’s take the the more forceful and evident opposition between communitarian and (neo)liberal tendencies in place of the failing of the polarisation of the Right-Left as a starting point of our discussion. This acknowledges an understanding of the present time, and moves towards a formulation of a coherent political theory which could be historic in its leading to the political principles of every subject who is interested in taking part to a new political conflict.

It is inside this oppositional system that must be placed the old political narration, with a particular attention to the principles which have founded them. It is important to establish how in the communitarianist sector – and also in the liberal one – each today converge already different political identities, which are often characterized by deeply different stories, (theoretical or material) fights for the exclusive control of certain (narrative or physical) strategic sectors.
The main problem, for those who identify themselves in the communitarian field, is the lack of that cohesion which, on the contrary, is typical of the liberal one. This, thanks to its own view of the world where the concept of Value has to be found in its tangible manifestation of commodity-form, manages to secure a more quickly reformulation of its own identity, on the basis of the pure interest. On the contrary, the communitarianist sector hasn’t already identified itself as such. The pursuit of views of the world which are, if not similar, definitely compatible, has not brought all those representatives of the different narrations – who should meet each other on the common field of the Communitarianism – to the recognition of the new political horizon. At best, particular groups which are part of these sectors have undertaken a necessary path of theoretical vanguard aimed at recognizing the historical necessity, regrettably moving forward only in parallel towards the same aims. In these conditions the strategic battle could be lost, and the risk is the historical realization of the neoliberal Absolute. We cannot let that happen.

It is in this respect that the formulation of a new political paradigm becomes necessary for the communitarianist pole, just as much as neoliberalism has found its own identification in the proposition of the realization of the Absolute Capitalism. This political theory must allow above all the identification in it of all those who are part of a political identity which is substantially communitarianist. The duty of the new political theory will be absolutely inclusive, in order to allow the realization of various narrations basically communitarianist in a unique Absolute. In order to do so, it is necessary to declare open war to the Language, the prison of the Meaning, through its reformulation and the aesthetic experiential demonstration.

It is the Absolute Capitalism the first which has reformulated the language in a consumerist and commercialized way, having previously imposed itself experientially thanks to the unleashed wildness in the anthropological profile of the consumer-man. While the Absolute Capitalism is ahead of the communitarianist front regarding the categorization of the historical necessity, the conquest of the souls through the experiential demonstration of its own magnificence and the colonization of the collective imagination through the creation/manipulation of the language, it has also taken several steps towards its grave and its historical exhaustion.

It is necessary to set the absolute pragmatism of the neoliberal interest – appearing today in the form of the Absolute Capitalism, the Capital in its virtual and ideal phase – against the consubstantiation of the historical communitarianist narrations inside the new political paradigm. In this case the common field is to be found in all those narrations which affirm the iniquity of the present situation, the necessity of its overturning, the total reintegration of the Man in its fullness and the end of its historical alienation. Ultimately, the base of foundation of the new political theory must be established on the comprehension of the communitarianist pole as effectively founded on those excluded by society: by the world’s view, by the method of liberal-capitalist production, or by those who are discontent about it, and those that the Italian philosopher Costanzo Preve called the holders of the “unhappy conscience”.

By considering our age as the victory of the Capital (which has become “absolute” – at least nominally – and almost all-encompassing) becomes evident that every excluded (economically, ideologically or existentially) from the worst of all possible worlds turns to be a potential interlocutor and alley of the new political theory within the communitarianist pole.

The new theory, as said by Alexander Dugin, must propose as fundamental aims the assurance of the Peoples’ rights (Peoples understood as communities of Destiny) and an omnidirectional and polycentric approach, based on the coexistence of the same People, of pathways of civilization, cultures, historical narrations and world views, geopolitical poles, which can ensure basically the right to diversity.

**Ukraine 2014: Casus Belli Ideologicus**

As it has been said in the introduction, it is in the tragic Ukrainian crisis of 2014, now in its most dramatic phase, that we find the litmus test of our thesis. The fact has struck fear in the political perspective of the majority of the “anti-system” European political sectors, which are surely the less far-reaching. All it took was a taste of the fourth generation war technique, in order to confuse the ideas of the heirs of those of noble political backgrounds.

That is the case, in particular, of the European Far-Right and Far-Left movements, which, far from being two monolithic blocs with divergent interests, are actually purely nominal entities, constituted by very different identities and strategies. They are divided in several
weak and often self-referential groups which testify, basically, the progressive depoliticisation of these circles, which are now only “areas” of identitarian membership, real parodistic communities sailing in the turbulence of the liquid modernity.

In the interpretative and failing stagnation, which has had a worthy forerunner during the Arab riots, the main thesis brought up by both the parts has been the definition of the Ukrainian conflict in terms of the inter-imperialistic conflict, such as confrontation between the North American and the Russian imperialisms: the confrontation of the relative opposite interests such as in the age of the national selfishness.

The fact that the thesis has been shared both by the radical Right and the radical Left shows an undeniable element: the thesis has been expressed not by virtue of the professed political ideologies and different narrations, but as remnant of an age which has started at the end of the XIX century and has ended with the end of the second global conflict, the age of the imperialisms.

Inside the same interpretative paradigm, which the Ukrainian case wants as the opposition between two different imperialisms, radical Left and radical Right have answered at the same time according to their own ideological orientation: at best they have decided to abstain from taking position, at worst they have taken the stand in favour of the mass of manoeuvre which works – more or less consciously – for the North American interests.

On the contrary it is in the proposal of the new political theory (the fourth one after the affirmation of the historical liberalism, of its social-communist antithesis and its fascist synthesis) that we find clarity of analysis in relation to the eminently communitarianist intents which has to be prosecuted.

Located in the context of the transition from the unipolar world lead by the USA, which represents geopolitically the formal realization of the interests of the Absolute Capitalism in its financial and cosmopolitan form, to a multipolar world, or rather divided in predominantly autonomous big spaces of regional integration which match with the areas of historical civilization and placed on the same level in a stable balance of power, the interest of the communitarianist faction must be in favour of a multipolar global asset. Having taken note of the effectiveness of the globalization put into action by the Technique (penultimate form of nihilistic force before the Economy), the conscious alternative to the monopoly of the Capital's strength, to the destruction of the local specificity such as ethnic groups, religions and societies, to the anthropological dehumanisation put in action by the process of completion of the liberal hybris, to the definitive realization of the global market, is only the multipolar alternative.

The realization of the great geopolitical spaces, already desired by the prophets of the German geopolitical school, will represent the collapse of the global liberal hegemony, by now without its livelihood, the global market, and of its strategic force, the North American control above the destiny of the world. It is clear that the affirmation of the communitarianist sector will depend by the realization of the multipolar alternative: it will determine the end of the predominance of the financial capital, a step towards the realization of the worker's society and the affirmation of the cultural diversity, which rebuilt differences and traditions.

If we assume that the path which leads the Peoples to the affirmation of a global balance based on the coexistence and the dialogue of civilizations must be the starting point in the interest of the communitarianist sector, the critic must be directed towards the old conception which still sees the opposition on the international chessboard of different national imperialisms. The fact of the matter is that the age of the imperialisms has been quickly replaced by Yalta since the age of the bipolar opposition and, even more quickly, by the raise of the unique North American imperialism at the beginning of the '90es, with the collapse of the Soviet bloc. To speak of inter-imperialistic conflict by using the Leninist formula – suitable for the first global conflict – in the age of the achievement of the global imperialism means to use schemes which before were effective, but now are out of time. Now on the chessboard we will see only the hegemonic imperialism, the sub-imperialisms of certain Countries and the opposition represented by the BRICS and the non-aligned Countries.

Who says to want to defend the interests of the workers or the traditions of the different Peoples must take that into consideration. There is no other possibility for the workers inside the mechanisms of the financial capitalism, promoted within the Euro-Atlantic security sector, among precarious work, deindustrialisation, delocalisation. And the same can be said for the traditions and the identities if not inside a multipolar world, where Peoples
and Nations could be protected inside the big regional integrations of the great geopolitical spaces.

Today, the battle for Ukraine doesn’t only represents a battle for Russia. The battle for Ukraine is a battle for a multipolar world. The deepest principles of the historical politics about Work and Self-determination of Peoples are now continuing thanks to the resistance of Donbass. To confuse the militants of the Right Sector with the representatives of the national identity is as serious as not to understand the necessity for the workers to stand with the emerging economies of the BRICS, with their alternative economical models. Now the true patriots understand that the battle for Ukraine is also their battle against the North Atlantic advancement towards the Heart of the Continent, such as the miners of Donbass already fight and die for the true independence, the independence from a government which plans to launch the worst measures of austerity and sell-off of the sovereignty, following a post-democratic and anti-popular model of technocracy, which Western Europeans already know very well.

The fight in Ukraine is the fight against the Absolute Capitalism, towards a multipolar world. In order to win, the enemy has used above all the weapon of confusion, by using our words, our symbols, our ideas. We’ve seen too much. The imperative for all the defenders of the communitarianist principles, addressed to a new political perspective, is to know the truth, in order to transform the world. To fight as communitarists, or to live as slaves. The choice is up to you.
FINANCIAL SOVEREIGNTY AS THE PREREQUISITE FOR POLITICAL SOVEREIGNTY AND CULTURAL REGENERATION

Kerry Bolton

Unless a nation-state has control over its own banking and financial system talk of national sovereignty whether by a movement or by a government is empty. Yet the banking sector is something that is eschewed today by many movements and thinkers as somehow outside the realm of concern whether by the Left or the Right. Indeed, the Left seldom addressed the matter, and still refrains from doing so, content with trite slogans about taxation and property nationalisation. As the socialist movement has shown, nationalisation means little and often nothing as far as securing financial and hence political sovereignty. Often a so-called ‘state bank’ such as the New Zealand Reserve Bank or the Bank of England, and many others, gives the appearance of financial sovereignty. In reality, it does nothing of the sort. A state bank such as those that have long been common in the social democracies, merely serves as the means by which the state borrows from private and usually international, financial sectors.

During the Great Depression central banks were promoted as a panacea for booms and busts and to secure financial and economic stability. While Paul Warburg of the Warburg international banking dynasty, had previously drafted the bill for the USA’s Federal Reserve Bank, and this was promoted as being a ‘state bank’, during the early 1930s Otto Niemeyer of the Bank of England toured the British Empire promoting the idea of central banks like the Bank of England. These would be based on private bond holders. In New Zealand the Reserve Bank was created in 1933. This bank, like all such central banks, however, merely served as the state’s medium for borrowing from private sources. Harvard and Georgetown historian, Dr Carroll Quigley, close to governing circles, stated the purpose of these central banks as being ‘to form a single financial system on an international scale which manipulated the quantity and flow of money so that they were able to influence, if not control, governments on one side and industries on the other’.

Congressman Louis T McFadden, who had for ten years served as Chairman of the US Congressional Banking and Currency Committee, and had been a banker himself, exposed the nature of the Federal Reserve System and the operations of the international debt-finance system in speeches before US Congress. In 1932 McFadden stated in the House concerning the Federal Reserve Bank:

This evil institution has impoverished and ruined the people of these United States, has bankrupted itself, and has practically bankrupted our Government. It has done this through the defects of the law under which it operates, through the maladministration of that law by the Fed and through the corrupt practic-

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es of the moneyed vultures who control it. Some people think that the Federal Reserve Banks are United States Government institutions. They are private monopolies which prey upon the people of these United States for the benefit of themselves and their foreign customers; foreign and domestic speculators and swindlers; and rich and predatory money lenders.¹

NEW ZEALAND EXPERIENCE

In 1936 the New Zealand Labour Government nationalised the Reserve Bank, bought out the private bondholders and made the bank the instrument of state policy. As mentioned, nationalisation by itself, however, means little or nothing, if such a state bank merely acts as the state medium for borrowing privately created credit, and thereby merely sustains accumulated debt to the international banking system. The First New Zealand Labour Government was voted into office mainly on the issue of banking. Unlike today, the masses of people understood banking and financial issues far more deeply than our present economists and academics. The Great Depression gave impetus for a worldwide demand for banking reform, prior to which practical men such as Major C H Douglas in Britain, who formulated the theory of Social Credit, and even prior to him the inventor Arthur Kitson; Gottfried Feder in Germany, who campaigned for the ‘breaking of the slavery of interest’;² and Silvio Gessell in Austria, developed their ideas on banking reform which were widely accepted.

The New Zealand’s Labour Government was among the most successful in its banking reforms, mainly thanks to the iconic Labour politician John A Lee, a one-armed war veteran who was determined to keep Labour at its word, despite the attempts at compromise by orthodox Fabians such as Minister of Finance Walter Nash. From 1933, after the Labour Party Conference, the party adopted a policy for the full and total control of the ‘nation’s financial machinery’. Lee pointed out that in other countries (Britain and Australia) where Labour had assumed Office, they had declined to take such steps in regard to the financial machinery, and their polices in dealing with the Depression had come to nothing.³ In the nine points on finance that came out of the 1933 Party Conference, the first demanded ‘immediate control by the State of the entire banking system. The State to have sole authority for the issue of credit and currency’. The issue of credit would be based upon the productive needs of the country.⁴

The Bank’s function set out in Section 1 of the Reserve Bank Act was to ‘regulate and control credit and currency in New Zealand’ for the ‘economic and social welfare of New Zealand’ The Bank would underwrite any loan the Government desired to raise, and Treasury was empowered to borrow from the Reserve Bank the complete amount of estimated revenue for the year. The Bank also had complete control over the ownership of sterling exchange, which Lee explained was of ‘vital importance’ in controlling the ‘international movement of gangster financial capital that can occur in times of political emergency’ and can ‘raid a country’s external credit’. Subsection 3, Clause 18 of the Act gave the Government authority over the operations of the trading banks, and they were to be audited by the State.⁵

New Zealand’s success was most evident and longest lasting in the creation of Reserve Bank state credit, issued at 1% interest, for the funding of the state housing programme. Not only did this programme provide stoutly-built houses at low rentals on quarter acre sections, where it was customary for families to grow their own vegetable gardens, and often to keep poultry, but the building and spin-off work on this one programme found work for 75% of New Zealand’s unemployed. A massive injection of state credit into the economy meant that there was no debt accrued by the state or the people, and that it was done moreover without causing inflation.

The Reserve Bank also issued the dairy industry low-interest state credit, and the profits that were made by the State on these advances were placed back into a Consolidated Fund for farming.⁶

In a Government document ‘State Housing in New Zealand’ the project was explained as follows:

¹ Louis T McFadden, United States Congressional Record, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 10 June 1932, p. 12595.  
² G Feder, ‘Manifesto for the Breaking of the Bondage of Interest’, Munich 1917. That as also the year Douglas formulated Social Credit. Feder stated that ‘money is not and must not be anything but an exchange of labour’.  
⁴ Ibid., p. 3.  
⁵ Ibid., pp. 6-7.  
Reserve Bank Credit: To finance its comprehensive proposals, the Government adopted the somewhat unusual course of using Reserve Bank credit, thus recognising that the most important factor in housing costs is the price of money – interest is the heaviest portion in the composition of ordinary rent. The newly created Department [Ministry of Works] was able therefore to obtain the use of funds at the lowest possible rate of interest, the rate being 1% for the first £10 million advanced, and one and a half percent on further advances. The sums advanced by the Reserve Bank were not subscribed or underwritten by other financial institutions. This action shaped the Government’s intention to demonstrate that it is possible for the State to use the country’s credit in creating new assets for the country. This pioneering measure by the Labour Government, funding a large state construction project entirely with state credit, succeeded without accompanying inflation or any other adverse side-effects that orthodox economists insist would result.\(^1\)

New Zealand was not the first nor the last nation to inaugurate a sovereign banking system, albeit of short duration. In Alberta, Canada, at the same time a Social Credit party came to Office, and despite being obstructed at every occasion by the Courts, issued ‘Prosperity Certificates’.\(^2\) Previously a similar scheme had been tried in the small town of Woergle, Austria, and by so doing this community got itself out of destitution, but was then obliged to discontinue its ‘scrip’ by central Government, and went back to destitution.\(^3\) During the 1930s communities across the USA issued their own local ‘scrip’. Although it is not politically or academically expedient to say so, Germany, Italy and Japan all overcame the Depression by bringing banking under state control and issuing state credit for public works. They undertook on a large scale what New Zealand undertook on a limited scale.\(^4\)

The miracle that was Peron’s Argentina was achieved in significant measure by the Peronist understanding that national sovereignty cannot be achieved without economic sovereignty. That in turn is a primary prerequisite for the Peronist goal of social justice as the unifying factor for any genuine nation. Peron had stated, ‘In the capitalist system the currency is an end and not a means, and its absolute value subordinates everything, including man.’\(^5\) Dr Arturo Sampay, drafter of the 1949 Peronist constitution, an internationally acclaimed legal and constitutional scholar, succinctly explained after Peron’s ouster:

The modern way with which a country develops the economy, is no longer with outright annexation of territory, as was the method during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but handling your own credit and currency. Indeed, the development of a country is through its investment policy. Whoever gives the orders on credit and the expansion or contraction of the money supply, controls the development of the country.\(^6\)

Peron’s economic adviser Arturo Jauretche gave a detailed account on the importance of state credit, including its relation to national sovereignty, stating that bank nationalisation is ‘fundamental to the implementation of a national policy’.\(^7\)

Whoever handles credit controls more than the issue of currency. By controlling credit trade export and import is also controlled. The control of credit can encourage certain forms of production and weaken others; determine what is to be produced and what not, what can and what cannot get to market facilities, and consequently sales and consumption is also controlled.\(^7\)

Jauretche explained with exactitude the organic character of credit as but a means of exchange, a convenient method of barter of goods and services:

The secret of prosperity or decline, development or backwardness, is held in banks. Laws and business organisations are just the anatomy of economic society. But money is the physiology of a society’s commerce. Money is the blood circulating within it, and the price of money, its abundance or scarcity, is determined by the banking system.\(^8\)

However, credit and currency have become in themselves commodities, bought and sold at profit (usury). Without understanding this premise, all else is folly in terms of politics, economics and even the arts and morality. The question is one of subordinating the role of money; quite literally dethroning the worship of Mammon.

\(^3\) Bolton, ibid., pp. 84-86.
\(^4\) Bolton, ibid., pp. 103-117.
\(^5\) Juan Peron, ‘Banking and Credit’, Buenos Aires, ca. 1951.
\(^8\) Jauretche, ibid.
Jauretche also explained how banks create credit when he stated, ‘Banks create money through credit, because credit is converted from deposits at a multiplicity of times, and the abundance or shortage of hard cash in circulation is a reflection of the number of times a bank multiplies its lending’. This is called ‘fractional reserve banking’ and has been the method of credit creation for centuries, allowing private banks to create credit that is only backed by a fraction of the amount of actual reserves the banks have on hand. Every time a deposit is made by a bank’s customer, the bank is able to create and lend out credit at many more times than the amount deposited. The bank then charges interest (usury) on that credit. Therefore the borrower must pay back in real wealth – created with his own labour – not only the principal of the loan that has been created out of thin air by a mere ledger (or computer) entry, but also added interest. This is how the entire international banking system runs. When a nation becomes so indebted that it cannot even keep up interest payments on loans, it must either take out further loans to pay off the interest on previous loans, or it must start selling off state assets and resources, in a process that is often claled ‘privatisation,’ and adopt ‘austerity measures,’ which cause social dislocation, economic stagnation, and can be a means by which international finance brings down inconvenient governments through well-planed and funded ‘spontaneous revoluiions’. We have seen this taking place for several decades all over the Western world, and since the implosion of the Soviet bloc, in the former Soviet states. The outcome is ‘globalisation’ and the increasing concentration of wealth by oligarchs and plutocrats. Those states that resist the process are often bombed into submission, and their statesmen demonised, jailed or lynched in the name of ‘democracy’ and ‘human rights’.

Professor Carroll Quigley, likewise explained the mechanism of credit creation and its historical development:

It early became clear that gold need be held on hand only to a fraction of the certificates likely to be presented for payment… In effect the creation of paper claims greater than the reserves available means that bankers were creating money out of nothing. The same thing could be done in another way. Deposit bankers discovered that orders and cheques drawn against deposits by depositors and given to a third person were often not cashed by the latter but were deposited in their own accounts. Accordingly it was necessary for the bankers to keep on hand in actual money no more than a fraction of deposits likely to be drawn upon and cashed, the rest could be used for loans, and if these loans were made by creating a deposit (account) for the borrower, who in turn would draw cheques upon it rather than withdraw money, such ‘created deposits’ or loans could also be covered adequately by retaining reserves to only a fraction of their value. Such created deposits were also a creation of money out of nothing… William Patterson however, on obtaining the Charter of the Bank of England in 1694, said: ‘the bank hath benefit of interest on all moneys which it creates out of nothing’.¹

Peron relates that in 1946 a delegation from the International Monetary Fund were prompt in visiting him when he assumed Office. His rejection of Argentina’s membership of the IMF was also prompt. He stated among the reasons:

For us, the value of our currency was fixed in the country, and we were setting changes according to our needs and conveniences. For international exchange we resorted to barter: our real currency was our goods. The permanent reality of international monetary manoeuvring of all types on which the insidious system was created, gave us no recourse but to do so or be robbed with inanity.²

MAMMON VERSUS CULTURE

Ezra Pound, and the New Zealand poet Rex Fairburn, both became interested in Social Credit at around the same time and for the same reasons. Like Peron, Sampay and Jauretche in their rebellion against plutocracy after World War II, the two poets realised that the question of man’s higher development, that is to say, his culture, is impacted by materialism, signified by the rule of money. Oswald Spengler had pointed out in the aftermath of World War I that Western Civilisation had been in decline for centuries, and that the war had brought matters to crisis point. He saw plutocracy ruling behind liberal-democracy. Looking at the analogous cycles of prior Civilisations, Spengler stated that money rules during the epochs of decay, prior to a reaction that overthrows plutocracy. This overthrow of money was called ‘Socialism’.

² Juan Peron, ‘Argentina and the International Monetary Fund’. Cited in Bolton, Peron and Peronism. The manner by which the USA undermined Argentina’s economy and blocked Argentine exports to European markets is explained in this writer’s book, Peron and Peronism.

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Financial Sovereignty as the Prerequisite for Political Sovereignty

Kerry Bolton

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by Spengler, a conservative, while all money-thinking was regarded by him as capitalistic, and this included most forms of 'socialism', including communism, which aim not to transmit money-thinking but to expropriate it. In this manner we might understand why the poets Pound and Fairburn sought a third way which would overthrow money-rule and return to a culture-state. Pound turned to 'Fascism' because he thought such militancy was required to overthrow plutocracy. Fairburn regarded Social Credit as sufficient. In Britain Social Credit did take on a militant form with the Green Shirts, whose paramilitary formations, rallies, marches and throwing green painted bricks through bank windows, sought a place beyond the Communist Party and Mosley's Black Shirts.

The Role of Money in Cultural Decay

However, before Spengler, there was Brooks Adams’ Law of Civilisation and Decay, now little known, which Ezra Pound recommended as essential to understanding the causes of cultural decline and fall. Adams can be read profitably with Spengler. Adams outlines the enervating force of money on the aesthetics and morality of a Civilisation. Adams held that 'commerce is antagonistic to the imagination.' Where a state is commercially based, as are most states in the world today, aesthetics stagnates. Hence the great Gothic era that epitomises the flowering of Western Civilisation (what Spengler called the 'Spring' epoch) did not flourish in the commercial city-states Venice, Genoa, Pisa, or Florence, 'nor did any pure school of architecture thrive in the mercantile atmosphere.' \(^1\) The enervating effects caused by energy expended on mercantile pursuits is explained in terms that fit well with Spengler’s conclusions about the role of money-thinking at the end-cycle of a Civilization, Adams writing:

Whenever a race is so richly endowed with the energetic material that it does not expend all its energy in the daily struggle for life, the surplus may be stored in the shape of wealth; and this Stock of Stored energy may be transferred from community to community, either by conquest, or by superiority in economic competition. However large may be the store of energy accumulated by conquest, a race must, sooner or later, reach the limit of its martial energy, when it must enter on the phase of economic competition. But, as the economic organism radically differs from the emotional and martial, the effect of economic competition has been, perhaps invariably, to dissipate the energy amassed by war.

When surplus energy has accumulated in such bulk as to preponderate over productive energy, it becomes the controlling social force. Henceforward, capital is autocratic, and energy vents itself through those organisms best fitted to give expression to the power of capital. In this last stage of consolidation, the economic, and, perhaps, the scientific intellect is propagated, while the imagination fades, and the emotional, the martial, and the artistic types of manhood decay. When a social velocity has been attained at which the waste of energetic material is so great that the martial and imaginative stocks fail to reproduce themselves, intensifying competition appears to generate two extreme economic types, — the usurer in his most formidable aspect, and the peasant whose nervous system is best adapted to thrive on scanty nutriment. At length a point must be reached when pressure can go no further, and then, perhaps, one of two results may follow: A stationary period may supervene, which may last until ended by war, by exhaustion, or by both combined, as seems to have been the case with the Eastern Empire; or, as in the Western, disintegration may set in, the civilized population may perish, and a reversion may take place to a primitive form of organism.

The evidence, however, seems to point to the conclusion that, when a highly centralized society disintegrates, under the pressure of economic competition, it is because the energy of the race has been exhausted. Consequently, the survivors of such a community lack the power necessary for renewed concentration, and must probably remain inert until supplied with fresh energetic material by the infusion of barbarian blood. \(^2\)

Where a people fails to be reinvigorated with ‘barbarian blood’, and remains stagnant, they are what Spengler referred to as Fellaheen, no longer within the scope of history, inert from century to century, the peasantry and the urban mass dwelling within the shadows of ruins of once great monuments. Hence, as Ezra Pound and Fairburn realised from the aesthete’s outlook there is more to the economic question than economics or politics alone. T S Eliot also espoused economic reform, as did Hilaire Belloc and G K Chesterton, while other aesthetes, such as W B Yeats and D H Lawrence, who rebelled against the crassness of the times, did so without apprehending the

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\(^2\) Brooks Adams, x.
economic factors involved. Fairburn and Pound knew exactly what processes were at work in eating away at the cultural organism.

Pound’s ‘With Usura’ (Canto XLV) reflects lucidly the manner by which the primacy of money, as shown by Spengler and Adams, intervenes in the culture of a society, acting as a contagion on the social organism, on work, craft, art, religion, and all else associated with a High Culture:

With usura no picture is made to endure nor to live with but it is made to sell and to sell quickly…

Stone cutter is kept from his stone Weaver is kept from his loom…

**WITH USURA**

Wool comes not to market Sheep bring not gain with usura…

Usura rusteth the chisel It rusteth the craft and the craftsman…

Pound stated succinctly in a three-sentence section on Kulturmorphologie in a pamphlet written in Rome in 1942: ‘To repeat: an expert, looking at a painting (by Memmi Goya, or any other) should be able to determine the degree of the tolerance of usury in the society in which it was painted’.

Fairburn wrote a poem on themes very similar to those of Pound’s ‘With Usura’, but entirely independently, in his ‘Dominion’:

The house of the governors, guarded by eunuchs, and over the arch of the gate these words engraved: HE WHO IMPUGNS THE USURERS IMPERILS THE STATE

Within the gates the retinue of evil, the instruments of the governors: scabs picked from the body of the enslaved well-paid captains and corporals in the army of privilege taking the bread of tyranny, wearing the livery of extortion; and those who keep the records of decay, statisticians and archivists, turning the leaves with cold hands, computing our ruin on scented cuffs. For the enslaved, the treadmill; the office and adoration of the grindstone god; the apotheosis of the means, the defiling of the end; the debasement of the host of the living; the celebration of the black mass that casts the shadow of a red mass.

This is our paper city, built on the rock of debt, held fast against all winds by the paperweight of debt. The crowds file slowly past, or stop and stare, and here and there, dull-eyed, the idle stand in clusters in the mouths of gramophone shops in a blare of music that fills the crumpled air with paper flowers and artificial scents and painless passion in a heaven of fancied love.

**THE CHALLENGE OF THE TIMES: END MAMMON**

With the USA whose very foundation starts with Puritanism, an edifice was built that combined messianism with the concept of profit as Godly. America’s culture was distorted as a consequence, and today stands at the depths of depravity, as a world contagion heralded as such by neocon zealots such as Lt. Colonel Ralph Peters and promoted by the US State Department in alliance with a myriad of NGO’s across the world. The entire world is supposed to be recreated in that image, on the ‘rock of debt and artificial scents’, as Fairburn put it.

Mr E Fyodorov, of the ‘Our Sovereignty’ Russian parliamentary group, and the National Liberation Movement, has alluded to the necessity of nationalising the Central Bank of Russia, which he states does not report to the president or the state. He states that ‘most of the problems’ of Russia are related to the Central Bank, based on a constitution that was drafted by US advisers, allowing external political and economic influence. Fyodorov has expressed rare insight in stating that ‘most problems; center around the banking system. This applies not only to Russia, but also to much of the world, as the same system operates globally. New Zealand’s central state bank went down the same path of being detached from parliament. Therefore, more than ‘nationalisation’ is required. New Zealand’s Reserve Bank has remained nationalised for eighty years. It was only detached from parliament under the Reserve Bank Act in 1989. Until that time it existed to implement state economic policy. However, as John A Lee lamented from the start, this nationalised bank never did break New Zealand free from international finance, despite the issue of state credit for

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some public projects. The intentions were compromised by the party that nationalised the bank.

Until such time a state has leaders of stamina who will break the bondage of international finance, and its pervasive tentacles, it makes little or no difference whether a bank is nationalised or privatised. Until such time also, any talk of real national sovereignty is nothing other than rhetoric. Once the Russian central bank is nationalised, the next task is to ensure that the Russian state assumes the prerogative and the duty to create and issue its own credit.
PESHAWAR ATTACK – THE EMPIRE STRIKES AGAIN

Shelley Kasli
G Raja Sekhar

On December 16, 2014 seven gunmen affiliated with Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) assaulted the Army Public School in Pakistani city of Peshawar. The gunmen entered the school and opened fire on school staff and children. The attack claimed 141 lives, including 132 school children between eight and 18 years of age, with the remaining nine fatalities being staff members of the school. An eight-hour rescue operation was launched by the Special Service Groups (SSG), who killed all seven militants and rescued 960 people. Chief military spokesman Major General Asim Bajwa said in a press conference that at least 130 people had been injured in the attack.

This was the deadliest terrorist attack ever to occur in Pakistan, surpassing the 2007 Karachi bombing. According to various news agencies and commentators, the nature and preparation of the attack by the militants was very similar to that of the Beslan School crises that occurred in the North Ossetia–Alania region of Russia in 2004.

On May 5 2014, an American FBI agent named Joel Cox was arrested in the Pakistani megacity of Karachi. The charge? Attempting to board a flight to Islamabad with ammunition and knives in his carry-on baggage. The Pakistani media immediately drew comparisons between Cox’s case and that of Raymond Davis — the CIA spy jailed in 2011 after gunning down two Pakistanis in Lahore.

However, Cox’s legal travails, unlike those of Davis, didn’t last long. He was granted bail on May 8, and his case was dismissed on May 19. Cox’s lawyer contended that his client was in Karachi on a “special mission” that allowed him to carry weapons — and a judge concurred.

SO WHAT EXACTLY WAS THIS “SPECIAL MISSION”? 

A few years earlier In 2009 it was reported by The Nation that agents of notorious spy agencies were using journalistic cover to engage themselves in intelligence activities in NWFP and FATA. To the surprise and shock of many, top bosses of Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) Secretariat were allegedly feeding these journalists with secret reports and information regarding Pak Army and militant groups operating there. Matthew Rosenberg, South Asian correspondent of Wall Street Journal, had been spotted travelling frequently between Washington, Islamabad, Peshawar and New Delhi. His frequent and secret meetings with Secretary Law and Order FATA Secretariat, Capt (Retd) Tariq Hayat Khan, and Additional Chief Secretary FATA, Habib Khan, have raised several questions.

According to an official of law enforcement agency, who requested anonymity, Matthew was working as chief operative of CIA and Blackwater in Peshawar. The law enforcement agencies, he said, had also traced Matthews links with Israeli Intelligence agency Mosad as well. Matthew has also tried to hire some indi-
individuals from Peshawar, Dera Ismail Khan and Mianwali, and on refusal threatened some of them of dire consequences. When contacted, Additional Chief Secretary FATA Habib Khan confirmed that he held meeting with Mathew in his office. Habib said Mathew was interested in getting details of militants, tribes and strategy of Pak Army operation against militants. I refused to share details with him, Habib said. According to former NSA analyst and US navy Intelligence Officer Wayne Madsen, The CIA has deployed at least two operatives posing as journalists in several world hotspots after 9/11. These two operatives, both US Special Forces veterans, were subcontracted to the CIA by private mercenary company Blackwater.

Going back a couple years more in 2007 Pakistani Intelligence traced the source of much of terror in Pakistan to a ‘terrorist’ camp in Helmand province in Afghanistan. The camp was run by Michael Semple and Mervyn Patterson. Both of these were British spies ostensibly working with humanitarian organizations.

It was revealed by Intelligence sources in Kabul that Britain planned to build a Taliban training camp for 2,000 fighters in southern Afghanistan, as part of a top-secret deal to make them swap sides. The plans were discovered on a memory stick seized by Afghan secret police in December 2007. The computer memory stick at the centre of the row was impounded by officers from Afghanistan’s KGB-trained National Directorate of Security after they moved against a party of international diplomats who were visiting Helmand. The computer stick contained a three-stage plan, called the European Union Peace Building Programme. The third stage covered military training.

Afghan government officials insisted it was bankrolled by the British. UK diplomats, the UN, Western officials and senior Afghan officials have all confirmed the outline of the plan, which they agree is entirely British-led, but all refused to talk about it on the record.

The memory stick revealed that $125,000 had been spent on preparing the camp and a further $200,000 was earmarked to run it in 2008, an Afghan official said. The figures sparked allegations that British agents were paying the Taliban.

Mr. Patterson, a Briton, was the third-ranking UN diplomat when he was held. Mr. Semple, an Irishman, was the acting head of the EU mission. Officially, the British embassy remains tight-lipped, fuelling speculation that the plan may have been part of a wider clandestine operation.

Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) alternatively referred to as the Pakistani Taliban, is an umbrella organization of various Islamist militant groups based in the northwestern Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) along the Afghan border in Pakistan. For the uninitiated, it is important to realize that there exists a distinction between the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban.

**DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE TWO TALIBANS**

The Afghan Taliban, along with many other Afghans, were the ones engaged in a war against the occupying U.S. and NATO troops, with the objective of driving them away so they can gain control of their land. In other words, these Afghans are ready to fight any foreign troops, be they American, British, Canadian, German or even Indian (whom the interested players want to replace the withdrawing US troops with). But they have no intention of doing harm to others who have not lent troops to the occupying forces. At the same time, the Afghan Taliban would accept help from anyone, including the Pakistani Taliban, or any jihadi group functioning along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.
The Pakistani Taliban, however, are presently involved in breaking up Pakistan on behalf the geostrategic interests of the British colonists. This outfit, besides having a large number of tribes representing Pakistan's virtually ungoverned Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Northern Areas bordering Afghanistan and the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir, is guided by the British MI6. The Pakistani tribal groups, who have never formally accepted Islamabad's authority, see, in the present situation, an opportunity to carve out a separate nation bordering Afghanistan in the West and River Indus in the East. This objective, however farfetched it may have seemed years ago, is now a distinct possibility, not only because MI6 have chalked out a design for achieving it, but also because of Washington's reckless approach to taming the Taliban and al-Qaeda at any cost, including undermining of Pakistan's sovereignty.

The increasing disintegration of Pakistan's political establishment has added to the threat. The ISI has been deeply infiltrated by MI6, and the Pakistani Army does not have the will to engage in a bloody civil war to prevent yet another break-up, nor does Pakistan's weak political elite have a clue as to how to integrate the increasingly militant tribal areas with Pakistan.

The only way to comprehend what is happening is to first take a step back and understand the momentous events that shaped the region and look at the key geostrategic puppet-masters that helped shape it.

**The Graveyard of Empires**

For nearly a century the two most powerful nations on earth, Victorian Britain and Tsarist Russia, fought a secret war in the lonely passes and deserts of Central Asia for supremacy over the access routes leading up to India – to eventually possess the Jewel in the Crown for themselves. Those engaged in this shadowy struggle called it 'The Great Game', a phrase immortalized by Kipling. When play first began the two rival empires lay nearly 2,000 miles apart. By the end, some Russian outposts were within 20 miles of India. Disguised as holy men or native horse-traders, they mapped secret passes, gathered intelligence and sought the allegiance of powerful khans. Some never returned. The violent repercussions of the Great Game are still convulsing Central Asia today.

With the sudden and dramatic collapse of Communism in 1991, and the breaking up of the Soviet Empire, there sprang up almost overnight five entirely new countries – eight if you include the Caucasus region. At first, even those with long experience of Central Asia had difficulty in familiarizing themselves with this new geographical and political jigsaw puzzle – not to mention getting their tongues around such romanizations as Kyrgyzstan.

At the time the entire region was just called Soviet Central Asia. A single visa, if you could get one, took you from Baku to Bokhara, from Tbilisi to Tashkent, with Moscow and Leningrad thrown in.

Following Moscow's abrupt exit, Western embassies began to open up in brand-new capital cities, Soviet names were expunged from the map, and history books hastily rewritten, while foreign companies stepped in eagerly to fill the commercial and economic vacuum. For it was no secret that in Central Asia lay some of the last great prizes of the twentieth century. These included fabulous oil and gas reserves, together with rich hoards of gold, silver, copper, zinc, lead and iron ore, not to mention crucial oil-pipeline routes. So fierce was the competition that political analysts and headline writers in the West quickly began to speak of a 'New Great Game', as rival foreign and multinational companies fought for influence there. Some too had strategic and political agendas.

But the sudden lurch from Communism to free-for-all Capitalism has not been achieved without a heavy toll. Small but vicious conflicts – in Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, not to mention in neighbouring parts of southern Russia, such as Chechnya and North Ossetia – have since convulsed this highly volatile region as rival factions jockeyed for power.

Elsewhere on the old Great Game battlefield in Afghanistan, so long at the epicenter of the century-long Anglo-Russian confrontation, bloodshed seems almost endemic. In 1979, the Russians moved in 100,000 troops to support their puppet government. But after a barbaric ten-year conflict, they were humiliatingly forced to withdraw. They left behind them their former puppet President, General Mohammed Najibullah, who four years later fell into the hands of the triumphant Taliban when Kabul surrendered to them. Dragged from the UN compound where he had been given sanctuary, he was brutally beaten, castrated, then strung up publicly. Gruesome photographs of him hanging there were splashed on the front pages of the world's newspapers.

Next to follow the Russians into Afghanistan, in 2001, were US, British, Canadian, Dutch and other NATO troops.
This sprang from fears that further 9/11-type attacks on Western targets might be planned from secret al-Qaeda bases there. As well as destroying these, the NATO-led force was tasked with maintaining an uneasy peace, preparing the way for elections, eliminating the drug barons and helping with reconstruction.

Besides the Americans and Russians, other regional powers, notably China, India and Pakistan, are looking on with intense self-interest and concern. For after the crushing defeat of Victorian Britain and the collapse of Russian rule and now the humiliating exit of NATO troops from Central Asia has tossed the area back into the melting pot of history. Now the same geopolitical players, in order to keep their supremacy in the region; want India to maintain a proxy presence in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of US troops.

Should India maintain a military presence in Afghanistan for so called ‘maintaining peace and reconstruction’?

Afghanistan – one of the most isolated barren landscapes on earth. It’s difficult to believe that any Empire would want to invade it; and yet it’s become the unlikely target and obsession of some of the world’s greatest empires and superpowers. In 1839 up the city walls above Kabul marched red coated veterans of Waterloo (First Anglo Afghan War), in 1879 highlanders charged to the sound of the bagpipes (Second Anglo Afghan War), in 1979 Russian Special Forces swooped over the same hills in their helicopters (Soviet Afghan War) and in 2001 an American led coalition invaded Afghanistan. Each of these invasions has ended in tragedy and humiliation and each has sparked a fierce Afghan resistance.

Ask anyone who know anything about the history of Afghanistan and they will tell you – the Afghans have never ever liked to be conquered. It’s really easy to get into Afghanistan; it’s just the getting out part that is very difficult. Don’t go into Afghanistan and get whatever you do involved in a Tribal War. It’s not without reason Afghanistan is called the Graveyard of Empires.

BUILDUP TO THE CURRENT CRISIS

During the Cold War when the Soviets bumbled into Afghanistan with thousands of troops and tanks, ISI and MI6, along with the CIA, joined forces in the early 1980s to recruit mujahideen to fight the Red Army. MI6 turned over to the ISI some of their assets in the London-based organization known as alMuhajiroun, or The Emigrants. This became the recruiting arm of al-Qaeda in London. Coincidentally, in 1983, the British-based World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), headed by Prince Philip, which often provides the staging grounds for operations of MI6 and other British Intelligence outfits, suggested that two national parks be created in Pakistan’s Northwest, and although rather thin in natural wildlife, the preserves have proved to be excellent for growing poppy, and for training and staging mujahideen incursions into Afghanistan.

But, in the post-Cold War days, and particularly after 9/11, Washington moved closer to India, which went from being a “Soviet puppet,” as it was labeled by some American analysts, into becoming a U.S. ally. Following 9/11, Washington made it a point to seek India’s help in fighting the so called war on terror it helped create in the first place.

There exists a policy agreement between the ISI and MI6. Following the withdrawal of the defeated Soviet Army in 1989, the ISI moved in to arm and train the Taliban. The intelligence agency also brought in alQaeda, and was in the process of developing what is called “strategic depth,” which, it argued, was necessary to protect the country from its enemies.

After 9/11, the scene changed rapidly. The Bush Administration identified Afghanistan, which was under Taliban rule, as the staging ground of al-Qaeda, and invaded the country with the intent of eliminating both the Taliban and al-Qaeda, in one fell swoop. Neither the ISI, and by extension, a section of the Pakistani Army, nor the British colonial operatives, wanted these assets, set up over years with the intent of controlling Central Asia, and undermining Russia, China, and India, to be sacrificed. Pakistan’s ungoverned FATA immediately became the shelter of many who were facing Washington’s wrath. In December 2001, Asia Times reported that the former ISI chief and a close collaborator of the MI6, “Hamid Gul, nicknamed the ‘Godfather of the Taliban,’ is believed to be behind moves to help the Taliban establish a base in Pakistan’s autonomous Pushtun tribal belt.”

The added irony, is that Washington’s foolhardy approach involves two of its “best allies”—Britain and Pakistan—who had built up these assets, and were keen to protect them from Washington’s missiles and rockets. The outcome of Washington’s policy is now plain for everyone to see: Having routed the Taliban, and driven them from power within weeks following the invasion, almost more than a decade later, Washington now stands humiliatingly defeated and packing its bags planning for the
exit. The credit for this, of course, goes to MI6. Who has now come to realize that not only can the assets be protected, they can be “officially” lodged in a country carved out of Pakistan. None of these developments happened overnight, but are the results of a carefully drafted strategy that laid the seeds to preempt any counter attack from their century old arch enemy.

**British Geostrategy for the Subcontinent**

The British policy toward South Asia, and the Middle East as well, is uniformly colonial, and vastly different from that of the United States. Even today, when Washington is powered by people with tunnel vision, at best, the U.S. policy is not to break up nations, but to control the regime, or, as has become more prevalent in recent years, under the influence of the arrogant neocons, to force regime change. While this often creates a messy situation—for example, in Iraq, Libya, Syria—the U.S. would prefer to avoid such outcomes.

Britain, on the other hand, built its geostrategic vision in the post-colonial days through the creation of a mess, and furthering the mess, to break up a country; exactly on the same lines India was partitioned in 1947. This policy results in a long-drawn process of violent disintegration. That is the process now in display in Pakistan, as well as in many other nations where the British colonial forces had hunted before, and still pull significant strings.

When the British left the Indian subcontinent in 1947, it was divided into India and Pakistan. The British colonial geostrategists, coming out of World War II, realized the importance of controlling the oil and gas fields. If possession could not be maintained, the strategists argued, Britain and its allies must remain at a striking distance, to ensure their control of these raw material reserves, and deny them to others.

Here is where the strategic importance of than British India (India & Pakistan) comes into play which the historians and political analysts have forgotten.

**Strategic Importance of India & Pakistan**

Germany surrendered on 5th May 1945. The same day, Prime Minister Winston Churchill ordered an appraisal of the ‘long-term policy required to safeguard the strategic interests of the British Empire in India and the Indian Ocean’ by the Post-Hostilities Planning Staff of the War Cabinet. And, on 19th May, this top-secret appraisal report was placed before him. The central point of this report was that Britain must retain its military connection with the subcontinent so as to ward off the Soviet Union’s threat to the area.

The report cited four reasons for the strategic importance of India to Britain:

1. Its value as a base from which forces located there could be suitably placed for deployment both within the Indian Ocean area and in the Middle East and the Far East.
2. A transit point for air and sea communications.
3. A large reserve of manpower of good fighting quality.
4. From the northwest of which British air power could threaten Soviet military installations.

In each and every subsequent appreciation of the British chiefs of staff from then on till India’s independence that is available for examination, the emphasis was on the need to retain the British military connection with the subcontinent, irrespective of the political and constitutional changes there. Equally, they stressed the special importance of the northwest of India in this context. (Top-secret document, PHP (45) 15 (0) final, 19 May 1945, L/W/S/1/983988 (Oriental and Indian Collection, British Library, London).

It may be noted that the idea of partitioning India in some form, to safeguard British strategic interests, had started to circulate in Whitehall in Churchill’s time. Defense and Security considerations were therefore uppermost in the minds of British leaders as they considered withdrawal from India. However, sufficient attention has not been paid to this vital factor by historians and political analysts, perhaps because security matters were not debated publicly in Britain.

Another reason for not totally evacuating from India, they noted, was that ‘air fields in northwest India are except for those in Iraq, the nearest we have to certain important Russian industrial areas in Ural and western Siberia. They referred to the development of guided missiles that further augmented the menace of the Soviet Air Force operating from Central Asian plateau. They also mentioned the importance of India as an essential air link to the Far East as, at that point of time, ‘few existing types of aircraft had sufficient range for long hops’.

Peshawar Attack – The Empire Strikes Again

Shelley Kasli, G Raja Sekhar
At the end of British rule, Pakistan consisted of East Pakistan and West Pakistan. West Pakistan’s western wing (west of River Indus) bordering Afghanistan and Iran, consisted of Baluchistan, the North West Frontier Province (NWFＰ) and the Tribal areas. North of all these, was the state of Jammu and Kashmir, which was a princely state under the Maharaja of Kashmir. Of the three areas, Baluchistan and the Tribal areas had not been brought under the British occupation and were kept instead as British protectorates. This was because the Tribals were ferocious, and made it clear they would not accept British troops within their territories. Moreover, the British crown figured that these areas would act as a buffer with Afghanistan, where the British were worried the Russians would show up.

It is evident that Britain did not want India to have any direct land link either to Afghanistan, or Russia, or Iran. In the North, when the dispute over the status of the state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) arose, India’s access to the North was blocked as well. The Kashmir dispute, the handiwork of London, showed what the British were looking for. Using a large number of Mirpuris (Mirpur is a part of J&K) who had migrated to Britain soon after the partition of the subcontinent, the MI6 built up a very strong anti-India lobby in J&K and encouraged the demand for an independent Kashmir. At the same time, MI6 lent a hand to the Pakistani ISI, to implement terrorist acts within the India-held part of J&K which would undermine India’s efforts to stabilize the area. The policy has not worked so far, but a royal mess has been made, thanks partly to India and Pakistan’s misguided policies – the constant infighting working in favor of the colonial players.

**Future Implications of the Current Scenario**

The recent attack in Peshawar following the blueprint of the ongoing disintegration of Pakistan is not just a matter of penetration of the military and the intelligence services by forces friendly to the Taliban, but is the direct result of Colonial British Strategy—with the help of U.S.-based co-conspirators—to partition the country into a potpourri of ethnic entities.

The break-up of Pakistan’s westernmost wing is evidently backed by the colonial forces, and their adjuncts; it would establish an unstable state that would depend wholly on Western powers for its survival. That would cut off both India and China, in particular, from land access to the Central Asian oil and gas fields, as well as from Iran. Over a period of time, it would also endanger Russia’s southern flank.

The brutal story of British Empire continues to this day. All around the world, from Sierra Leone to Sri Lanka, the violent legacy of colonialism can still be witnessed.

Many of the present conflicts in the world take place in the former colonial territories that Britain abandoned, exhausted and impoverished, in the years after the Second World War. This disastrous imperial legacy is still highly visible, and it is one of the reasons why the British Empire continues to provoke such harsh debate. If Britain made such a success of its colonies, why are so many in an unholy mess half a century later, major sources of violence and unrest?
WHAT MULTIPOLARITY MEANS TO ME

Adam Lesak

Before I start expressing my ideas, it’s appropriate for you to know something about my background and more about myself so you can get a better understanding me. I was born in Slovakia in the early 1990s and was raised by my mom and dad, who are a doctor and train driver, respectively. I played basketball since I was six years old and I went to a religious high school. After graduating, I attended university and received a degree in International Relations and Diplomacy, before pursuing my masters at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) where I currently study.

There are a few factors that motivated me to take to expressing my views on multipolarity, and they are as follows:

• My personal shock relating to the EU’s foreign policy
• The negative propaganda against the Russian Federation
• The US’ lack of understanding pertaining to the modern world

In preparing for this article, I attempted to find some definitions of multipolarity. Wikipedia explains multipolarity as being a “system of four and more centers of power”, whilst The Free Dictionary describes it as “having or conceiving multiple centers of power or influence” a multipolar world; multipolar approach to foreign policy. Among other definitions that were interesting for me were: “A multipolar system is a system in which power is distributed at least among 3 significant poles concentrating wealth and/or military capabilities and able to block or disrupt major political arrangements threatening their major interests”; “Within a multipolar world, a pole could be defined as an actor which has influence on global outcomes beyond its own borders”; and the last one, which I found to be the most thought-provoking and closest to reality, is that “A pole is an actor capable of producing order or generating disorder”. It all sounds so nice and idealistic, whereby the idea is that more powers create more democracy, which in turn contributes to more control among the centers of power which eventually stabilizes the world. If that is truly so, then why is “the oldest continent” and the cradle of modern democracy and freedom so adamantly against it?

I’ll first begin by discussing the EU, since I’m from there and thus have inside experience as to its workings. The EU presents itself as an advanced supranational union that gives off the front of being open-minded. During the past few years, it opened up a Pandora’s Box by allowing same-sex marriage, ostensibly ‘justified’ by the idea that homosexuals are different but that this must be understood and accepted by everyone. I was shocked when I heard this because it was so astonishingly hypocritical, and I actually felt ashamed that I hold a passport from an EU-member state. If we are forced to ‘understand’ and ‘accept’ homosexuality, why can’t we at least have the option of understanding and accepting other values and approaches to democracy? The EU does not want to accept
Russia as a global player and doesn't want to hear a word about multipolarity, because if it accepted this understanding, then that would be its ultimate defeat. Yes, I agree that the EU brought peace to Europe and unified the continent, but it did not bring anything worthwhile to world politics. In terms of the military sphere, the EU is highly dependent on the US, while its economic dependence is split between Russia and the US. The US recently declared that it would be pivoting to the Pacific, not the Atlantic, thereby showing that the EU has already lost its traditional partner and that not even the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership can reverse this process. Due to the imposition of the anti-Russian sanctions (despite the German public being the loudest voice against these measures), the EU lost its other partner. Basically, by not accepting the realities of 21st-century world politics, the EU has geographically isolated itself. Almost exactly two years ago during my university state exam, I said that the EU stands at a crossroad, where it is forced to choose between following the same old and failed policies or creating new ones and gaining the possibility of becoming a serious regional and global player. Unfortunately, decision makers chose the former path, which has created a doomy scenario where the EU has internally transformed into a modern-day Sodom and Gomorrah while externally becoming a supporter to Mideast terrorists and Eastern European Nazis, all the while remaining clueless about its geopolitical imperatives.

The biggest opponent standing against multipolarity in global politics is the US, the superpower that presents itself as the winner of the Cold War and the nation whose ‘God-given’ obligation is to spread freedom and democracy the world over. I can’t decide whether it is run by geniuses or idiots, and I’ll explain my confusion. Ever since 2001, the US started pursuing the policy of democracy promotion, which actually served as a cover for justifying its military involvement in resource-rich states, starting from Afghanistan and continuing through to Iraq, Libya, and now Ukraine. It could be that US decision makers envision that their country’s power is significantly decreasing and that a new system of world politics is emerging. They would then obviously understand that American unipolarity would have no place in such a framework, hence why they may be trying to create as many allies as possible within the new system before it’s completely constructed. Or, it could just be that the US’ decision makers are absolute fools which simply point at the map and play “Monopoly for politicians”. I think that the truth lies somewhere between both claims. In my opinion, they noticed that fundamental global shifts were occurring but they never gave them much attention and instead opted to continue playing their own game. The situation, however, is still getting worse and worse, and I believe that it has resulted in the status quo that we have today. First, the US’ ‘steam engine’ crashed in Libya before it did so once more in Syria, with the most significant off-the-rails moment occurring in Ukraine. In my opinion, the latter conflict proves that the ‘steam engine’ is now dangerously running at full speed. So what caused the global superpower to become the state that 2/3 of the world has come to hate and mock in only 14 years? First of all, it was the US’ policy of continual interference. Wherever there is a problem or a military conflict, one is certain to find some level of American involvement in either the combat or support spheres (i.e. financing one side or supplying them with weapons and training). Most of the destabilizing parties that the US financed and equipped have now turned into terrorist groups that require global attention. Going back to the topic, another reason that the US has become reviled has to do with its diplomatic staff, at least in terms of those who publicly present themselves. One of the most ridiculous examples is Jen Psaki, one of the State Department’s spokespersons. One of my favorite examples was when she said that “In the event of a Belarusian invasion of Ukraine, the 6th US Fleet will immediately be deployed to the shores of Belarus.” Another masterpiece of America’s diplomatic corps is Samantha Power, the US Ambassador to the UN. I won’t quote her here, but when compared to how the Ambassador of the Russian Federation, Vitaly Churkin, expresses the views of his country and how he reacts and composes his sentences, it can immediately be understood why the US does not have any leading role in the construction of the new, multipolar world order.

Now, a few words about anti-Russian propaganda and why the West feels endangered by the Russian Federation. Russia was not in the best condition after the dissolution of the USSR, and furthermore, the economic crisis in 1998 slowed down its recovery progress. Ever since 2000, however, Russia has made significant steps forward, and not just internally, but also in terms of its foreign policy. It restrained itself from any hasty military involvements abroad and always seemed to ponder the best course of action, intervening in Georgia, for example, only when its national interests were threatened. Moreover, Russia never behaves as though its opinion is the only proper one, always giving time to listen to others’ viewpoints in an attempt to try to understand them.
and enter into negotiations. This approach to foreign policy has secured Russia an exclusive position in the creation of the new system of world politics in the 21st century. In my opinion, the recent anti-Russian sanctions and the situation in Ukraine only boosted this process and strengthened the position of the country. This is why the negative propaganda against it is so popular and climactic nowadays, because the Western powers fear that Russia will one day usurp their position. They also are afraid of the fact that Russian President Vladimir Putin does not have always state what Russia's values are in each and every situation. He doesn't have to make simple gestures that are against nature in order to prove that he accepts other forms of thinking or approaches to various problems. These things are what make Russia the real center of the multipolar world.

So what does multipolarity mean for me? It means that other ideas and perspectives will be accepted. They do not necessarily have to be implemented, but at least other ways of thinking won't be pushed into the corner, censured, and be the source of wars. For me, the centers of power could/should be Russia, China, Brazil, Mexico (in a long-term perspective), South Africa, and a country from the Mideast, perhaps Iran. I don't believe that the US has a moral right to be part of the new world order, and although the EU could play a significant role, it unfortunately chooses not to. For me, multipolarity is a source of opportunities that are able to construct better standards of living. The spread of mutual acceptance and cooperation in a multipolar world, in my view, will lead to more sustainable development as well. Also, decision makers and institutions in this future world order will be stronger than the current US-led ones (IMF, UN Security Council, etc.). So far, Russia is the only country I've lived in among those which I previously listed as possible centers of the multipolar world. Whenever I return from the EU and land in one of Moscow's airports, I always tell myself that I'm finally free! I cannot explain this feeling in words, but it now that it comes from the freedom that I feel here in Russia, which is based on my observations of how Russia acts towards the outside world. It always acts with respect and understanding, even if its counterpart does not reciprocate. My mom always told me to behave in a respectful way with those whom I interact with, and I'm really proud that I can live in a free country that does so, despite what the media's negative propaganda about it may lead one to think. Russia truly respects both itself and other countries, which makes it a strong cornerstone in constructing a modern and effective multipolar world.
BOOK REVIEWS

THE FOURTH POLITICAL THEORY
ALEXANDER DUGIN. ARKTOS MEDIA LTD, 2012. 214 PAGES.

By Dr. Daria Lebedeva

The Fourth Political Theory is a sketch, a cursory outline on an urgent need to analyze socio-political agenda of present-day world; The Fourth Political Theory is also a food for thought, the invitation to approach critically the legitimacy of such political theories as liberalism, communism and fascism; in this vein this is an introduction to what is predestined to be called the fourth political theory (4PT) after abolishing the status quo of the abovementioned theories, so 4PT is a matter of future.

Still, it is needed to mention that Alexander Dugin masterfully draws a clear-cut critique of post-modern reality we are living in. Yet, we are living in transition, in the ambiguous situation in-between (still carrying the burden of side-effects of the old regimes and at a halt peering into the glimpses of bright light on the horizon). Still, we are in a threshold to leap from modernity to post-modernity, from industrial society to post-industrial society, from liberalism to post-liberalism.

Yet, in closer to Communist Manifesto manner 4PT sets its enemy, describes the ongoing cramp and formulates the solutions. If for Marxism the enemy is a proper class reigning, accumulating the capital on the exploitation of the masses, so for 4 PT the enemy is a proper ideology, still matters and reigns. This is exactly liberalism legislatively advanced in the Western countries, crowned the process of globalization, i.e. spreading/imposing the Western-like standards and ideals throughout the globe. Globalization, thus a Westernization in its liberal roots and Americanization in its leading and promoting nation.

1 Henceforth 4PT.
2 In its turn The Fourth Political Theory is a competent detailed excursion into the analyses of social theories/hypotheses/tendencies for readers seeking for theoretical framework.

LIBERALISM AS ENEMY: SAY ME WHO IS YOUR ENEMY AND I WILL SAY WHO YOU ARE

All three examined theories purported the dichotomy of power and weakness, division for “we-and - they”, exalting the unshakably priority of individual (liberalism), class/proletariat (communism), nation/race (fascism). All three do not overcome the pro-racism biases, i.e. setting superiority of class/nation/race above others. Essentially the liberalism as ideology serves the interest of individual, as a socio-political agenda it intends to satisfy the demands of individual: to liberate him/her from the restrictions of any kind (tradition, religion, cultural habits and etc.) and to construct for individual such political formation as democracy, such economic tool as liberal (neo-liberal) capitalism. Fukuyama’s optimistic admiration of triumphant march of liberal ideology in the late 80-90’s of 20th century has ensured him to declare ambiguously (but still hastily) the end of history. In some degree this panegyric praise bestows liberalism with destiny-turn mission to present ideology not free from shortcomings but that is the best for today.

Liberalism - communism – fascism (where the last is devastated at the valuable price of millions of lives): as ideologies are in constant antagonism: where the second and third appeared as direct reaction on the shortcomings of the first, liberalism. The previous theories are debunked, but should not be broken into pieces: the rejected and ignored stones are put in the fundament of new building; the periphery swifts to the centre, “those regions that have been peripheral in classical politics” now need new rethinking. But the point is in what degree and manner to permutate and to redistribute the damaged material as if in kaleidoscope after shaking it the already present- and nowhere vanishing - colored glasses surprisingly show a new and invigorated image.

1 A bit analogous line of argumentation in famous Winston Churchill’s saying: “Many forms of Government have been tried, and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time” (from speech delivered in the House of Commons in 1 November 1947)
2 Compare Churchill’s definition of socialism: “Socialism is the philosophy of failure, the creed of ignorance and the gospel of envy.” (Cit. from Never Give In!: The best of Winston Churchill’s Speeches (2003), Hyperion, p. 446)
3 The apt allegory inspired by Dugin from the New Testament, Mark (12:10): “the stone the builders rejected has become the cornerstone”.
Still, the point is what must be rejected and what must be remained in the new hermeneutic circle from the ideological corpuses of the previous political theories. From fascism theory Dugin casts off all variations of racism and its such direct consequences as hierarchisation based on religious, cultural, economic grounds. The rising of one race is to be substituted with the concept of ethnos, nation, the very concept neglected by the Marxism theory as well. Marxism failed to predict the future, promoted the controversial idea of progress, i.e. a revolutionarily warranted idea of renewed paradise – communism. What must be borrowed is the capacity to use Marxism’s critical arsenal to oppose against something: against oppressing class, against ideology, against economic formation, in a word, against the observing state of affairs, but without the ambitious goal of remaking the world. And at last, liberalism despite its pillars provoking direct critique still offers the idea of freedom, the value and central point for 4PT. Not freedom from and individual freedom, but human freedom in the widest sense. Ontological support for the central idea of freedom is inspired from Heidegger’s concept of Dasein.

Dasein (There - Being) is subject of 4PT, also as a concept it provides a broad ontological ground. Dugin puts readers attention to weakly known fact that Martin Heidegger in the period between 1936 and 1945 constructed new history of philosophy centred around Dasein. The previous theories alienated Dasein, for their racist component the aspect of complete freedom for all doomed to stay as utopia, (freedom coincided with necessity in Marxism and freedom for individual in liberalism are distant and narrow-centred), when Dasein freedom expands and embraces cultural freedom with social freedom. “The freedom of Dasein lies in implementing the opportunity to be authentic: this is, in the realisation of Sein more so than of da … Yet, in order for ‘Being’ to flow into ‘there’ like a fountain, we must place all of this together – place this entire hermeneutic circle into the domain of complete freedom”

GLOBALIZATION AS IMPOSED MOVEMENT: ONE FOR ALL AND ALL FOR ONE

“Globalization is thus nothing more than a globally deployed model of Western European, or, rather, Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism, which is the purest manifestation of racist ideology” Dugin writes. All-spreading globalization (Americanization) in its ambition to penetrate the national borderlines, to delete the unique cultural differences and with Plushkin’s greed to swallow new areas (markets) and to conquer minds (imposing the pro-western ideals to youth) substantially tends to take more and more and such ad finitum and - as Dugin urges - in fact is analogous to monotonic process. Dugin heralds about the dangerousness of such tendency and (referring to Gregory Bateson’s Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity) suggests that non-stoppable process once has been launched without regulations will reach its deadly point (as a steam engine in mechanics once has reached cruising speed -point of no return- and without regulation the intake of fuel it will burst and destroy itself). As such monotonic process of endless accumulation without sound plan is alien to nature, also it is not met in sociological sphere. It merely echoes the optimism and belief in the progress as the translational motion from worse conditions to better ones as one of grand remnants of Enlightenment, that in postmodern reality is no longer pays off.

Globalization starting from one point covers with one tapis the others points making it seen from bird’s - eye homogenous, flat and smooth, in a word, unipolar. The unipolar world in its disproportion: the West and the Rest implies nothing more than a stretched imposed uniformity, a new world order, a new way of life, an American way of life. “America is due to affirm the American model, the American way of life, as a world order obligatory to all….The entire planet must henceforth become a ‘World America,’ ‘World Government’, or ‘World State’” (As if to repeat the characteristical metaphor for immigration and formation of early years of the rise of the USA, so in its decay – as prognosis by Patrick Buchanan1 – now the melting pot is boiling from the nations of the entire globe, not inside, but outside America. Still, alternative is offered: from singularity to plurality: unipolar world-multi-polar world, universalisation-pluralization.

POST-MODERN REALITY-SHOW: MULTIPLYING PREFIXES “POST”

There is an increasing crisis in politics, the situation compelled Dugin to declare: that “politics is disappearing”. Still, as everywhere in the book, the solution is offered after the most pessimistic conclusions: to bring political back to life is in capacity of political post-anthropology Dugin argues. Still,  

1 Ibid., p.148.  
2 Ibid., p.45.  
what is to criticized and to be overcome is the postmodern reality. Yet, post-industrial progress as industrial revolution has been prepared by the rapidly technical advancement, era of the Internet, social media and mass media and unlimited opportunities of the spreading of information. The worker in the factory is not yet replaced by the machine toll as in industrial revolution, but by robots. The human level of communication is sunk to the exchanging of SMS (texting) and supporting icons, posting photos and commenting news on Facebook and Twitter open to register to everyone: from president to schoolboy. Dehumanization of the values of human relations has not in the last degree determined socio-political roles to become upside-down: work and leisure, politician and voters, private and public spheres. Not urging for the revolutionary devastating changes, but for the correction of the given matters Dugin states: “an alternative to political post-anthropology is also postanthropology, but different”. The scope of 4PT is to develop this moment as well.

Aut viam inveniam aut faciam

To stop the rushing process, a monotonic process, to click on the stopcock is to refer to the alternatives as the first hope-inspiring steps towards the solutions of the crisis. Whereas stopping is the first measure, saying “no” to the ongoing situation is the second, and to reverse the course of history to the initial origins – the third, the crucial step. Exactly, the conservative approach is about not accepting the imposed ideological monopoly, as foisted items offered by a pushy commercial agent, the items that in fact are not needed and will gather dust on one’s shelf. The very concept of conservatism by the content overlaps with the concepts of traditionalism (position to reject all forms of modern/post-modern life as entirely bad par excellence), fundamental (religious) conservatism (Islamic and Protestant critique of Westernization), and Eurasianism (an episteme, a form of conservatism, views Western civilization as a local and temporary phenomenon). The last tendency in relation to Russia nationally and ideologically might be a candidate to continue the work of Slavophiles. Multi-polar vision of the world promotes the idea of co-existing of the various and diverse civilizations, their right to be authentic and unchanged. Not all nations in their spirit and turn in mind are ready to answer the post-modern challenge at a price of rethinking or oblivion century-long history of cultural and spiritual traditions, there is a kind of incompatibility to all ideological thesaurus/baggage kindly offered by the commercial agents of Westernization (that perhaps is more than the truth regarding the Russians and the Muslims").

Still, the conclusion is optimistic and challenging: there is a proposed solution for the exit of crisis of postmodern world: turn back the course of history (turn the rivers back) as boomerang to back to the starting point. In fact, it means to transcendent logos, beginning and advanced invention of European philosophy responsible for the rise of logocentric, authoritative, hierarchical order of being and supporting knowledge. The crisis of logos exhausted and discredited itself has been foreseen by Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger. By prolonging this thesis one must state on the wrongness of the path taken by humanity more than 2500 years ago. Albeit, the hopelessness can be erased by a drop of hope: the step back implies the step toward chaos, toward Heidegger’s ‘other beginning’, a new attempt to take new step, this time the right step, and here only external source—chaos— is capable to restore, to modernize, to purify, and to save logos together with humanity. And one more remark— expecting future, the future better then now one whether on personal level of private dreams or on national level of bestowing one particular people with messianic visions and goals has to be deal with this maxim: the future is preparing today as Dugin urges perhaps in the most philosophical chapter of the book. So the argumentation potential of the book applies to the reader from the tomorrow’s perspective, from the alarmed necessity for the alternative voice.

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1. Ibid., p.203.
2. I’ll either find a way or make one (Latin phrase).
3. As Karen Armstrong aptly notices in Islam: “Since the modernizing process has not been the same, it is unlikely that the end product will conform to what the West regards as the desirable form. If the correct ingredients of a cake are not available— if rice is used instead of flour, dried eggs instead of fresh, and spices instead of sugar – the result will be different” implying the discrepancy of the adoption of Western-like standards for Muslim world, spiritual and deeply-rooted in traditions. (Armstrong, K. (2002). Islam. A Modern Library Chronicles Book: New York, p.145)
4. See the 10th chapter called The Ontology of the Future.
GREAT GAMES AND THE ISLAMIC RENAISSANCE
ERIC WALBERG. CLARITY PRESS, 2011. 300 PAGES; CLARITY PRESS, 2013. 260 PAGES.

By Deena Stryker

Canadian journalist Eric Walberg has produced two very impressive works that between them cover most of what is politically relevant today: Post-Modern Imperialism: Geopolitics and The Great Games, the games being those played on the world political chessboard, and From Post-Modernism to Post-Secularism: Re-Emerging Islamic Civilization, both from Clarity Press.

Walberg admits that the internet made his task easier, but without a very thorough grounding in political theory and history, they could not have been written. Walberg who has a degree in economic from Cambridge and has lived in the Middle East, Central Asia and Russia, specializes in the Middle East. His Great Games are labelled GGI (pre-Russian revolution), GGII (the Cold War era) and today’s on-going GG III, which he sees as a US-Israeli campaign for world dominance. Walberg shows globalization’s brutality, and with theory to back him up, lays it squarely at imperialism’s door.

The scope of this work is vast, but I have chosen one quote that is particularly relevant to current events. Since 2008, the European Union, built up painstakingly after two world wars devastated the continent, has been teetering on collapse, and I have often affirmed that it is a deliberate American policy to destroy that elaborate welfare state. Walberg’s confirmation is stunning:

When I looked up Walberg’s books on Amazon, I found a new tool for the manipulation of the 99%. Customer reviews were followed by a section I had never seen before, titled: “What Other Items Do Customers Buy After Viewing This Item?” One was a book by Zbigniew Brzezinski, another was by neocon Robert Kaplan, and a third (out of four) was published by Praeger, a conservative publishing house. What a clever way to steer readers away from progressive books!

As a natural sequel to “Great Games” and with the same post-modern slant, in From Postmodernism to Postsecularism: Reemerging Islamic Civilization Walberg documents both the history of Islam and its main players, by country, period and theme. As in Postmodern Imperialism, the illustrations and maps are exceptional, and the author’s assertions are backed up by extensive references.

It is clear from the start that Walberg sees Islam as not so much better than other religions but better than western civilization’s destructive message, with respect both to humans and their environment. Reviewing Islam’s present and past positions on economics, politics and nature, Walberg notes that while it is presented to contemporary western publics as inherently violent, Islam has never built empires. (Currently, Iran is developing nuclear power for energy and medical use, however in its millennium and a half Islamic history, Persia has never invaded another country, the eight year war with Iraq...
in the 1990s having been started by Iraq, with American help).

The most important—and least known—message of this book is Islam’s emphasis on equality, both between classes and the sexes. While recognizing that women are at a disadvantage in contemporary Muslim society, Walberg cites Western female converts affirming that they like wearing the hijab because it protects them from lascivious male advances. The fact that many emancipated women do convert would be otherwise incomprehensible.

With respect to political equality, Walberg notes: “Charity must be redefined as a right which the poor have on the wealthy, to be regarded as the latter’s duty rather than reflecting their generosity. The intent is to try to overcome the divisions in society, not highlight the differences between haves and have-nots.” (One of the ‘pillars’ of Islam is the obligation to do an act of charity every day, another obligation being to consider the effects one’s actions will have on others.)

A entire chapter is devoted to Muhammad and Marx, but its main thrust, “The Dialectic Between Revelation and Reason” is less persuasive than the parts of the book that deal with Islam’s revolutionary message itself. (Walberg fails to mention that Jean-Paul Sartre confessed to Shariati, the foremost leftist theoretician of the Iranian revolution, that if he believed in God he would be a Muslim. On the other hand, Walberg emphasizes Michel Foucault’s positive attitude toward Islam. After visiting Iran in 1978 the famous French philosopher (who was gay), foresaw that Islam would become a major political force in the world.)

In a chapter on “The Theory of Islamic Renewal”, Walberg introduces us to theoreticians, converts and writers on Islam, presented according to geographic area. Their number will come as a surprise to readers whose awareness of Islam is limited to what is provided by the mainstream media, as part of its focus on the horrors committed by ISIS. (It fails to mention, for example, that beheading is the way approximately sixty criminals are put to death per year in Saudi Arabia, or that ISIS gains the support of populations under its control by implementing the Muslim Brotherhood’s decades-long policy of helping the poor, as does Hamas in the Gaza strip.)

Finally, Walberg spells out the political aspect of the Sunni/Shia divide, which is consistently ignored by most people writing about the West’s problems with Islam. That the Shia have traditionally been the downtrodden is made clear in this work. The Iranian revolution did not come out of nowhere.

Walberg’s monumental work is required reading for anyone seeking to view current events in their broader dimensions. Beyond the current threat of ISIS lie fundamental questions of civilization, which are coming to the fore in the standoff between the United States and Russia. That standoff has two separate facets: the one emphasized by the West is about territory: hungry for Russia’s vast mineral resources, Washington accuses Russia of violating international norms by returning Crimea to its centuries-long status as part of Russia, and of backing Ukrainian separatists, while the US feigns innocence when it engineers a coup d’etat against the democratically elected Ukrainian president with the goal of setting up on Russia’s doorstep, the better to undermine it.

This is what is reported, more or less accurately, in the news. But beyond the political aspect of the standoff lies a cultural chasm, illustrated by Vladimir Putin’s rejection of consumerism and vulgarity, that is shared by the growing anti-globalization movement as well as the Muslim world that comprises a fifth of humanity. Walberg writes: “Traditional Islamic society operated on the principal of social order where sanctions on behavior and promotion of art were intended to strengthen society, not artificially create excitement, tension and turmoil as in the West today.”

Belatedly giving Samuel Huntington his due, I believe that if Washington’s aggressive policies do not end in a nuclear holocaust, the coming world face-off will be cultural: against US-led globalization as the engine that drives what I call vulgarity and wich Putin and many other leaders call decadence: the endless promotion of ‘stuff’ and ‘fun’ that transforms sentient beings into mindless consumers, indifferent to what their governments are doing both to themselves and other human beings across the world. And although I have been an atheist since the age of then, I believe that Islam will play a major role in that ultimate Great Game.
The Dark Corridors of Power

By Stevan Gajić

A book was recently published in Belgrade by Dr Miša Đurković of the Institute of European Studies, entitled The Dark Corridors of Power. Although a serious scientific publication, it is clear and easily readable. That was the idea of the author: to present serious topic in a simple manner and it must be said that he managed that very well.

The book consists of eight chapters, thematically separated in key issues related to the ideological warehouse of the modern world, the elites who are promoting these themes and the ‘humanities’, which are largely in the service of these elites and justify their actions. The chapters are: (1) Conspiriology and Political Theory, (2) (Geo)politics of Homosexuality, (3) Neo-Trotskyism and Infiltration Systems, (4) Destruction and Construction of a Nation: the Case of Montenegro, (5) How Serbia’s Elite was Created out of the Nomenclatura, (6) Violence of Children Against Their Parents: Impact of the Reform of Family Legislation, (7) Obesity as a Political and Theoretical Problem, and (8) Authoritarianism in Contemporary Political Theory and Practice. I will briefly describe what each chapter of the Đurković’s book is devoted to.

The entering chapter, Conspiriology and Political Theory, is dedicated to the status of humanities in the modern (in fact Western, not only in strictly geographical sense) world, as well as in the intellectual provinces of the planet, that mimic the style and standards of the main research centres and universities around the world. The author underlines the seemingly self-evident fact – that not only formal institutions of political life are the centres of power and influence. There have always been, there are, and there will be informal vectors of power, which greatly promote certain political and economic goals.

The author starts with a question: what does political theory and political science in general tell about this? Then he immediately states that most of modern political science does not say anything. Instead, it is engaged in painless topics such as: normative political conceptions, or separated scientific topics which are divorced from the context and realities, therefore they never explain the whole picture. Such sterilised science, dealing with false dilemmas, according to Đurković, is a way to hide real problems and introduce the dictates of political correctness into academia. Due to the fact that normative science largely ignores and does not deal with the proper subjects of its own, according to the author, this place is now occupied by conspirrology. Further, the author examines in detail the results of its research, i.e. explains who are the main carriers of the informal power in the world. Basically, says Đurković, they come from Anglo-Saxon world: these are secret government services, then the so-called deep state, informal groups of influential like-minded people etc., all of which use various informal ways of pursuing their goals. However, the main research question, that the author poses here, is: whether it is possible to separate scientific conspirrology from popular conspiracy theories.

The second chapter, (Geo)politics of Homosexuality, is in my opinion, the most interesting part of the book. The author deals here with a very important topic. This issue is among most important issues in today’s globalized world, in fact the Western world, which creates discourse and standards of civilization’s good manners for the rest of the planet. In a world where political correctness is the main source of (auto)censorship, a particular view of homosexuality, family and gender is being actively propagated, in fact that particular perception, became one of the ‘holy cows’ in the ideology of ‘human rights’ ever since the 1960’s, and Đurković dares to question it. Not only in the sense that he breaks taboos, however even a simple attempt to deal with this particular issue potentially puts the author personally in a difficult position if active citizens start to engage with his heretical book. Nevertheless, in the interests of science, the author came to the subject deliberately risking accusation of being politically incorrect, by the new kind of ‘mind police security officers’, inspectors of a distinctive style, in many ways similar to employees of the Ministry of Truth from George Orwell’s 1984. Đurković opens this part of the book, by saying that the issue of homosexuality is one of those burning political issues in many societies nowadays, including Serbian society, one that he comes from. Because of the gay pride parades and other public events in the new fashion of homosexuality and gender sensitisation, imported and financially supported from abroad, Serbian society enters high political tension whenever the issue is raised. The author provides vivid examples that illustrate how Serbian state has been...
forced to reform legislation in the spirit of ‘anti-discriminatory’ discourse, over a period of past 15 years, which is in fact an instrument of colonial style imposition of a new system of values upon the Serbian society.

In the activity of foreign institutions (such as the ‘Brussels Administration’), as well as the so called ‘civil society’, the author recognises direct pressure of foreign geopolitical factors on the country, and powerful social engineering attempts, aimed to radically change the cultural and moral code of the Serbian people. These changes of the system of values are imposed through a number of institutions, starting with new legislation, school curricula and promotion of homosexual themes in popular culture. This is also done through the externally-sponsored activities of civil society and via general public discourse changes, especially through ‘gay-friendly’ public policy and, above all, privately owned media. Đurković notes that homosexual themes began to emerge in pop culture in Yugoslavia in early 1980-ies and that they existed in Serbia during the 1990-ies, under Slobodan Milošević’s regime. Media that spearheaded promotion of gay culture was a privately owned television station TV Pink. Its owner Željko Mitrović, was a prominent member of the Yugoslav Left (YUL), a political party, that used to exist at the time. Thus, TV Pink actually belonged to YUL, that was lead by none other than Mira Marković, the wife of Serbia’s President Slobodan Milošević.

In the second part of the chapter the author is trying to find actual causes and sources of this social engineering on a global scale. Đurković finds that promotion of homosexual discourse is neatly connected with a network established long time ago. This network of organisations, the so called ‘Round Table’, was established by a famous British imperialist figure Cecil Rhodes. Organisations such as The British Royal Institute of International Affairs, i.e. Chatham House, The Tavistock Institute (which is the creator of powerful discourses and a place where modern experimental psychology was founded), The Bilderberg Group, The Trilateral Commission, etc. The purpose of social engineering carried out by representatives of the world’s elite is changing and reconstructing the world in accordance with their needs. These needs are not only economic and geopolitical in their nature, but they are also value-oriented, according to author. In addition, besides this network of institutions created by the global elite, current officials of global forces are also personally actively involved in promotion of the new discourses. For example, the author reminds us of December 6th 2011 meeting of the UN Committee on Human Rights in Geneva. On that meeting the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said: “It is a violation of human rights when governments declare it illegal to be gay”; Given that the US under the auspices of the fictional principle of ‘humanitarian intervention’ already fought outside of its territory, i.e. it used direct military intervention in foreign countries without the approval of the UN Security Council for the sake of ‘human rights’, Đurković forecasts that we do not need much to wonder if in the future due to human rights violations in the area of sexual minorities’ rights US would invade some country. In the last part of this chapter Đurković chronologically shows, in detail, the appearance of a mechanism promoting gay discourse. He believes that it is introduced in a more or less violent and rapid fashion that aims to achieve a radical moral and institutional change into the fabric of a given society. The author also claims that this process is controlled and enforced from abroad. This is done by agents of foreign influence, which, as the author describes, work with passion almost equal to that of fanatical religious preachers, concentrated on trying to change the moral code and value system of domestic populations, against the interests and wishes of the people themselves.

In the third part of the book Neo-Trotskyism and Infiltration Systems, the author argues that Trotskyism and all its fruits—such as deliberate infiltration (entryism) in all possible structures, even in the ranks of the enemy, or the concept of permanent revolution—are far from being remnants of history. Instead, they are existing mechanisms of influence, and a way to change political reality in today’s world. Although liberalism (as the winner of the Cold War) is trying to show that there is no ideology anymore (Francis Fukuyama’s thesis about the end of history), it turns out that this is not the case. Ideologies do exist very much so, and they are still competing as in the past, however their style and aesthetics have changed. So, in an amazing historical twist, it turns out that Trotskyism—an extreme branch of communist ideology—found its supporters among the extreme American right wingers, among the so-called Neocons, gathered in the circle of George W. Bush. Expectedly, traditional US conservatives accuse neoconservatives of promoting Trotskyite ideology. They perceive the Neocons, as a kind of sect that used the Trotskyist technology of entryism to capture the Republican Party in the United States, placed their people everywhere, thus changing the discourse and transforming the Party's nature. But because of their overwhelming dominance, the neocons do not consider it necessary to refute the allegations against themselves, Đurković argues. He believes that this phenomenon is not limited to the US.

Book Reviews

Stevan Gajić

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Having in mind entryism as one of the two major components of Leon Trotsky’s teaching, one should not be surprised that members of the transnational elite, such as Joschka Fischer, José Manuel Barroso or Javier Solana, use to be Trotskyites when they were young. Đurković skilfully demonstrated the way in which for decades the values and principles of Trotskyism has shaken the world and undermined long-established institutions and principles—such as sovereignty, balance of power in the world, or internal sovereignty of states—in the name of new content such as internationalism, ideology of human rights, economy of the Washington consensus, democracy, Western-type secularism, etc. Besides entryism that maybe never vanished, at the end of the 20th century we have to be particularly interested in the idea of permanent revolution. This is proven by the wave of so called velvet revolutions in Eastern Europe, which began in 1989, and afterwards captured even non-European part of the former Soviet camp, finally entering then the Arab world in the beginning of second decade of the 21st century. All these revolutions are colloquially called the colour revolutions and the phenomenon is associated with the name of theorist Gene Sharp. However, it is necessary to have in mind that this is all just rehashing of Trotsky’s ideas, which impressed Sharpe in his youth. Of course, the author also touched on the history of the promotion of Trotskyite ideas in Yugoslavia/Serbia, with special emphasis on the great 1968 student protest at the University of Belgrade.

The fourth part of the Đurković’s book, Destruction and Construction of a Nation: the Case of Montenegro, details the history of social engineering and artificial creation of new, unnatural nations. The principle of deconstruction of national identity and the creation of new (hybrid) national identities out of the fragments of old nations, is clearly explained stage by stage in this chapter. The author has plastically described and explained this process on the example of artificial construction of ‘Montenegrin nation’ from one part of Montenegro. The paradox in this case is even greater having in mind that Montenegrins are traditionally extremely proud for being Serbs, calling Montenegro ‘Serbian Sparta’. Nevertheless, by a persistent and long-term campaign, supported from abroad, using the cultural, historical, linguistic, and religious fraud this social construction eventually gave certain results. This part of Đurković’s book should be particularly interesting to the Russian reader, bearing in mind that the theme is far from being a new one for the Russians. As we can see in the most recent case (Ukraine), the process of dividing the Russian nation is one of the most painful tendencies for Russian people and state nowadays. As it is widely known, for centuries, attempts (especially from the Vatican in the case of Ukrainians and Byelorussians) were made in order to create some new nations out of Russian ethnicity, ‘proving’ that supposedly these people have no relation to the Russian nation. The same methods were used to create separate nations out of Serbian on the basis of religious affiliation during the 19th, 20th and 21st centuries, in this process a particularly grim role was played by a number of Franciscan friars of the Roman Catholic Church. Today, in the examples of the (neo)Montenegrins and (neo) Ukrainians we can observe that this kind of social design can be quite a postmodern phenomenon. Today, it is on purely regional basis that new unnatural ethnic groups start to function as nations, so we can observe how even the bearers of the same religion, culture and language begin identifying themselves as something else.

The fifth and sixth chapters of Đurković’s book—How was Serbia’s Elite Created out of the Nomenclatura and Violence of Children Against Their Parents: Impact of the Reform of Family Legislation—are focused on Serbian society. In the fifth, the author tried to explain the system of nepotism and family-political-class foundations of transfer of power in different aspects of Serbian society. He illustrated that system with many examples of particular interest for Serbian readers. Post-Soviet residents would have been very familiar and interested in their own mechanisms. Here Đurković, in his style and with other categorical apparatus, deals with phenomena that Alena Ledeneva beautifully explained in her books Russia’s Economy of Favours and How Russia Really Works. The other part of the chapter describes specific biographies of famous people in Serbia and their carriers. However, this part would be more interesting to people who are familiar with the context in Serbia, as well as to Russian experts on Serbia, historians, diplomats and political scientists in the first place.

The sixth chapter phenomenologically describes and explains a variety of detailed examples regarding the growth of violence perpetrated by children against their parents. Most importantly, Đurković has clearly shown how the state promotes and incites this violence in postmodern spirit. Postmodernist legislation changes that took place in many countries (and more recently in Serbia, which is the case study for the author) increasingly involve the state into the realm of the family. The State is increasingly being involved into family life, that was once a private matter. This atmosphere is also helped by the media, most of which are owned by foreign capital in the Serbian case. The media, on the other hand, em-
phases the need for meddling of state and society with family, while at the same time it brands family as a source of almost all forms of pathological behaviour. More and more the news displays extreme examples of pathological phenomena happening within families. In this way a completely new public image of family is being created. The family therefore ceases to be the mainstay and bulwark of human society and humans in the public image, and becomes a source of a variety of pathological phenomena. In other words, these extreme cases are so often displayed in the Media, so that the public starts believing they are not isolated and extreme events after all, but instead a dominant pattern of behaviour in families. This kind of reporting in turn creates an image of, what we would traditionally call a ‘normal family’ as a very bad place to be in, in the first place. Đurković stresses that family life is more and more a topic of regulation in Serbian legislation. In many Western countries, where the example of Sweden stands out, but also in other ‘transitional’ countries, there is a ‘roadmap’ which a country is advised to follow, by imposing more and more pressure on traditional family. Đurković concluded that in this Orwellian atmosphere family can protect itself from social influence and quite direct state violence, personified in family legislation, only by its inner strength.

The seventh part of the book, Obesity as a Political and Theoretical Problem engages with an increasingly prominent phenomenon – a peculiar phenomenon of global epidemic of obesity, especially spreading in the developed world. Studies, Đurković says, showed that the problem began in mid-1980-ies, but from 1990-ies the percentage of obese people is continuously increasing. He made the connection between this phenomenon and the global victory of neo-liberalism. It turns out that the beginning of the epidemic of obesity coincides exactly with the collapse of communism, a system which emphasised physical health of the population, where a strong public health system existed as a basic right. Physical health of the population in communist societies was an important issue, to which it devoted a lot of time. This is obvious if we observe the policy of forming sport clubs, scout associations and mandatory military service in communist societies. Completely free market economy, which has won the global victory at the end of the 20th century, brought to heavy investment of multinational companies (junk-food manufacturers). These companies have the means to advertise unhealthy food, while healthy food increasingly becomes a privilege of the rich, who even began to differ physically from the poor. Đurković claims that such advertisings changed even the cognitive perception of the consumer, who—instead of looking at food as a basic need for survival—begins to look at it as a form of drug, i.e. solely as one of the sources of physical pleasure. At the same time the capitalist system leaves ordinary people with less and less time for leisure, so citizens lack time to prepare food for themselves and they are forced to rely on a large network of multinational fast food companies such as McDonald’s, Burger King, Pizza Hut and the like. On the other hand, even the ideology of feminism, Đurković claims, is supported by such companies, because they have the interests in supporting it. Modern wave of feminism, according to Đurković, reduced the percentage of families with homemade food. The tricky advertising by major food industry directly emphasises that fast food will help women to break away from the chains of kitchen and emancipate. Obesity also coincides with the secularisation of society and removal of religion, as moral norms that have held back personal passions, such as gluttony, are no longer respected. In conclusion Đurković advises societies and states to seriously tackle the problem of obesity, if they want to stop the overall mental and physical decline of their population. His specific proposal is to start with limitation of destructive advertisement of fast food companies that should result in reduction of their negative impact on people and society.

The last part of the book, Authoritarianism in Contemporary Political Theory and Practice, is very interesting and to some extent it is indicative for the future of political theory and practice. In recent years, many countries are moving towards authoritarianism, first of all the US, after the terrorist attack in New York on September 11th 2001. They have adopted the so-called Patriot Act, which virtually eliminated many of the civil rights of the American Republic, such as the Bill of Rights of 1791. However, the author notes that despite a real interest in the practice of authoritarianism, and in this model of government, official political science pretends authoritarianism supposedly doesn’t exit and prefers to ignore the reality, operating as if Fukuyama’s world is still a valid paradigm. In the last chapter—returning to the subject of the first chapter of the book, i.e. inability of official normative science to respond to the needs of the time due to the dogma of political correctness—Đurković indicates that even if science does not dare to explain reality, it could not stop that reality. In describing this phenomenon, he points to a shocking tendency – political scientists are debating the economic aspects of the crisis, while simultaneously almost not touching upon the crisis of the concept of liberal democracy. If pure hedonism—advocated by the creators of the dominant discourse—is a dominant model, and if the European peo-
ples physically die out in the reluctance to continue their families and their nations, Europe is in a state of decadence as well as ancient Rome was, at its final stages. Historical experience suggests that the way out of this situation is beyond the scope of democracy, Đurković adds. This is also consistent with the logic of Aristotle’s natural changes in political regimes, but this model does not suit dogmatic defenders of liberal democracy. While discussing authoritarianism, Đurković recalls its policy framework on the example of Robert Filmer’s 1680 book Patriarcha, or The Natural Power of Kings, which acts with the arguments in favour of authoritarianism, similar to the concept of Russian autocracy. Patriarcha was followed by a well-known polemical answer of one of the fathers of liberalism, John Locke in Two Treatises of Government. Đurković emphasises that throughout much of its history the mankind lived in authoritarianism and that other forms of government are relatively new for us. He reminds that the relationship between authoritarianism and democracy is a more complex one than from what it appears to be in ideal types: for example, the US as the largest liberal democracy has the institution of President, that bares much stronger levers of power than in the case of most European countries. The complexity of this relationship is most noticeable when liberal democracies are under a threat, such as war. In such situations, the institutions of democracy are often temporarily replaced by classical authoritarian models of government. But for how long this ‘state of emergency’ can last it is always questionable, notes Đurković.

Critics might say that Miša Đurković’s book is provocative, it can also be accused of being supportive of authoritarianism and destructive for the postmodern discourse, finally, some may even accuse him of violating political correctness and so on. Nevertheless, this is a book with a political opinion and it is a kind of a book that one can either violently hate or largely agree with. In any case, it is impossible to remain indifferent to it. The Dark Corridors of Power is a kind of revelation to the Serbian public, but it will also, not to a lesser extent, be interesting for a foreign reader. In this book Đurković questions the very essence of power and the very core of the global system in which modern man lives, awakens thought and leaves the readers feeling concerned for themselves, their loved ones and, dare I say it, the whole of humanity. With The Dark Corridors of Power Miša Đurković thematically joined a number of classical authors such as Curzio Malaparte and Carroll Quigley or contemporary Russian writers like Alexander Dugin, Alexander Prokhanov or Andrei Fursov.